NBACC's Scientific Research and Operational Posture During the 2020–2021 COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract

Abstract

Introduction:

The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is a national resource established to understand the scientific basis of the risk posed by biological threats, and to analyze evidentiary material from bioterror or biocrime events. Like many other U.S. research institutions, the emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and rapid development of the COVID-19 pandemic allowed only a few short weeks of preparations before infectious disease controls could be implemented. Due to the nature of its mission, the NBACC must be available on a 24/7 readiness posture to support bioforensic casework from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It also serves to provide the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with key scientific data to assess the hazard from biological agents, especially in this instance to inform the national response to COVID-19. These factors caused the operational tempo to significantly increase.

Methods:

To accomplish our mission during a national emergency, laboratory staffing levels needed to be maintained at prepandemic levels. As a result, the Battelle National Biodefense Institute (BNBI) leadership took significant actions to prevent COVID-19 exposure and transmission within the workforce. These multiple actions included engineering changes to the facility, stockpiling of personal protective equipment and consumable products, educating the staff on the signs and symptoms of COVID-19, reducing the population of the nonlaboratory staff, and the completion of a comprehensive risk assessment to quantify the risk of COVID-19 infection for all NBACC staff.

Conclusion:

These early actions, used in tandem, were successful in maintaining a healthy and stable workforce so that BNBI's research objectives could be met.

Introduction

The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is a national resource established to understand the scientific basis of the risk posed by biological threats, and to analyze evidentiary material from bioterror or biocrime events. The NBACC is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) facility funded jointly by the DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and it is managed and operated by the Battelle National Biodefense Institute, LLC (BNBI). Like many other U.S. research institutions, the emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and rapid development of the COVID-19 pandemic allowed only a few short weeks of preparations before infectious disease controls could be implemented at NBACC.

Due to the nature of its mission, the NBACC must be available on a 24/7 readiness posture to support bioforensic casework from FBI. It also serves to provide DHS with key scientific data to assess the hazard from biological agents, especially in this instance to inform the national response to COVID-19. These factors caused the operational tempo to significantly increase. To accomplish the mission during a national emergency, laboratory staffing levels needed to be maintained at near prepandemic levels, while most other organizations moved to maximize offsite operations. As a result, BNBI leadership took significant actions to prevent COVID-19 exposure, infection, and transmission within the workforce.

These multiple actions, described below, included the following: performing a comprehensive risk assessment to quantify the risk of COVID-19 infection for all NBACC staff, environmental engineering changes to the facility, following current Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)-recommended preventive measures, procurement and stockpiling of personal-protection consumable products, educating the staff on the signs and symptoms of COVID-19, reducing the population of the nonlaboratory staff in the building to the extent possible, establishing a rigorous cleaning and disinfection schedule of common areas, establishing additional medical surveillance, and identifying other mitigation actions to reduce the risk.

In hindsight, these early actions were very successful in maintaining a healthy and stable workforce so that the Federal sponsors' research objectives could be met. Since March 16, 2020, 15 staff tested positive for COVID-19, however, none of these cases was believed to be the result of COVID-19 transmission internal to NBACC facilities. As of this writing, nearly 99% of the staff are fully vaccinated against COVID-19, with a requirement for the entire workforce to be vaccinated by early January 2022.

Risk Assessment and Control Banding

In March 2020, the DHS requested that BNBI prepare a risk assessment for specific staff cohort groups regarding their potential quantifiable exposure to COVID-19 infection and assign a control band with engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment (PPE) recommendations for each cohort. The result of this effort was the publication of the NBACC Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Diseases Occupational Safety and Health Risk Assessment (PEID_OSH). The purpose of this risk assessment was to establish hazard controls for the emerging COVID-19 pandemic, which was caused by the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, by using the DHS Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Diseases Workforce Protection Plan (PEIDWAPP) and Control Band Desk Aid. ^*

Using the DHS PEIDWAPP and Control Band Desk Aid, four different staff cohort groups were placed into Control Band A:

1. 1.

NBACC work population of administrative/office personnel who can telework during a pandemic/

2.

NBACC work population of nonadministrative/nonoffice personnel who can telework during a pandemic.

3.

NBACC Administrative (office) staff who will be required to work at the NBACC during a COVID-19 pandemic.

4.

NBACC Administrative (office) staff who may be called into work at the NBACC during a COVID-19 pandemic.

Control Band A requires no engineering controls or use of PPE. During a pandemic or disease outbreak, persons in occupations with Band A assessment should be counseled to practice basic hygiene as well as sneeze and cough etiquette, frequent handwashing with soap and water or use of an alcohol-based hand sanitizer, social distancing, avoiding direct contact with others (e.g., handshaking), and staying home if ill. As a result, the following controls were implemented for the staff in Band A:

• Administrate Controls: Basic hygiene training, provide sick leave option (if sick, stay home), staff were to monitor body temperature daily, all visitors had temperature monitored before building entry, Laboratory Director provided COVID-19 communications to staff as required, monthly meeting with other Battelle national laboratories regarding COVID-19 status, and operational posture.

• Environmental Controls: Handwashing/alcohol-based hand sanitizer stations.

• PPE: Use of appropriate masks as per CDC recommendations. ¹ Facemasks with exhalation valves or vents were prohibited.

Two other staff cohort groups were evaluated and placed into Control Band B:

1. 1.

   NBACC BSL-2, BSL-3, and BSL-4 staff who may be called into work at the NBACC during a COVID-19 pandemic.

2. 2.

   NBACC Occupational Health Clinic personnel who are more likely to be exposed to SARS-CoV-2 during the performance of their duties during a pandemic.

Control Band B requires no significant engineering controls. During a pandemic or disease outbreak, persons in occupations with Band B assessment should be counseled to use appropriate masks as per CDC recommendations, practice basic hygiene as well as sneeze and cough etiquette, frequent handwashing, social distancing, and staying home if ill. Workplace controls such as EPA-registered disinfectant supplies found on List N ² (for increased cleaning), and alcohol-based hand sanitizer will be considered for this level during a pandemic or disease outbreak. The following controls were implemented for staff in Band B:

• Administrative Controls: Band A plus: early identification and evaluation of symptomatic persons, signage to educate workers, masking symptomatic persons.

• Environmental Controls: Handwashing/alcohol-based hand sanitizer stations, physical barriers (such as plexiglass barriers between those in shared workspaces), increased ventilation of indoor spaces following The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) guidance, ³ surface disinfection of work areas of symptomatic persons.

• PPE: Surgical masks for droplet and contact, gloves for physical examinations, voluntary N100 respirators, or

• PPE: PPE selection is unique to each biosafety level and research task (the PPE is unrelated to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic). At BSL-2, staff working with Risk Group 2 toxins are required to don an N100 filtering respirator for procedures that have the potential to produce aerosols. Upon BSL-3 entry, all staff are required to don a 3M VersaFlo^® powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) with a half face hood (assigned protection factor of 10). At BSL-4, staff are required to don a positively pressured, fully encapsulating supplied air environmental suit.

NBACC personnel who were required to work with live the SARS-CoV-2 virus during their performance duties on research projects, such as for environmental decay studies and aerosol infectivity studies, were not assigned a specific COVID-19 control band but instead relied on specific project risk assessments and approvals to detail engineering and administrative controls and PPE requirements.

Although no specific engineering controls were required, additional engineering and administrative controls were applied to reduce the likelihood of COVID-19 transmission within the entire NBACC building.

Facility and Support Operations Modifications

• To reduce the likelihood of aerosol COVID-19 transmission, NBACC adjusted building heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems to provide administrative spaces with 100% outdoor air only with five or more air changes per hour following ASHRAE guidance. The BSL-2, BSL-3, and BSL-4 laboratory HVAC system has always used 100% single pass air.

• Installed clear partitions in all office areas, where possible, to further reduce aerosol-associated transmission dynamics.

• Increased custodial cleaning and disinfection of high-contact surfaces to at least once daily using EPA-registered disinfectant products at a concentration and contact time recommended by the manufacturer.

• Increased custodial cleaning and disinfection of occupational health suite to once daily.

• Deployed multiple teleconferencing applications to facilitate remote meetings for staff working from home.

Staff Health

• Daily symptoms and temperature monitoring (staff given thermometers if they needed one).

• Mask wearing mandated in common areas (and reinforced by the U.S. Government Office of Management and Budget mandate published in January, 2021 ⁴ ).

• Social distancing—no closer than 6 feet between workers.

• All in-person meetings changed to tele/videoconferences.

• Staff are responsible for disinfecting workstations daily.

• Limitations were placed on conference room, elevator, and bathroom occupancy.

Efforts to Reduce the Workforce in the Building While Maintaining Mission Capability

• In mid-March 2020, all staff who could work from home were encouraged to do so.

• Infrastructure Operations (Facilities, Environmental Health and Safety, Security, Information Technology and Engineering) cut back to 50% onsite in the building and 50% telework.

• Total staffing averages throughout March 2020 to March 2021 = 75% working in the building, 25% teleworking.

• All visitor requests were canceled until September 2020.

• All international and domestic business travel was canceled.

• Accommodations made for higher risk staff (e.g., preexisting health conditions) on an as-needed basis.

• Extensive use of video or call-in meeting capability.

Training and Education

• The BNBI Leadership Team, Environmental Health and Safety Office, and Human Resource Office distributed CDC and DHS information and recommendations regarding the COVID-19 pandemic to the staff on an as-needed basis. Any official DHS and/or company policies were also published on an internal BNBI shared site. Information was updated with changes published by the CDC.

BSL-2, BSL-3, and BSL-4 Operations

• At the onset of the pandemic, ordered excess PPE, laboratory disinfectants, and consumables to mitigate supply chain issues associated with critical items required to maintain biocontainment operations and obtained Designation of Procurement Priority Placement as an essential entity, which would allow NBACC orders to be preferentially filled.

• In addition to general staff health controls, surgical masks were supplied for use in every BSL-2 laboratory (unless project-specific risk assessments required respiratory protection such as an N100, in which case these were worn in lieu of a surgical mask) as well as all BSL-3 and BSL-4 change rooms.

• No changes were needed in BSL-3 and 4 biocontainment PPE as NBACC requires all staff to don HEPA-filtered 3M VersaFlo PAPRs in BSL-3 settings and positively pressured environmental suits in the BSL-4 environment. Staff were to maintain 6 feet of physical distancing in the change rooms if multiple people were entering/exiting a containment suite.

• When consistent with mission requirements, laboratory staff were encouraged to stagger workdays and perform administrative functions (trainings, data analysis, report writing, etc.) from home to minimize the number of staff in the building.

Occupational Health

• All contact tracing was conducted confidentially by the Occupational Health Competent Medical Authority (CMA). Contact tracing was based on current CDC guidance as was any quarantining of staff.

• Testing for COVID-19 infections was made available through the onsite occupational health program.

• Annual flu shots were recommended and administered free of charge.

• NBACC staff were encouraged to obtain the COVID-19 vaccine once they became available. BNBI staff who were enrolled in the BNBI Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) and Biological Select Agent and Toxins (BSAT) Medical Surveillance Program and had been vaccinated were obligated to inform the CMA of their vaccination status.

Risk Assessment of Readiness for Work

As conditions changed, with the onset of vaccine availability in early 2021, BNBI conducted a risk assessment as a readiness-check for return of all staff to an onsite work/telework combination rather than a typical return-to-work scenario. The British Standards Institution (BSI) guidance document ⁵ for standard practices for working in a pandemic situation was used by NBACC to help identify and analyze the risks in each business area, document the actions that went well, and produced good results for future reference, and to identify those areas we could improve to ensure our ability to continue the mission at NBACC.

We determined the gaps in risk control actions and activities that would help improve the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A total of 341 risks were reviewed and analyzed, including one item deemed very high level and four deemed to be high-level risks. The very high-level risk was evaluated for any condition where a large number of NBACC staff might be unavailable to work in the laboratory. These risks are mitigated by providing sufficient PPE, issuing guidance, modifying work areas to ensure social distancing measures, and teleworking to limit exposure to COVID-19. Vaccines were deemed to greatly reduce risk as well as following policies and Federal guidelines issued from the CDC, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Office of Management and Budget, and the DHS.

In addition, controls to mitigate the high-level risks included creation of two work teams that had alternating “on duty” schedules where possible. Three of the four high-level risks were in the supply chain/subcontracts area. These risks for supply shortages were mitigated by ordering supplies of PPE and alcohol-based hand sanitizers, reagents, and so on, with extra lead time and identifying secondary sources for procurement of supplies. Project planning ensured that shortages were anticipated and included in a detailed project schedule.

In general, the risk evaluation showed that actions taken early in the pandemic were highly beneficial and allowed the NBACC to continue operating during the pandemic, even expanding the typical hours of work. The extra hours prompted BNBI to provide guidance for combating COVID-19 fatigue-anxiety issues, including tools to maintain wellness, and information on financial and other benefits available.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

In hindsight, these early actions were successful in maintaining a healthy and stable population so that our sponsors' research objectives could be met. With the development of several vaccine candidates and the subsequent approval under Emergency Use Authorization, voluntary vaccination of NBACC staff added additional protective control measures to mitigate the ongoing effects of COVID-19 pandemic impacts. With the recent declaration of a requirement for all Federal and contractor government employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, BNBI is well poised to satisfy this condition as per the provided directives.

Notice: This article has been authored by BNBI, LLC under Contract No. HSHQDC-15-C-00064 with the U.S. DHS. The U.S. government retains, and the publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the U.S. government retains, a nonexclusive, paid up, irrevocable, worldwide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this article, or allow others to do so, for U.S. government purposes.