Abstract
On October 2, 2003, David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), submitted a report on the Group's activities to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/ david_kay_10022003.html).
The editors of Biosecurity and Bioterrorism invited a number of former bioweapons inspectors who had been in Iraq to comment on the report. It was the editors' view that the Kay report may have led the public to make quick judgments about the Iraqi bioweapons program that did not reflect the great scientific, technical, and logistical complexities and uncertainties that surround the bioweapons inspection process.
The editors were interested in the analysis and interpretations of the Kay report and of the post-war BW inspections process as these former inspectors now understand it. It is hoped that from their comments, readers of this journal can gain a deeper understanding of the challenges surrounding the BW inspections process, of what the BW inspections process can plausibly accomplish, and of the limits of what can be proven and disproven.
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