Should we attempt to eradicate disability?

Abstract

This paper addresses two very important questions about the ethics of dealing with disability, namely: is it morally wrong to attempt to eradicate disability? and does such an attempt constitute discrimination against the disabled? The attempts to answer these two very general questions involve distinguishing two prior questions: is it wrong to prefer a non-disabled person to a disabled one, and is it wrong to prefer to produce (or even to prefer to be) a non-disabled individual rather than a disabled one? The paper argues that not only is it not wrong, but indeed it is right to prefer to produce a non-disabled individual rather than a disabled one where there is a genuine choice. It argues that the exercise of such a choice is morally defensible and does not constitute discrimination against those with disability, although the contrary is often asserted. The paper concludes that attempts to eradicate disability are not the same as attempts to eradicate the disabled, even where these attempts constitute preferring not to create new individuals with disability.

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References

See also my discussion of this and related issues in Harris, J. , 1992, Wonderwoman and Superman: Ethics and Human Biotechnology (Oxford University Press), Chap. 3.

The argument of most of this section first appeared in Harris, J. , 1993, Is gene therapy a form of eugenics? Bioethics, 7(2/3), 178-188. I have taken the liberty of quoting from myself here, and apologize to anyone familiar with these few paragraphs.

See my discussion of the difference between harming and wronging in Harris, J. , 1992, Wonderwoman and Superman: Ethics and Human Biotechnology (Oxford University Press), Chap. 4.

In this sense the definition of disability is like that of `poverty'. Here my discussion of these issues is identical with my discussion of the same points in Harris, J. , 1993, Is gene therapy a form of eugenics? Bioethics, 7(2/3), 178-188.

When I talk of valuing individuals in an existential sense—valuing an individual `as a person'—I am talking of the dimension of the individual which entitles them to equal concern, respect and protection, which speaks to the issue of their dignity and standing with equal moral and political claims. I have analysed this notion at some length in Harris, J. , 1985, The Value of Life (London: Routledge), Chap. 1.

Davis, A., 1988, p. 150.

and Harris, J. , 1994, Not all babies should be kept alive as long as possible. Principles of Health Care Ethics, edited by R. Gillon (London: Wiley), pp. 643-657.

Harris, J. , 1992, Wonderwoman and Superman: Ethics and Human Biotechnology (Oxford University Press).

Judith Thomson's famous article is unpersuasive on the subject of self defence because it does not adequately show why the fetus is not entitled to defend itself. See Thomson, J. J. , 1971, A defence of abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(1), 000-000.

10.

This is unattractive particularly to women, though not indefensible on that ground alone. There are, however, other grounds for rejecting it. See Harris, J. , 1985, The Values of Life (London: Routledge), Chap. 1.

11.

Locke, J. , 1962, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Oxford University Press), Book II, Chap. 27.

12.

and Harris, J. , 1992, Wonderwoman and Superman: Ethics and Human Biotechnology (Oxford University Press).