Abstract
In an extensive technical review entitled ‘The nonlinear theory of schizophrenia’, Breakspear [1] argued that ‘… a “non-linear theory” of schizophrenia may be helpful in understanding the disorder’. He outlined evidence from a variety of sources which supported the idea that ‘a chaos may underlie brain dysfunction in the major psychoses’. Concluding his paper, he appealed to the philosophers Paul Feyerabend and Karl Popper in justi?cation of his bold conjectures.
I believe that Breakspear failed in his objective as he did not offer even the minimal outline of a theory of schizophrenia [2]. This outcome was predictable because of some elementary philosophical errors.
Like all biological psychiatry, Breakspear's paper repeatedly fell into the mereological fallacy, namely, ‘… ascribing to a part of a (person) attributes which logically can be ascribed only to the (person) as a whole’ [3], p.29]. Thus, ‘… the brain makes causal inferences about the world based upon its sensory input’ [1], p.31]. This is incorrect: humans make causal inferences, their brains do not.
This error arose because he could not de?ne the relationship between brain subsystems and mental function, and simply assumed a relationship of identity. First, he conceded ‘… the conceptual relationship between the (observational) data and the brain must be understood cautiously’ (p.27), that is, it is a complete mystery. Second, in an audacious understatement, he acknowledged that the relationship between brain activity and mental phenomena is ‘a far-from resolved problem’ (p.21, sic). This issue, better known as the mind–brain problem, haunts psychiatry [4]. Finally, he allowed that the relationship between normal mental function and psychosis remains totally unknown: ‘… if schizophrenia is viewed as a dysfunction in the dynamical regulation of the self…’ (p.21).
Thus, his four ‘giant leaps’, from data to brain subsystems, thence to brain, on to mind and ?nally to mental illness, were all blind. Despite this, he announced ex vacuo: ‘… the role of chaos theory in understanding the psychoses is an empirical question, which requires careful scienti?c research’. That is, he assumed that what applied at the microscopic level necessarily and completely applied at the highest level of mental function. This is completely false. The relationship of brain to mind is wholly metaphysical, that is, empirical evidence has no bearing on it.
Because he overlooked this crucial matter, his extensive array of evidence amounts to naught. Despite all his hard work, his paper is not science, but is mere scientism, that is, the inappropriate application of scienti?c methods and procedures to questions with no empirical content. Biological psychiatry cannot answer such fundamental questions just because it is itself an ontological choice [3, 4]. Having proposed reductionism as a solution to the mind–body problem, any attempts to revisit the problem within a biological framework are therefore questionbegging (petitio principii).
An outline of how body and mind interact logically precedes any consideration of brain and psychosis [5]. Oddly enough, grants are always available for yet another misdirected attempt to bypass critical questions, but there is remarkably little support for primary research into them.