Abortion: Correct Application of Natural Law Theory

Although many of the quotations below are derived from traditional Catholic documents, the truth of these statements has been acknowledged by most thoughtful persons and religions over the centuries.

For a simple, brief summary of the Principle see Austin Fagothey S.J. , Right and Reason (second or third editions only) (St. Louis: The C.V. Mosby Company, 1963), pp.107–110. For a brief but accurate explication of the Principle, see Peter J. Cataldo, “The Principle of the Double Effect,” Ethics and Medics (Braintree, MA: Pope John Center, March 1995), 20(3): 1–2. See also Kevin O'Rourke and Philip Boyle, “Double Effect”, Medical Ethics: Sources of Catholic Teachings (St. Louis, MO: The Catholic Health Asscciation of the United States, pp. 102, 103 (hereafter referred to as Sources…).

Pius Pope XI , “Encyclical Letter on Christian Marriage” (Dec. 31, 1930), The Human Body: Papal Teachings, 1960, pp. 31–34, in Sources…, p. 35, 36: “…Whether inflicted upon the mother or upon the child, [direct abortion] is against the precept of God, and the law of nature: ‘Thou shalt not kill’. The life of each is equally sacred, and no one has the power, not even the public authority, to destroy it…Those who hold the reins of government should not forget that it is the duty of public authority by appropriate laws and sanctions to defend the lives of the innocent, and this all the more so since those whose lives are endangered and assailed cannot defend themselves. Among whom we must mention in the first place infants hidden in the mother's womb.” See also “Declaration on Procured Abortion” (Nov. 18, 1974), Vatican Council II, Vol. 2, 1982, pp. 441–443, in Sources… P. 38; “Divine law and natural reason, therefore, exclude all right to the direct killing of an innocent man.”

For examples of several classic explications of natural law theory, see Fagothey A. (note 2) esp. pp. 124–139; also. Vernon J. Bourke, Ethics (NY: The Macmillan Col., 1953); Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982); McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action (Vatican Council II, 1992); Charles Rice. 50 Questions on the Natural Law (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993).

Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured Abortion (1974) (Alexandria, VA: St. Paul Books & Media), p. 19 (emphasis mine).

See Fagothey (note 2). pp. 128–131. See also Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Veritatis Splendor (Boston. MA: St. Paul Books & Media, 1993), #72 (P. 91): “Acting is morally good when the choices of freedom are in conformity with man's true good and thus expresses the voluntary ordering of the person towards his ultimate end [good].”: also, Declaration on Procured Abortion. p. 92.

Fagothey (note 2) p. 112. See also Veritatis Splendor. #74, p. 93: “But on what does the moral assessment of man's free acts depend?…[It is] the intention of the acting subject, the circumstances - and in particular the consequences of his action [and] the object itself [i.e. the kind of action, i.e., inherently right or wrong or neutral]…”

Note that Paul Pope John II has clarified in Veritatis Splendor that “proportionalism”, an ethical theory proposed by dissident moral theologians, is not properly natural law or morally acceptable - in particular because it rejects the very possibility of actions which are morally good or morally bad per se, i.e., by their natures - see Veritatis Splendor #79–80, pp. 100–102: “One must reject the thesis, characteristic of teleological [consequentialist. e.g. utilitarian] and proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species - its “object” - the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or specific acts apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned…There exist acts which per se and in themselves, independent of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object [i.e. the kind of act willed]…[E]xamples of such acts: ‘whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and voluntary suicide; whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit: whatever is offensive to human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution and trafficking in women and children; degrading conditions of work which treat laborers as mere instruments of profit, and not as free responsible persons; all these acts and the like are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice…’ ”. See also Veritatis Splendor, #75)p. 94). #76 (p. 77). #77 (p. 98), #78 (p. 99), #90 (p. 112). #96 (p. 119). #97 (p. 119). See also John Finnis, Moral Absolutes (Washington. DC: The Catholic University of America Press. 1991).

Fagothey (note 2), p. 107.

Pius Pope XI , “Encyclical Letter on Christian Marriage” (Dec. 31, 1930), The Human Body: Papal Teachings, 1960 in Sources. (note 2). p. 36: “Evil is not to be done that good may come of it.” See also. Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (1968) (Boston. MA: St. Paul Books & Media), p. 7. “If it is sometimes licit to tolerate a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater evil or to promote a greater good, it is not licit. even for the gravest reasons, to do evil so that good may follow therefrom.” See also Veritatis Splendor, #80, pp. 102–103.

Fagothey (note 2). p. 107.

Fagothey (note 2), pp. 107–108.

Pius Pope XII “The Attempt on Innocent Human Life” (Nov. 26. 1951), in Sources… (note 2). p. 103:“… Deliberately, we have always used the expression ‘direct attempt on the life of an innocent person’, ‘direct killing’. Because if. for example, the saving of the life of the future mother, independently of her pregnant condition, should urgently require a surgical act or other therapeutic treatment which would have an accessory consequence, in no way desired nor intended, but inevitable, the death of the fetus, such an act could no longer be called a direct attempt on an innocent human life. Under these conditions the operation can be lawful, like other similar medical interventions - granted always that a good of high worth is concerned, such as life, and that it is not possible to postpone the operation until after birth of the child, nor to have recourse to other efficacious remedies.” See also. Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance. Charter For Health Care Workers (Boston: St. Paul Books & Media, 1995), pp. 122–123: “If the abortion follows as a foreseen but not intended or willed but merely tolerated consequence of a therapeutic act essential for the mother's health, this is morally legitimate. The abortion in this case is the indirect result of an act which is not itself abortive” (from Pius XII, To “Face of the Family” and the “Associations of Large Families” Nov. 27. 1951 in AAS 43 (1951) p. 859). See also. Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, (Washington, DC. 1995), pp. 19–20: #47. “Operations, treatments, and medications that have as their direct purpose the cure of a proportionately serious pathological condition of a pregnant woman are permitted when they cannot be safely postponed until the unborn child is viable. even if they will result in the death of the unborn child.”

Fagothey (note 2), p. 108.

See note 13.

Fagothey (note 2), p. 108. See also Veritatis Splendor. #8l. pp. 102–103: “If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain ‘irremediably’ evil acts per se and in themselves… Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by nature of its object [the kind of act willed] into an act ‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice.”

“Declaration on Procured Abortion” (note 5), pp. 14–15: “…We do not deny these very great difficulties. It may be a serious question of health, sometimes of life or death, for the mother: it may be the burden represented by an additional child, especially if there are good reasons to fear that the child will be abnormal or retarded; it may be the importance attributed in different classes of society to considerations of honor or dishonor, of loss of social standing, and so forth. We proclaim only that none of these reasons can ever objectively confer the right to dispose of another's life, even when that life is only beginning.”

Fagothey (note 2), p. 108.

See notes 13, 14.