The Sacredness of Life: An Overview of the Beginning

One of the finest treatments of these issues that I know of is given by Germain Grisez in Living a Christian Life, Vol. 2 of his The Way of the Lord Jesus (Quincy, IL: Franciscan Press, 1993), Chapter Eight, in particular, pp. 460–469, 489–497. I am deeply in debt to his thought, both in this work and in other writings.

Excellent philosophical treatments of this matter are provided by Mortimer Adler, The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes (New York. Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1968) and, more recently, by Braine David , The Human Person: Animal and Spirit (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

Paul John II Homily given at the Capitol Mall of Washington, D.C., October 7, 1979, “‘Stand Up’ for Human Life,” L'Osservatore Romano (English ed.) 5 November 1979, 7.

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured Abortion, n. 6. It needs to be noted, however, that the Magisterium of the Church has not definitively taught that the life of a human person begins at conception/fertilization. Thus, in this same document the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, in footnote 19, pointed out the following: “The present Declaration deliberately leaves untouched the question of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused. The tradition is not unanimous in its answer and different authors hold different views: some think animation occurs in the first moment of life, others that it occurs only after implantation… For two reasons the moral position taken here on abortion does not depend on the answer to that question: 1) even if it is assumed that animation comes at a later point, the life of the fetus is nonetheless incipiently human (as the biological sciences make clear); it prepares the way for and requires the infusion of the soul, which will complete the nature received from the parents; 2) if the infusion of the soul at the very first moment is at least probable (and the contrary will never be established with certainty), then to take the life of the fetus is at least to run the risk of killing a human being who is not merely awaiting but is already in possession of a human soul.”

Wylie Philip The Magic Animal (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968, p. 272). This characterization is found in a particularly vitriolic passage, filled with invective against the notion of the sanctity of human life.

One proponent of this view is the biologist Garrett Hardin. See his “Abortion — or Compulsory Pregnancy?” Journal of Marriage and Family, May, 1968, 250.

A representative of this view is the late ethicist Joseph Fletcher. See, for example, his essay, “New Beginnings of Life,” in The New Genetics and the Future of Man, ed. Hamilton Michael (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), p. 76.

This claim, made early in this century by the sexologist Havelock Ellis in his Studies in the Psychology of Sex (New York, 1924) 6.607), is quite common and a tenet of some contemporary feminists.

Grisez Living a Christian Life, p. 495.

Grisez Living a Christian Life, p. 494.

On this see his essay, “When Do People Begin?” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63 (1989) 27–47.

Grisez identifies the claim I describe in this way as the view that personhood is limited to nonbodily substances.

Among those holding this position is Pierre de Locht, quondam professor of moral theology at the University of Louvain, who claims that a human fetus can be considered a person only when its parents confer personhood on it by recognizing it as such. See Pierre de Locht, “Discussion,” in L'avortement: Actes du Xeme colloque international de sexologie (Louvain: Centre International Cardinal Suenes, 1968) 2.155. See also Louis Beirnaert S. J. “L'avortement: est-il un infanticide?” Etudes 333 (1970) 520–523; Mary Warnock, “Do Human Cells Have Rights?” Bioethics 1 (1987) 2.

On this see Grisez “When Do People Begin?” 29; Living a Christian Life, p. 489.

See Tooley Michael Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Daniel Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 384–389, 497–498.

Grisez Living a Christian Life, p. 490. Grisez, in a footnote (n. 54), observes that both Webster's New International Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary say that a standard use of person is to refer to a living, human individual.

On this see Grisez, Living a Christian Life, pp. 490–491; “When Do People Begin?” 30–31.

On this see Fletcher Joseph Morals and Medicine (Boston: Beacon, 1954), pp. 152, 211–213; Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, pp.64, 103, 130, 154–155, 163–164, 175–176.

Living a Christian Life, p. 491. See also his “When Do People Begin?” 31–32.

For Joseph Donceel S.J. see his essay, “Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization,” Theological Studies 31 (1970) 76–105. For Thomas A. Shannon and Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., see their article, “Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo,” Theological Studies 51 (1990) 603–626. Shannon and Wolter seek to support this theory by appealing to additional supposed facts made known by contemporary science.

“When Do People Begin?” 33–34.

For Benedict Ashley's refutation of this view, see his “A Critique of the Theory of Delayed Hominization,” in A n Ethical Evaluation of Fetal Experimentation: A n Interdisciplinary Study, ed. McCarthy Donald (St. Louis: Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center, 1976), pp. 113–133. See also his more recent essay, co-authored with Albert Moraczewski, O.P., “Is the Biological Subject of Human Rights Present from Conception?” in The Fetal Tissue Issue, ed. Peter Cataldo and Albert Moraczewski, O.P. (Braintree, MA: Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center, 1994), pp. 33–60. For Jean de Siebenthal, see his “L'animation selon Thomas D'Aquin,” in L'Embryon: Un Homme: Actes du Congres de Lausanne 1986 (Premier Congres de la Societe Suisse de Bioetique 8 et 9 novembre 1986) (Lausanne: Centre de documentation civique, 1987), pp. 91–98.

Siebenthal refers to the following Thomistic texts to show this: Summa theologiae, 1, q. 118, a. 3, q. 76, a. 4 and a. 6, ad 1; 3, q. 6, a. 4, ad 1; q. 2, a.5.

Siebenthal “L'animation selon Thomas d'Aquin,” 96–97.

Among proponents of this position is Veatch Robert M. , “Definitions of Life and Death: Should There Be a Consistency?” in Defining Human Life: Medical Legal and Ethical Implications, ed. Shaw Margery W. , and Edward Dondera A. (Ann Arbor, MI: AUPHA Press, 1983), pp. 99–113.

Grisez “When Do People Begin?” 34; Living a Christian Life, pp. 493–494.

See the following: Anthony Fisher, O.P., “Individuogenesis and a Recent Book by Fr. Norman Ford,” Anthropotes: Rivista di studi sulla persona e la famiglia 7 (1991) 199–244; Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, “A Critical Note,” Linacre Quarterly 56 (August 1989) 36–50; Benedict Ashley O.P. , and Albert Moraczewski O.P. “Is the Biological Subject of Human Rights Present from Conception,” in The Fetal Tissue Issue, pp. 33–60; Grisez, “When Do People Begin?”, 35–40; Grisez, Living a Christian Life, pp. 495–497.

Yanimagachi R. “Mamallian Fertilization,” in The Physiology of Reproduction, ed. Knobil E. , Neill J. (New York: Raven Press, 1988), p. 135; cited by Grisez, “When Do People Begin?” 45, n. 49; Living a Christian Life, p. 495, n.66.

Grisez “When Do People Begin?” 37.

Grisez “When Do People Begin?”, 38.

Ashley-Morazcewski “Is the Biological Subject of Human Rights Present from Conception?” pp. 50–53.