Human rights are not a privilege conferred by the government They are every human being's entitlement by virtue of his humanity. The right to life does not depend, and must not be declared to be contingent, on the pleasure of anyone else, not even a parent or sovereign … I have no new teaching for America. I seek only to recall you to faithfulness to what you once taught the world Your nation was founded on the proposition — very old as a moral precept, but startling and innovative as political insight — that human life is a gift of immeasurable worth, and that it deserves, always and everywhere, to be treated with the utmost dignity and respect
Mother Theresa of Calcutta, in an Amicus Curiae filed before the Supreme Court of the United States, as reprinted in the Human Life Review, 20: 2, (1994) 128.
2.
At this point a note should be made on terminology. The use of the word “pre-embryo” describes the entity post-fertilization, from the zygote stage to the full implantation of the individual into the uterine wall (see Keith L. Moore, Essentials of Human Embryology [Philadelphia: Decker, 1988] 16). This would include the blastocyst period. “Conceptus” will be used interchangeably, since the meaning implies a newly conceived organism. These terms are generally used to describe the entity in the germinal stage of pre-natal development; this period is followed by the embryonic stage (from the beginning of the third week to the eighth week). Embryo has also been used “loosely” to describe the conceptus, but I will avoid doing so here. The final moment is the fetal stage, which encompasses the last seven months of pregnancy. (See Rod Seely et. al., Anatomy and Physiology [2nd ed. St. Louis: Mosby Year-Book, 1992] 948). Although I choose to make the distinction for clarity's sake between pre-embryo, embryo, and fetus, it is a premise of this work that these stages hold an identical ethical relevance.
3.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. (1973) 156–7Justice Harry Blackmun argued that, “The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a ‘person’ within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment … If the personhood of the fetus is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life is then guaranteed specifically by the Amendment…. The Constitution does not specifically define “person” in so many words. The use of the word is such that it has application only post-natally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application.”
4.
HumberJames“Abortion: The Avoidable Moral Dilemma,”Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol 9, (1975) 297
5.
NoonanJohn T.The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) 223–224. It is also interesting to note that the roots of this theory date to Aristotle, who suggested that quickening occurred in males at forty days, and females at eighty days. (See James Q. Wilson, Human Life Review, 20 Winter [1994]93). While sixty days is about the time when physical movement of the embryo begins, the pre-embryo is actually moving before this time.
6.
NoonanJohn T.The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 52
DoranKevinWhat Is A Person? (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press1989) 34
15.
DoranKevinWhat Is A Person? (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press1989), 43
16.
DoranKevinWhat Is A Person? (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press1989), 43
17.
PoplawskiNicola, and GillettGrant“Ethics and embryos,”Journal of Medical Ethics17 (1991) 62
18.
Note the difference between this position and that of the position popularized by abortion proponents, namely, that the being is “potential life.” Here the conceptus is assumed to be human life, but her status after this point is what is taken to be in question.
19.
Poplawski, and GillettJournal of Medical Ethics, 62–69
20.
I do not agree fully with the conclusions of Poplawski and Gillett, who, in a disappointing “Postscript,” (69) contradicted the central thrust of their argument by implying that the rights of “identifiable human beings” are more specific than embryonic rights and thus take precedence over them. I do not see this conclusion as consistent with the rest of their work. Thus, my approach will borrow from theirs, but hopefully be at the same time, more universally applied and hence consistent.
21.
Poplawski, and GillettJournal of Medical Ethics, 62
22.
This, I think, is an important fact to note for two reasons. First, the longitudinal theory is only a kind of Aristotelian philosophy, because it avoids Aristotle's scientific errors (e.g., that the fetus was the egg itself), and yet maintains the importance of form. Secondly, Aristotle's metaphysics have sometimes been combined with Kant's ethics to produce the potentiality theory described above. That is, the pre-embryo, embryo, or fetus are the potential form of the moral agent, where the moral agent would be a rational, autonomous individual. Obviously, from the analysis above this line of reasoning ought to be rejected. By contrast, the theory I am proposing claims that the pre-embryo is the same form as the adult human, and ought to be respected and protected in that regard.
23.
Aristotle, Physics I: 2, ed. AckrillJ.L., A New Aristotle Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)
24.
Poplawski, and Gillett, Journal of Medical Ethics, 63–64
25.
Poplawski, and Gillett, Journal of Medical Ethics, 64
26.
Poplawski, and Gillett, Journal of Medical Ethics, 65
27.
Poplawski, and Gillett, Journal of Medical Ethics, 65
28.
This very argument is the postscript, at which, inexplicably (and unfortunately) Poplawski and Gillett seem to arrive in the end of their article.
29.
Poplawski, and Gillett, Journal of Medical Ethics, 66
