See GilsonEtienne, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949); also, Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New York: Image Books, 1962).
2.
See IrvingDianne Nutwell, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human Embryo (Doctoral dissertation: Washington, D.C., Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, April 1991), pp. 267–273 (includes charts of 26 of the arguments).
3.
DalyFr. Tom, “When does a human life begin? The search for a marker event”, in DawsonKaren, and HudsonJill (eds.), Proceedings of the Conference: IVF: The Current Debate (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash Center for Human Bioethics, 1987), 79.
4.
Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human Embryo (1991), particularly Chap. 5.; Benedict Ashley and Kevin O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics: A Theological Analysis (St. Louis: Catholic Health Association, 1989, 3rd ed.); also Benedict Ashley, “A critique of the theory of delayed hominization,” in D. G. McCarthy and A. S. Moracqewski, (eds.), An Ethical Evaluation of Fetal Experimentation: A n Interdisciplinary Study (St. Louis: Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center, 1976), 113-133; R. Werner, “Abortion: the moral status of the unknown”, in Social Theory and Practice, 3 (1974): 202; R. Wertheimer, “Understanding the abortion argument”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1971): 67-95; B. Brody, “On the humanity of the fetus;, in Tom Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters, (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (California: Wadsworth, 1978), 229-240; J. Santamaria, “In vitro fertilization and embryo transfer”, in M. N. Brumsky, (ed.), Proceedings of the Conference: In Vitro Fertilization: Problems and Possibilities (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Center for Human Bioethics, Clayton, Vic., 1982), 48-53; G. T. Noonan, “An almost absolute value in history”, in J. T. Noonan (ed.), The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 1-59; G.C. Grisez, Abortion: The Myths, the Realities and the Arguments (New York: Corpus Books, 1970); T. Iglesias, “In vitro fertilization: the major issues”, Journal of Medical Ethics 10 (1984): 32-37; W. Quinn, “Abortion: identity and loss”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 24-54. Several documents also argue for personhood at “fertilization”: Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation,” reprinted in L'Osservatore Romano (Vatican City: 16 March 1987), 3; Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Select Committee on the Human Embryo Experimentation Bill 1985, (Official Hansard Report), Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1986, 25; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “On the use of human embryos and foetuses for diagnostic, therapeutic, scientific, industrial and commercial purposes”, Recommendation 1046 (1986), 1; and Davis v Davis, 641 1 (D. Tenn. 1989). For arguments counter fertilization, see Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson and Peter Singer, “The syngamy debate: when precisely does a human life begin?”, in Peter Singer, et al (eds.), Embryo Experimentation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 214-215; Karen Dawson, “Fertilization and moral status: A scientific perspective”, in P. Singer, Embryo Experimentation, 1990, 43-52; J. Donceel, “Immediate animation and delayed hominization”, Theological Studies 31 (1970), p. 75-105; Michael J. Coughlan, “From the moment of conception…’: The Vatican instruction on artificial procreation techniques”, Bioethics 2(4), 1988, p. 294-316; also, Dame Mary Warnock, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1984); (also, all of the writers infra who argue for a biological marker event of personhood any time after fertilization).
5.
SuarezAntoine, “Hydatidiform moles and teratomas confirm the human identity of the preimplantation embryo”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 15 (1990): 627–635.
6.
BedateCarlos, and CefaloRobert, “The zygote: to be or not be a person”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy14 (6), 1989: 641; Richard McCormick, S.J., “Who or what is the preembryo?”, paper presented at the Andre E. Hellegers Lecture (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University: May 17, 1990) (pre-publication manuscript); see also Richard McCormick, S. J., “Who or what is the preembryo?”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1 (1), 1991, 1; Norman Ford, “The case against destructive embryo research”, in Proceedings of the Conference: IVF: The Current Debate, 90-95; also Ford, When Did I Begin? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); sometimes William Wallace, “Nature and human nature as the norm in medical ethics”, in Edmund D. Pellegrino, John Langan and John Collins Harvey, (eds.), Catholic Perspectives on Medical Morals (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1989), 23-53.
7.
IrvingD.N., Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human Embryo (1991); supra, pp. 267–273.
8.
BoleThomas J.III, “Metaphysical accounts of the zygote as a person and the veto power of facts”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy14 (1989): 647–653; also, “Zygotes, souls, substances, and persons”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15 (1990): 637-652.
9.
Singer, and Wells, in Gareth JonesD., “Brain birth and personal identity”, Journal of Medical Ethics15 (1989): 175.
10.
LockwoodMichael, “When does life begin?”, in LockwoodMichael, (ed.), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 10; also Lockwood, “Warnock versus Powell (and Harradine): When does potentiality count?”, Bioethics 2 (3), 1988: 187-213.
11.
SheaM.C., “Embryonic life and human life”, Journal of Medical Ethics11 (1985): 205–209.
12.
HareR.M., “When does potentiality count? A comment on Lockwood”, Bioethics2 (3), July 1988: 214.
13.
EnglehardtH.T., The Foundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 111.
14.
SingerPeter, “Technology and procreation: How far should we go?”, Technology Review (Feb./Mar. 1985).
15.
See IrvingDianne N., “Science, philosophy, theology — and altruism: the chrosimos and the zygon”, in MayHans, StriegnitzMeinfried, HefnerPhilip (eds.), Loccumer Protokolle (Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1992), forthcoming; Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949); Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New York: Image Books, 1962; Leonard J. Eslick, “The material substrate in Plato”, in Ernan McMullin, ed. The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963); Frederick Wilhelmsen, Man's Knowledge of Reality (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), esp. Chaps. 2 and 3.
16.
For an excellent explanation of the differences between Boethius’ and Aquinas’ definitions of a “human being” or “human person”, see DoranKevin, “Person — a key concept for ethics”, Linacre Quarterly56(4), 1989, 39.
17.
See CottinghamJ., StoothoffR., MurdochD. (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
18.
Aristotle, in his De Coelo (1.5.271b, 9-10), in McKeonRichard (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941).
19.
See Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis … (1991); esp. pp. 83–125, and Chap. 5.
20.
Aristotle, Categories, in RossDavidSir, Aristotle (New York: Random house, 1985), p. 20–21; also, Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora 2.19, 100a 3-9, in Richard McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941); for Aquinas’ similar position, see: The Division and Method of the Sciences, Q6, a.1, reply to 1st Q, pp. 65-66; ibid., Q6, reply to 3rd Q, pp. 71-72; ibid., Q6, a.2, pp. 176-178; ibid., Q6, a.4, p. 90; ibid., Q5, a.3, p.35 (also quoted there in note 21: In I Post. Anal. lect. 1-3, and in De Veritate 1.1); see also George Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), pp. 293-298.
21.
LewinBenjamin (ed.), Genes III (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987), pp. 11-13, 17-19, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 79, 91, 93-94; also Alan E. H. Emery, Elements of Medical Genetics (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1983), pp. 25, 34, 65, 101-103.
22.
Aristotle, Categories 5. 2a, 11-13, (McKeon, 1941), p. 9; also (Ross, 1985), p. 24; also (McKeon, 1941): Metaphysica 7.11.1036b, 3-7, p. 800; 8.1.1042a, 30-31, p. 812; even in his De Anima (McKeon, 1941) Aristotle argues for the composite: 2.1.412b, 6-10, p. 555 and 2.1.413a, 3-4, p. 556; for Thomas Aquinas, see his Summa Theologica, Fathers of the English Dominican Province (trans.) (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981, Vol. 1): Ia.q29, a.1, ans., ad2,3,5, p. 156; ibid., a.2, ans., p. 157; see also Kevin Doran, “Person — a key concept for ethics”, Linacre Quarterly 56(4), 1989, p. 39.
23.
Aristotle, De Anima (McKeon, 1941): 1.4.408b, 13-15, p. 548; also, 1.4.488b, 25-26, p. 548; for Aquinas see ST Ia.q75, a.2, ad.2, p. 365; also see Frederick Wilhelmsen, Man's Knowledge of Reality (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), pp. 78-79 and 103-105.
24.
MooreKeith L., The Developing Human (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1982, 3rd. ed.), pp. 14ff; also Benjamin Lewin, Genes III (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987), pp. 24ff.
25.
Aristotle, Physica, (McKeon, 1941): 1.7.191a, 15-18, pp. 232-233; also 2.3.194b, 23-35, pp. 240-241; see also, Henry B. Veatch, Aristotle: A Contemporary Approach (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1974), Chaps. 2,3; for Aquinas, see George Klubertanz, The Philosophy of Human Nature (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), pp. 124ff; also Klubertanz (Philosophy of Being, 1963), pp. 98-100, 116 (and Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, lect. 1, (ed.) Cathala, Nos. 1688-1689, as quoted p. 118).
26.
Aristotle: A Contemporary Approach
27.
See Moore (1982) and Lewin (1987), note 26 supra.
28.
Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis … (1991), see notes pp. 78-80. There is a rapidly increasing volume of this kind of work, e.g., KolliasG; HurstJ; deBoerE., and GrosveldF.“The human beta-globulin gene contains a downstream developmental specific enhancer”, Nucleic Acids Research15(14) (July, 1987), 5739–47; R. K. Humphries et al, “Transfer of human and murine globin-gene sequences into transgenic mice”, American Journal of Human Genetics 37(2) (1985), 295-310; A. Schnieke et al, “Introduction of the human pro alpha 1 (I) collagen gene into pro alpha 1 (I) — deficient Mov-13 mouse cells leads to formation of functional mouse-human hybrid type I collagen”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science — USA 84(3) (Feb. 1987), pp. 764-8.
29.
See note 27 supra.
30.
paceHareR.M., “When does potentiality count? A comment on Lockwood”, Bioethics2(3), 1988.
31.
paceLockwoodMichael, “Warnock versus Powell (and Harradine): When does potentiality count?”, Bioethics2(3), 1988.
32.
For brevity I will designate Aristotle's theory of substance as a composite, which is the pre-dominant one in his Categories, Physics, the first half of the Metaphysics, and even in many parts of his De Anima, as “Aristotle - proper”. Aristotle's theory of substance as form alone — or as only the “rational.” part of the form, and the succession of souls as found predominantly in the second half of his Metaphysics and in parts of the De Anima, contradicts the former theory. There is also some degree of contradiction in Thomas — insofar as he sometimes “unblushingly” follows Aristotle's theory of separate form (see, for example, the differences between the definition of a human being and that of a human soul in the De Ente et Essentia in Chapter Two and Chapter Four.
33.
Aristotle, Physica 2.1.193b, 3-5, (McKeon, 1941), p. 238.
34.
Aristotle, Physica 2.2.194b, 12-14, p. 240; see also 2.2.193b, 33-37, p. 239.
35.
Aristotle, De Anima 1.5.41 1b, 14-18, (McKeon, 1941), p. 554.
36.
Aristotle, De Anima, 1.5.411b, 24-28, (McKeon, 1941), p. 554.
37.
Aristotle, Metaphysica, 3.2.997b18-998a 10, (McKeon, 1941), p. 721; see also 11.1.1059a34-1059b 14. pp. 850-851; for Aquinas, see ST, Ia.q.45, a.4, ad.2, p. 235.
38.
Thomas Aquinas, ST, Ia.q29, a.1, ans., ad.2,3,5, p. 156; ibid, a.2, ans., p. 157; also ST, IIIa.q19, a.1, ad.4.2127; see also, DoranKevin, “Person-a key concept for ethics”, Linacre Quarterly56(4), 1989, p. 39.
39.
See note 24 supra; also AquinasThomas, On being and Essence, MaurerArmand (trans.), (Tornoto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), Chap. 2; also The Division and Method of the Sciences, Armand Mauer (trans.), (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), p. 14, 29, 39, 40.
40.
Thomas Aquinas, ST, IIIa, q 19, a.l, ad.4.2127; see also DoranKevin (1989), p. 39.
41.
Thomas Aquinas, ST, Ia.q75, a.4, ans., p. 366.
42.
For example, Suarez, McCormick, Ford, Wallace and Bole, infra.
43.
Aristotle, De Anima, 1.5.411b, 14-18, (McKeon, 1941), p. 554; also, 1.5.411b, 24-28, p. 554; for Aquinas, see notes 41 and 39, supra.
44.
As Klubertanz has expressed it, the human soul, being a form, cannot be divided. The ovum and sperm unite, “thus giving rise to a single cell with the material disposition required for the presence of a soul”: Klubertanz, The Philosophy of Nature, 1953, p. 312.
45.
BedateCarlos, and CefaloRobert, “The zygote: to be or not be a person”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy14(6), 1989, p. 641–645.
46.
BoleThomas J.III, “Metaphysical accounts of the zygote as a person and the veto power of facts”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy14, 1989: 647–653; also, “Zygotes, souls, substances, and persons”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15, 1990: 637-652.
47.
LewinBenjamin (ed.), Genes III (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), p. 681; also Alan E. H. Emery, Elements of Medical Genetics (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1983), p. 93.
48.
In addition to the references on “information cascading”, see also those in note 30, supra
49.
SuarezAntoine, “Hydatidiform moles and teratomas confirm the human identity of the preimplantation embryo”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy15, 1990, 630.
50.
Jerome Lejeune (Nobel Prize, genetics), testimony in Davis v. Davis, Circuit Court for Blount County, State of Tennessee at Maryville, Tennessee, 1989; as reprinted in Martin Palmer, A Symphony of the Pre-Born Child: Part Two (Hagerstown, MD: NAAPC, 1989), 9–10.
51.
See, e.g., Richard McCormickS.J., “Who or what is the preembryo?”, paper presented at the Andre E. Hellegers Lecture (Washington, D.C. Georgetown University: May 17, 1990); (pre-publication manuscript); see also, McCormick, “Who or what is the Preembryo?”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1 (1), 1991, p. 3; also see reference in Lejeune, note 50 supra, p. 14.
52.
Lejeune, 1989, p. 14.
53.
For example, Grobstein and McCormick, Ford, Wallaceinfra.
54.
Lejeune, 1989, p. 17, 20; also see article by Mavilio, where he explains that the modulation of the methylation pattern represents a key mechanism for regulating the expression of human globin genes during embryonic, fetal and adult development in humans. Mavilio et al, “Molecular mechanisms of human hemoglobin switching: selective undermethylation and expression of globin genes in embryonic, fetal and adult erythroblasts’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 80(22) (1983): p. 690;7-1 1; see also Alan E. H. Emery, Elements of Medical Genetics (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1983), p. 103.
55.
See references on “cascading” in note 48, supra; also “transgenic mice” in note 30, supra.
56.
SuarezAntoine, “Hydatidiform moles and teratomas confirm the human identity of the preimplantation embryo”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy15 (1990): p. 631.
57.
McCormickRichard A., S.J., “Who or what is the preembryo?”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal1(1), 1991: p. 2.
58.
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, p. 3.
59.
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, p. 3.
60.
MooreKeith L., The Developing Human (Philadelphia: W. B. Sunders Co., 1982), p. 33, 62-63, 68, 111, 127; also see K. Chada et al, “An embryonic pattern of expression of a human fetal globin gene in transgenic mice”, Nature 319 (6055), 1986: 685-9; also G. Migliaccio et al, “Human embryonic hemopoiesis. Kinetics of progenitors and precursor underlying the yolk sac — liver transition;, Journal of Clinical Investigation 78(1), 1986: 51-60.
61.
McCormick (1991), p. 4.
62.
DawsonKaren, “Segmentation and moral status”, in SingerPeter, Embryo Experimentation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 58; see also Keith Moore (1982), p. 133.
63.
FordNorman, When Did I Begin? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 298.
64.
When Did I Begin?, p. 156.
65.
MooreKeith L., The Developing Human (1982), p. 1.
66.
WallaceWilliam A., “Nature and human nature as the norm in medical ethics:, in PellegrinoEdmund D., LanganJohn P., and HarveyJohn Collins (eds.), Catholic Perspectives on Medical Morals (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1989), 23–53.
67.
Catholic Perspectives on Medical Morals., p. 30.
68.
Aristotle, Metaphysica VI, 1029 a.20, Ross (trans.), in Klubertanz, Philosophy of Being (1963), p. 115 (note 27); for Aquinas see ST, IA.q6, a.1., ad.3, p. 330; also Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book VIII, lect. 1 (ed. Cathala, No. 1686), in Klubertanz (1963), p. 100, and 124-125.
69.
Klubertanz (1963), p. 100.
70.
Thomas Aquinas, ST, Ia.q.45, a.4, ad. 1 and 2, p. 235; also, Ia.q6, a. 1., ad. 3, p. 330; also Ia q.65, a.3, ans., p. 327; also ibid, a.4, sed contra, p. 327; also ibid, ans., p. 328-329; also, Ia.q.76, a. 7, ans., 381.
71.
Aristotle, Categories, in Ross (1985), p. 20–21; Thomas Aquinas, The Division and Method of the Sciences (Mauer, ed., 1986), pp. 37-38.
72.
Wallace (1989), p. 43–44.
73.
Wallace (1989), p. 33.
74.
Gareth JonesD., “Brain birth and personal identity”, Journal of Medical Ethics15(4), 1989, 178. Oddly enough Jones will himself argue for personhood at 6-7 months (p. 177).
75.
JonesHoward W., and SchroderCharlotte, “The process of human fertilization: implications for moral status”, Fertility and Sterility48(2), Aug. 1987: p. 192.
76.
Gareth JonesG. (1989), p. 177.
77.
For example, see Singer, and Englehardt, infra.
78.
DescartesRene, Meditations on First Philosophy, in CottinghamJohn, StoothoffRobert, and MurdochDugald (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1984), 2nd Meditation, 12ff.
79.
LockeJohn, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, WoozleyA.D. (ed.) (London: Fontana/Collins, 1964), Book Two, Ch. XXXI, pp. 211–212.
80.
EnglehardtH.T., The Foundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 111.
81.
TooleyMichael, “Abortion and infanticide”, in CohenMarshall (ed.), The Rights and Wrongs of Abortions, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 59, 64.
82.
KuhseHelga, and SingerPeter, “For sometimes letting — and helping — die”, Law Medicine and Health Care3(4), 1986: pp. 149–153; also Kuhse and Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 138; also, Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, “The ethics of embryo research”, Law, Medicine and Health Care 14 (13-14), 1987. For one reaction, see Gavin J. Fairbairn, “Kuhse, Singer and slippery slopes”, Journal of Medical Ethics 14 (1988), p. 134.
83.
SingerPeter, “Taking life: abortion”, inPractical Ethics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 118; also, see note 84 supra.
84.
SingerPeter, “Taking life: abortion” (1981), p. 118.
85.
IrvingD.N., Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human Embryo (1991); also D. N. Irving, “Science, philosophy, theology and altruism: the chorismos and the zygon“ (1992); for an excellent work on the previous topic by an expert in both science and philosophy, see Anthony Fisher, O.P., “Individuogenesis and a recent book by Fr. Norman Ford” Anthropotes 2 (1991), pp. 199ff; also A. A. Howsepian, “Who or what are we?”, Review of Metaphysics 45 (March 1992): pp. 483-502; also, Robert A. Destro, “Quality-of-life ethics and constitutional jurisprudence: The demise of natural rights and equal protection for the disabled and incompetent”, Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 2 (Spring, 1986: pp. 71-130; also Edmund D. Pellegrino, “Character and the ethical conduct of research”, Accountability in Research 2(1), 1992: pp. 1-11; also Pellegrino “Character, virtue and self-interest in the ethics of the professions”, Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 5 (Spring 1989), pp. 53-73; also, Pellegrino “Trust and Distrust in Professional Ethics”, in E. Pellegrino, R. Veatch, J. Langan, Ethics, Trust, and the Professions (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1991), pp. 69-85; also, Ashby Sharpe, How the Liberal Ideal Fails As a Foundation for Medical Ethics; or, Medical Ethics “In a Different Voice” (Doctoral dissertation, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1991), Chaps. 1-3; for a scholarly work on distinguishing different “Thomists’ “ ethical grounding, see George C. Reilly, O.P., “The empiricism of Thomistic ethics”, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the Secretary of the Association, The Catholic University of America, 1956), pp. 1-36; a short 20-article bibliography of critiques of bioethics can be found in Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. and Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P., Ethics of Health Care (St. Louis: The Catholic Health Association, 1986), pp. 250-251. For works more focused on science, see Adil E. Shamoo, “Role of conflict of interest in scientific objectivity: A case of a Nobel Prize work”, Accountability in Research 2 (1992): pp. 55-75; also, Shamoo, “Policies and quality assurance in the pharmaceutical industry”, Accountability in Research 1 (1991): pp. 273-284; also Shamoo, “Role of conflict of interest in public advisory councils”, Ridea Research Foundation Proceedings (1991); also, Peter McCullagh, The Foetus as Transplant Donor: Scientific, Social and Ethical Perspectives (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987); also, John C. Bailar III, Marcia Angell, Sharon Boots et al, Ethics and Policy in Scientific Publication (Bethesda, MD: Council of Biology Editors, Inc., 1990); also, Gerhard Portele, “Moral development and education”, in David Gosling and Bert Musschenga, Science, Education and Ethical Values (Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications; and Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1985), pp. 31-36; also Gerrit Manenschijn, “Reasoning in Science and Ethics”, in Gosling (1985), pp. 37-54; also Crombie, Medieval and Early Modern Science (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959); also, for a feminist view see Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections of Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
86.
See GillMary Louise, A ristotle on Substance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); also Charlotte Witt, Substance and Essence in Aristotle (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989); also Marjorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963).
87.
EdwardsPaul, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967); Vol. 1, pp. 341–352.
88.
GorlinRena A. (ed.), Codes of Professional Responsibility (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1991).