The dual reading of general conditionals: The influence of abstract versus concrete contexts

Abstract

A current main issue on conditionals is whether the meaning of general conditionals (e.g., If a card is red, then it is round) is deterministic (exceptionless) or probabilistic (exception-tolerating). In order to resolve the issue, two experiments examined the influence of conditional contexts (with vs. without frequency information of truth table cases) on the reading of general conditionals. Experiment 1 examined the direct reading of general conditionals in the possibility judgment task. Experiment 2 examined the indirect reading of general conditionals in the truth judgment task. It was found that both the direct and indirect reading of general conditionals exhibited the duality: the predominant deterministic semantic reading of conditionals without frequency information, and the predominant probabilistic pragmatic reading of conditionals with frequency information. The context of general conditionals determined the predominant reading of general conditionals. There were obvious individual differences in reading general conditionals with frequency information. The meaning of general conditionals is relative, depending on conditional contexts. The reading of general conditionals is flexible and complex so that no simple deterministic and probabilistic accounts are able to explain it. The present findings are beyond the extant deterministic and probabilistic accounts of conditionals.

Keywords

Abstract contexts Concrete contexts Conditional meaning Deterministic Dual reading Probabilistic

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