Attributes that are common, or overlapping, across alternatives in two-alternative forced preferential choice tasks are often non-diagnostic. In many settings, attending to and evaluating these attributes does not help the decision maker determine which of the available alternatives is the most desirable. For this reason, many existing behavioural theories propose that decision makers ignore common attributes while deliberating. Across six experiments, we find that decision makers do direct their attention selectively and ignore attributes that are not present in or associated with either of the available alternatives. However, they are as likely to attend to common attributes as they are to attend to attributes that are unique to a single alternative. These results suggest the need for novel theories of attention in preferential choice.
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