Abstract
The Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence (FCADV) was a nationally recognized nonprofit until 2019 when scandalous newspaper headlines such as “$7.5 million payday for the head of this Florida nonprofit” alerted the public that something was amiss. The nonprofit was sued by the state and disbanded. In this teaching case, we describe the history of the nonprofit coalition and the crisis that emerged. This case is appropriate for undergraduate and graduate students. Students put themselves in the position of learning from the lessons of FCADV and designing a new and improved nonprofit coalition. The teaching tools address learning objectives in board governance, leadership, human resources, ethics, finance, public policy, and public management courses.
The crisis experienced by the Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence (FCADV) 2019–2021 played out publicly via major newspapers nationwide. Media headlines such as “Being well-connected meant a $7.5 million payday for the head of this Florida nonprofit” alerted the public that something scandalous was happening. It took several years for all the facts to come out and for the legal battles to be resolved. In this case, you will learn what happened within this nonprofit coalition, and then, you will step into the shoes of the coalition’s new leader and chart a path forward.
Not often do nonprofits fall apart so openly. The public nature of FCADV provided ample evidence for a thorough investigation. This teaching case surfaces critical issues in nonprofit governance, chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, and board oversight. There are three key learning objectives. First, this case improves critical thinking about board governance. Specifically, it asks students to take the best practices of board governance and apply them to a unique organizational structure (i.e., a geographically dispersed coalition). Second, this case examines the intersection of financial and executive oversight in a high-performing organization. Third, this case illustrates the challenges of determining an executive compensation package that is both fair and palatable to the public.
There are several important players to consider. The Florida Legislature (2002) authorized FCADV to distribute millions of dollars on behalf of the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF). The FCADV board oversaw the long-term CEO’s activities and compensation. The CEO manipulated compensation structures to her own interest. Additionally, the FCADV staff neglected their ethical and legal duty to report the organization’s finances at face value. We leave it to the reader to assign culpability and design a new structure to avoid such negligence and maleficence in the future.
We provide suggestions for teaching this case to undergraduate and graduate students appropriate for in-person and online instruction. We provide a list of publicly available reading materials that can support the teaching of this case and that instructors may share with students. We conclude by offering insight as to what really happened once the new nonprofit (the Florida Partnership to End Domestic Violence) was created.
The case of the Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence
Background
From 1979 to 2020, FCADV’s purpose was to eliminate institutional and personal violence by empowering women and girls, with a narrow focus on domestic violence. Domestic violence is a form of gender-based violence (e.g., intimate partner violence, sexual violence, human trafficking). Domestic violence is physical, emotional, or financial abuse or threat of abuse directed by one family member or partner against another (Title XLIII § 741.28, 2022). Domestic violence remains one of the most critical health and social issues for women in America and affects one in three women in their lifetime (World Health Organization, 2021). Community-based providers of social services, including nonprofits, health departments, and local government offices, were contracted by the state and federal agencies to conduct gender-based violence victim services (Wiley & Berry, 2018). FCADV was one of the first organizations to address such crime at the state level.
FCADV was a 501(c)(3) charity with the rare benefit of having its governance role established by legislation (Title V § 39.9055, 2019). FCADV’s statutory duty was assuring the service quality of Florida’s 42 certified domestic violence centers. All but one of these centers were 501(c)(3) charities when this case study was written. The certified centers built on FCADV’s mission, and their role in their local communities was to provide justice and safety to domestic violence survivors. Florida’s certified centers were statutorily mandated to provide nine core services: year-round emergency shelter, 24-hour hotline, information and referrals, case management, children’s programming, counseling, support group, community awareness and professional education, and training to law enforcement (Title 70 V § 39.905, 2022). In addition, intervention activities—child welfare advocacy, high-risk advocacy, economic justice programming, and attorneys for injunction relief—are provided through most centers as statewide initiatives. Many centers also provide programming aimed at the primary prevention of all types of violence.
History of the coalition
The Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence (FCADV) began in 1979 as the volunteer-led Florida Network, a statewide coalition of 14 domestic violence shelters. The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence had just incorporated, and other statewide coalitions were emerging to represent their state’s domestic violence shelters. In the 1970s, domestic violence victims were referred to as battered women, and the laws did little to protect the individuals affected by these crimes. Shelters served as a temporary haven, typically catering to white, heterosexual, married women. When the police responded to an incident, batterers were often told to take a walk around the block rather than the officer arresting the offender. FCADV worked for protections for victims and to strengthen the shelters.
At that time, Florida’s shelters were primarily funded through a legislatively mandated marriage license fee trust fund and private donations (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence [NCADV], 1982). Shelter funding through the Victims of Crime Act became available in 1984 (Victims of Crime Act, 1984 ). However, the coalition was not funded at this time (NCADV, 1982). In 1986, the Florida Network changed its name to the Refuge Information Network of Florida. It was one of 53 statewide domestic violence coalitions in the United States (U.S.) (California had three regional coalitions; National Coalition Against Domestic Violence [NCADV], 1986b). Coalition staffing in the U.S. ranged from zero to 14, and revenue from zero to $5 million, with most coalitions falling below $45,000 in revenue (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence [NCADV], 1986a).
Sometime before 1990, the nonprofit coalition changed its name to the Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence. By the time FCADV began operating as the privatized state provider of contracted domestic violence services in 2004, shelters were funded by federal sources, such as the Victims of Crime Act (1984 ), the Violence Against Women Act (1994 ), and Temporary Aid to Needy Families (42 U.S.C. 601). Florida’s shelters were also funded with state dollars, like the Marriage and Divorce Trust Fund, Domestic Violence Trust Fund, and state general revenue. The coalition snowballed, and, by 2019, the organization’s annual revenue was approximately $55.8 million. FCADV then employed 92 with a near-even split between full-time employees and short- and long-term consultants (FCADV, 2019). While the Victims of Crime Act and Family Violence Prevention and Services Act funds have always passed through the state government, Florida was unique in that the funds also passed through the coalition to the member centers (NCADV, 1986a; Wiley & Berry, 2018). The Coalition retained a percentage of each of these funds to cover the administration costs. The complexity of this funding structure meant that the coalition’s human resource spending was distributed broadly across multiple government grants, contracts, and private sources.
FCADV appeared to be a financially stable nonprofit with steady revenue and contracts with the state and federal governments. Unfortunately, a crisis was brewing internally. By 2004, FCADV served as the purse and accountability monitor for Florida’s 42 domestic violence centers. FCADV was responsible for funding the centers and ensuring each center’s nine core services were implemented according to state guidelines and FCADV’s own guidelines. The executive directors of the domestic violence centers that FCADV funded provided board oversight for FCADV’s financial activities. An apparent conflict of interest emerged. Domestic violence centers relied on FCADV to maintain their certification, which opened the door to public funding. FCADV monitored the centers’ performance, which determined if centers qualified for public funding. Simply put, FCADV provided oversight for the centers while the centers’ leaders provided oversight for FCADV. Disrupting this mutualistic, symbiotic relationship would require changing Florida statute or FCADV’s dissolution.
FCADV leadership
FCADV was subject to the coalition guidelines outlined in the federal Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 1984). Consequently, the nine board members (FCADV, 2019) were a group of primarily current and former Executive Directors from domestic violence centers across the state and a few business leaders who had served on center boards or were center donors. The board members were all very familiar with domestic violence issues and how service was provided throughout the state. The board met at off-site locations throughout the state rather than the FCADV Tallahassee headquarters. Meeting off-site at hotel conference centers gave the board a space to do governance work without interruption. However, it also meant the board had limited interactions with coalition staff and, thus, could not observe the organizational culture.
FCADV’s former CEO, Tiffany Carr, established the organization as a formidable force in state politics through aggressive advocacy and networking. The agency grew into one of the largest state nonprofit coalitions nationwide with high funding levels, policy influence, and a national reputation. The Coalition’s membership benefitted from statewide initiatives that funded prevention work, child welfare collaboration, economic justice programs, high-risk advocacy, and legal services. The CEO was asked to serve on national boards, provide interim management of a neighboring state’s failing coalition, and was recognized as a national leader in the Battered Women’s Movement (henceforth, the Movement). Because of this productivity, the CEO’s reportable compensation was $593,633 in 2018 (FCADV, 2019). The total sum included deferred compensation for retirement, as well as regular salary. For comparison, the 2018 compensation of the National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV) CEO based in Washington, D.C., was $220,736 (National Network to End Domestic Violence [NNEDV], 2019). To determine Carr’s compensation, the board reviewed comparable salaries from Charity Navigator (n.d.). The board also sought legal advice from the contracted employment lawyer and continued reviewing salaries from other Florida nonprofits.
As time progressed, Carr’s compensation was ratcheted up through other means, like Paid Time Off (PTO) and vehicle expenses. FCADV reported the salary, PTO, and other benefits in their Form 990s as required by the IRS. Carr’s large salary documented on these publicly available documents often caught the attention of reporters and legislators throughout FCADV’s existence. However, the attention would quickly fade. In 2017, Carr’s compensation at FCADV crossed a line that the public would not forgive (Koh, 2019).
The crisis
The CEO submitted her resignation in October 2019 to the board chair. She cited health concerns as her reason for resigning. The board’s executive committee was told that a public statement would be made in November 2019. At that time, an interim CEO was announced. This individual had a long-standing personal and political relationship with the CEO and FCADV. A small committee of the executive board, handpicked by the CEO, was tasked with working with the interim CEO and beginning the search process.
In January 2020, at the beginning of the legislative session, the interim CEO abruptly resigned. The Coalition leadership fell to the board, most of whom were CEOs of domestic violence agencies around the state. Staff from the Coalition’s Executive Team (i.e., the Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operations Officer) quickly informed the board of the ongoing dispute over contract documents and disclosures to the Department of Children and Families. The Coalition’s legal counsel told the board that this dispute was resolved in September 2019.
Beginning in early February 2020, the state initiated a series of legal actions against the Coalition and the board (Gross, 2020). These actions included subpoenas for testimony before the legislative ethics committee and civil suits alleging misappropriations of state funds in the form of salary and benefits to the CEO. In fact, the IRS form 990 filed in 2019 included reportable compensation of $4.5 million.
It was at this time that the board learned that the Paid Time Off component of the compensation, which had been given for medical leave, had been manipulated. The board learned that the internal policy had been altered to allow this leave to be accrued for cash, which was not the board’s original intent (FCADV Investigation, 2020). Carr was awarded 425 days of PTO in a single year—60 more days than in a calendar year. According to testimony, the board verbally approved 425 hours of PTO for medical leave. However, when the board chair signed the final version of the contract, the chair failed to see that 425 hours had been changed to 425 days.
The board had never received feedback from the contracted auditor, who had provided clean reports, or the legal counsel that there was impending action by the state stemming from these payments. Additionally, the centers were required to submit a forensic audit. In March 2020, the board formally resigned so the state could appoint a corporate receiver to begin the dissolution of the nonprofit corporation and make way for a new state coalition to be formed. In May 2020, the Florida Partnership to End Domestic Violence (FPEDV) was formed by the certified centers’ leaders, and the work to repair the reputation, standing, and network began under new DCF oversight. Hope was on the horizon, but that hope rested on whether the new nonprofit coalition would be better structured and managed than the last.
Teaching tools
We present the case of FCADV to assist in translating nonprofit scholarship into practice. One can find nonprofit scholarship across the disciplines of Public Administration, Social Work, Sociology, Business, Political Science, and more. Nonprofit scholarship ranges from the lifecycle of nonprofits, including their birth and death and everything in between (See Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly) to day-to-day operations (See Nonprofit Management and Leadership). Nonprofit scholarly literature also expands to address the unique role the “third sector” plays in society (See Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations). The teaching tools provided here zero in on the governance and leadership aspects of nonprofit management. In this section, you will find a discussion prompt and questions, assignments, and a list of publicly available documents related to the case.
Class discussion prompt: A fresh start
Imagine you have just agreed to serve as the first CEO of the newly formed FPEDV. Your primary goal is to develop a new structure that will allow FPEDV to do its essential work as effectively as possible but also prevents the kind of crisis experienced by FCADV in 2019–2021. To accomplish this, you need to understand what happened and why. Your first order of business is to review the organization’s policies, procedures, records, and tax forms to understand what happened. Here are the facts you uncover in your investigation: CEO compensation was $761,560 in 2017, $593k in 2018, and $4.5 million in 2019. The IRS Form 990 filed by FCADV in 2018 indicated that, yes, the board had reviewed a copy of the IRS Form 990 before it was officially filed (Part VI, Section B, Question 11a). In 2019, the Form indicated that no, the board had not reviewed a copy of the IRS Form 990 before it was filed. Board minutes indicate that the board regularly reviewed financial documents. However, some information—such as a presentation of the audit results—was not shared with the board. FCADV had no formal CEO succession plan.
Questions for discussion
Here are some general questions for discussion. Some questions are similar to those addressed in the assignments below. This duplication intentionally encourages deep and sustained thinking, particularly for undergraduate students. Which actors should have intervened before the crisis erupted? Consider all actors, including board members, staff, state officials, and those contracted to perform professional services. As the new CEO, how can you repair the damage to the public image of domestic violence victim services caused by this crisis? Specifically, how can you repair the relationships with funders, restore the organization’s reputation in the eyes of the public, and earn donors’ trust back to ensure service continuity at the centers? As the new CEO, how can you earn the board’s trust? At the same time, how can you create a structure that ensures the board is providing oversight of the role of the CEO? How, if at all, would you change the organization’s compensation structure moving forward? What leadership style and governance structure would work best for the newly formed FPEDV? How should CEO productivity be defined and measured? How can the board evaluate a long-standing CEO who is highly productive? Consider the four pillars of Public Administration in your answer: equity, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency. What other types of boards might have these same issues?
Assignment
Here we describe a two-part assignment that invites students to analyze what went wrong and chart a path forward. These assignments can be adapted to focus on the course’s specific objectives.
Assignment part #1: Looking back
Identify what went wrong that allowed this crisis to occur. Consider a nonprofit
Consider all actors, including board members, staff, state officials, and those contracted to perform professional services. What mistakes and red flags, if any, were overlooked? What functions of
What can we learn about
What impact, if any, did the
How might the CEO’s strong productivity record have affected the board’s
How might the size of the CEO’s original compensation package (not including the cash out of annual leave hours) have affected the state and public’s judgment about the organization?
Recommended scholarly readings to accompany this assignment:
Bolton, E., Kumaran, M., & Guest-Jelley, A. (2015). Working with Nonprofit Organizations in Community Settings: Governance and Board Functions. UF IFAS Extension.
Tschirhart, M., & Bielefeld, W. (2012). Boards and Governance. In Managing Nonprofit Organizations. Jossey-Bass.
Assignment part #2: Looking forward
Identify how the organization should move forward from this crisis. Develop an action plan of three-to-five pages to present to the FPEDV board. Here are questions to consider: How should executive pay be determined and monitored? How should boards monitor and evaluate executive performance? How can the board ensure it receives accurate and complete information about the organization? Consider the various actors, including the state representatives, FPEDV staff, those contracted to perform professional services, and survivors of domestic violence, who are at the heart of their mission. How, specifically, should the board interact with those individuals? How can the board address the limitations inherent in their geographic distance? What should the succession plan include?
Recommended scholarly readings to accompany this assignment:
Maier, F. (2019). Financial Accounting and Financial Management for Transformative Change. In A.M. Eikenberry, R.M. Mirabella, & B. Sandberg (Eds.), Reframing Nonprofit Organizations Democracy, Inclusion, and Social Change, pp. 169-181. Melvin & Leigh Publishers.
Tschirhart, M., & Bielefeld, W. (2012). Executive Directors and Leadership. In Managing Nonprofit Organizations. Jossey-Bass.
Notes for additional assignments
We have presented two detailed assignments. However, there are many other possible assignments depending on the course objectives. We offer six suggestions. A board governance lesson might ask students to take the project further by developing a sample board agenda or board member position descriptions. A leadership course might incorporate a role-play activity where the students present their action plan (developed in Assignment #2) to a mock board of directors comprised of their peers. A human resources course might focus on compensation and board oversight issues. Students might be asked to do a market analysis of CEO compensation or develop a CEO evaluation plan. A social equity lesson could consider the crisis’s negative externalities, such as the job loss of the several dozen nonprofit coalition staff members not involved with the scandal and the absence of the support they provided to the centers. Also, consider the loss of trust among donors and public funders and how that may affect domestic violence services and, ultimately, domestic violence survivors. A public finance course might ask students to review the financial documents in this case and develop policies and procedures to address the loopholes allowing such negligence and maleficence. Finally, a public management or public policy course may consider the oversight complexity of funding third-party providers by tracking revenue and expenses in IRS Forms 990 and nonprofit annual reports alongside the various legislation authorizing funding.
Publicly available documents related to the case
We encourage instructors to share publicly available documents related to the case with the students. This extra step will give students real-world context and valuable practice reading official documents. Here are 13 documents we recommend:
Legal and financial documents
As of 2023, the IRS Form 990 can be found on GuideStar’s website for the years 2017, 2018, and 2019. (https://www.guidestar.org/) As of February 2023, Charity Navigator gave FCADV a rating of 85/100. It did have a “moderate advisory,” which listed at least nine media articles related to the crisis. (https://www.charitynavigator.org) U.S. Department of Justice Office on Violence Against Women awarded FCADV 31 formula and competitive grants 2005–2020 and 21 formula grants to the State of Florida, where some or all funds were awarded to the nonprofit coalition to distribute to partners. This office provides a searchable database for grants awarded by their office beginning in 2005 and includes grant title, amount, awardee name, and awardee location. (https://www.justice.gov/ovw/awards) The Florida House of Representatives Public Integrity & Ethics Committee hearing videos, transcripts, and depositions for the case can be found on the House’s website: https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/committees/committeesdetail.aspx?CommitteeId=2999
Media stories about FCADV in chronological order
Koh, E. (2019, October 17). This nonprofit paid its CEO $761,000. Now it’s flouting Florida auditors. Tampa Bay Times. Retrieved from https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/10/17/this-nonprofit-paid-its-ceo-751000-now-its-flouting-florida-auditors/
Gross, S.J. (2020, January 30). Florida lawmakers investigate top domestic violence nonprofit. Tampa Bay Times. Retrieved from https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2020/01/30/florida-lawmakers-investigate-top-domestic-violence-nonprofit/
Klas, M.E. & Gross, S.J. (2020, February 19). Amid pay scandal, Florida’s domestic violence nonprofit loses support. Tampa Bay Times. Retrieved from https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2020/02/19/amid-pay-scandal-floridas-domestic-violence-nonprofit-loses-support/?utm_expid=.rZxRlJI0T86fmAabR1Jv8w.0&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
Klas, M.E. (2020, March 11). Feds launch probe into nonprofit that paid ex-CEO $7.5 M. Tampa Bay Times. Retrieved from https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2020/03/11/feds-launch-probe-into-nonprofit-that-paid-ex-ceo-75m/?utm_expid=.rZxRlJI0T86fmAabR1Jv8w.0&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
Gainesville Sun. (2020, March 18). Lawyer says Carr issue “out of control.” Retrieved from https://www.gainesville.com/story/news/local/2020/03/18/lawyer-says-carr-issue-out-of-control/1500893007/
WUSF Public Media. (2020, June 6). Embattled Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence Sues Insurers. WUSF. Retrieved from https://wusfnews.wusf.usf.edu/news/2020-06-06/embattled-florida-coalition-against-domestic-violence-sues-insurers
ABC7. (2021, August 26). State settles lawsuit with domestic violence nonprofit. Retrieved from https://www.mysuncoast.com/2021/08/26/state-settles-lawsuit-with-domestic-violence-nonprofit/
DCF Newsroom. (2021, August 26). Governor Ron DeSantis Announces More Than $5 Million Settlement with Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence Following Recent Lawsuit. Florida Department of Children and Families. Received from https://www.myflfamilies.com/newsroom/pressreleases/2021/20210826-Gov%20DeSantis%20Announces%20more%20than%205%20Million%20Settlement%20with%20FCADV.shtml
What happened next
Here, we included information about what really happened next. Instructors can use this section during their debriefing of student assignments and discussions. The new nonprofit coalition, FPEDV, adopted a different structure than the FCADV model. FPEDV was assigned a mentor by the national coalition (NNEDV) to help navigate the many issues in starting up a new coalition. FPEDV and NNEDV examined board leadership models for coalitions in other states and interviewed other coalition directors. Eventually, FPEDV settled on a model that incorporates both members at large and the certified domestic violence centers (For more information, see Florida Partnership to End Domestic Violence, n.d.).
The new coalition addressed problems through structural enhancements and communication methods that increased transparency and accountability. There were six primary issues identified in the FCADV model that were strategically addressed in the FPEDV model. First, the FCADV Board of Directors was primarily composed of center CEOs. This arrangement created a conflict of interest because the public dollars flowed through FCADV to all the centers. The structure also created an insular culture. The
Second, the FCADV board was self-nominating, a process that led to homogeneity. The new model allowed for greater member participation and was inclusive of allies beyond the centers.
Fourth, centers were primarily led by white women, and due to the board structure, their voices were prioritized in FCADV decision-making and oversight. During the time FPEDV was forming, they were contacted by a variety of groups that expressed they had felt marginalized by the previous coalition. For example, although the Movement was largely started by African American women decades ago, most staff, leadership, and meeting participants were white. FCADV also eliminated the caucuses designed to include the voices of formerly battered and battered women, women of color, and LGBTQAI+ survivors and staff.
Fifth, a culture of toxicity had developed within FCADV and between FCADV and the centers. While the centers consistently worked with survivors on empowerment, members were disempowered within the Movement in Florida. The culture of the coalition had been viewed and experienced as controlling from the top down.
Finally, a newly formed Domestic Violence Collaborative managed several critical statewide functions for DCF, including the statewide hotline, injunctions for protection attorney project, high-risk projects, and the training and technical assistance to the centers.
FPEDV took numerous steps to gain control of the governance and funding concerns. Unfortunately, the new coalition faces an uphill battle with external pressures. The Florida Legislature challenged FCADV’s deviance claiming concern for victims of gender-based violence. However, two years later, when writing this case, Florida passed or proposed new laws that increase the risk for gender-based violence victimization (e.g., increased access to firearms, restrictions on LGBTQ+ civil rights, and decreased access to medical care for transgender individuals). New and emerging laws restrict access to reproductive health care for victims of sexual assault. Evidence-based programming to prevent individual acts of violence became illegal (i.e., primary prevention efforts and cultural competency training) (Individual Freedom Act, 2022; Parental Rights Act, 2022). Where once FCADV had been a formidable force in fighting and winning policy battles over justice and safety for survivors of domestic violence, FPEDV was hampered by its nascent stature and tarnished public image. FPEDV faced severe internal and external challenges in fulfilling the group’s 1979 purpose of eliminating institutional and personal violence by empowering women and girls.
Footnotes
Acknowledgment
We would like to thank the two community reviewers for their help in strengthening this teaching case and ensuring accuracy in our presentation.
Disclosure statement
Two authors have formally engaged with the nonprofit in this teaching case. The second author was employed by the organization seven years prior to the crisis. The third author was a board member of the organization before its dissolution. All claims made within the case are cited from reliable sources. Additionally, the authors solicited two community members knowledgeable of the crisis to review the teaching case for accuracy and bias as a form of peer review. An Institutional Review Board approved the study.
