Abstract
An experiment is reported which establishes that inclusive disjunction arguments embedded in concrete content are not always easier to reason with than those involving abstract content. The subjects had to assess conclusions drawn from pairs of premises such as “Either Joan is intelligent or she is rich (or both); Joan is intelligent” or “Either Joan is intelligent or she is rich (or both); Joan is not intelligent”. The terms in the disjunctive premise were varied systematically across three content dimensions (i.e. compatible, abstract and contradictory). An analysis of variance revealed significant differences according to both principle of inference and type of content, and a significant interaction between these factors. The results demonstrated that semantically incompatible premise content had a marked influence on comprehension of inclusive disjunction reasoning schemes. The response patterns suggest that these reasoning schemes invited erroneous judgments based on other logical connectives.
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