Constitution or Conflict?

Abstract

Constitutional resolution of disputes between constituent groups of a polity avoids the incremental costs of civil conflict. But, the political process prescribed by a constitution provides a viable alternative to civil conflict only if the constitution is self-enforcing. Theoretical analysis reveals that the following properties help to make it possible to design a self-enforcing constitution that can settle recurring disputes:

• No party to the disputes has a big advantage in civil conflict.

• The parties to the disputes expect the incremental costs of civil conflict to be large relative to the importance of the disputes that arise between them.

• The parties are greatly concerned about the future consequences of their current actions.

Theoretical analysis also reveals that a self-enforcing constitution can require limitations on the prerogatives of winners of constitutional contests such that on average outcomes under the constitution are not too favorable to any one party and such that the outcome of each constitutional contest does not matter too much. The paper concludes with historical examples that illustrate the broad applicability of the theoretical analysis.