1 This paper is based on research undertaken as part of an ESRC financed project “The Political Institutional and Economic Impact of the Channel Tunnel”, Grant No. YD00250018.
2.
For a more detailed discussion seeVickermanR. W., Economic policy responses to the Channel Tunnel, in Policy Responses to the Channel Tunnel, Channel Tunnel Research Unit, University of Kent, Canterbury, December 1988.
3.
Centre for Local Economic Strategies, 1989, Channel Tunnel: Vicious Circle, Research Study Series No. 2, CLES, Manchester, January.
4.
Department of Transport, 1987, Kent Impact Study: Overall Assessment, HMSO, London, December.
5.
VickermanR. W., The Channel Tunnel, Regional Growth and Regional Development, Regional Studies, June 1987; R. W. Vickerman, After 1992: The South East as a Frontier Region, in M. Breheny and P. Congdon (eds), Growth and Change in a Core Region: The Case of the South East, Pion, London, 1989, forthcoming.
6.
ManningA.SzymanskiS., The Impact of the Channel Tunnel on 1992, in Centre for Business Strategy, 1992, Myths and Realities, London Business School, 1989.
7.
KayJ.ManningA.SzymanskiS., The Economic Benefits of the Channel Tunnel, Economic Policy, April 1989.
Channel Fixed Link TreatyEach Unit issued in Equity III has a warrant attached which can be exercised to buy further Units at a fixed price from late 1990.
10.
See MorrisP. W. G.HoughG. H.1986, Preconditions of Successs and Failure in Major Projects, Technical Paper No. 3, Major Projects Association, Oxford.
11.
HollidayI., Franchising Major Investment Projects: The Case of the Channel Tunnel, Working Paper 89/4, Channel Tunnel Research Unit, ECONOMY University of Kent at Canterbury, April 1989.
12.
MorrisHough, op cit.
13.
KayJ.ThompsonD. J.1986, “Privatisation: a policy in search of a rationale” Economic Journal, 96, 18–32.
14.
UK Government, 1986, The Channel Fixed Link(Cmnd. 9735)HMSO, London.
