Real people or mere numbers? The influence of kill-save ratios and identifiability on moral judgements ( ¿Personas reales o meros números? La influencia de la proporción vidas sacrificadas/vidas salvadas y la identificabilidad en los juicios morales )

Abstract

Spanish

In moral dilemmas, decision-making can be based on more utilitarian or deontological reasoning. In two experimental studies, we manipulated the number of people to be sacrificed (1 to save 5 vs. 3 to save 5) and whether personalizing information about them was presented. Results provide the first evidence of how the effects of kill-save ratios and identifiability of the potential victims are contingent on one another. Specifically, this research shows that when individuating information about the potential victims is present in a trolley dilemma, participants are more reluctant to sacrifice three persons to save five than to sacrifice one person to save five. When such individuating information is not present, the acceptability of sacrificing the victims does not depend on their number.

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