Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online 2016-01
Complementary gender stereotypes and system justification: the moderating role of essentialist lay theories for group differences / Estereotipos de género complementarios y justificación del sistema: el papel moderador de las teorías populares esencialistas sobre las diferencias grupales
Past research has established that complementary stereotypes of men and women serve to justify the gendered division of labour as well as the division of labour in society at large. This paper is concerned with the essentialist lay theories for the origin of group differences (i.e. belief in genetic determinism vs. belief in social determinism) which may moderate the justificatory effect of complementary gender stereotypes. We present data from an experimental study conducted in Greece, in which genetic vs. social deterministic lay theories for group differences and complementary vs. non-complementary accounts of gender differences were crossed. In these data, complementary accounts of gender increased participants’ justificatory responses only when a genetic deterministic context was made salient; on the contrary, the social deterministic context appeared to buffer the justificatory function of complementary accounts of gender. The results extend the literatures on the justificatory effects of complementary stereotypes as well as on essentialism, and point to the importance of the historical context in which particular ideas and lay theories for intergroup differences are embedded.
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