Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online 2016-03
Counterfactual thinking as an issue between language and pretend play / El pensamiento contrafactual como un problema entre el lenguaje y el juego de simulación
Discussions on counterfactual thinking (CT) have been focused on whether it is a language skill or it emerges spontaneously before language acquisition. This paper surveys the most compelling arguments regarding these frameworks: (1) the approach ‘CT as a language skill’; (2) those who claim that pretending shows that children have CT; (3) those who consider pretend play is a rehearsal for cognitive dispositions. I shall point out that the three approaches on CT are incomplete: (1) neglects pretend play (which prelinguistic children perform) as an instantiation of the CT; (2) puts too much emphasis on the linguistic dimension of pretense; (3) is highly demanding on the cognitive architecture that we ought to have by nature — the so-called children as scientists.
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