Restricted accessReview articleFirst published online 2016-03
The unity of consciousness in pre-psychotic states. A phenomenological analysis / La unidad de la conciencia en estados pre-psicóticos. Un análisis fenomenológico
This paper explores the way in which the phenomenon called delusional moods — an alteration of consciousness that characterizes the moment that precedes the adoption of delusional beliefs — would challenge the claim that consciousness is necessarily deployed as an experiential unity. After exploring three basic characterizations of the unity of consciousness, it is concluded that during delusional moods only some of them are completely altered. Finally, after complementing the analysis with the examination of some psychotic states, it is concluded that, from the three dimensions of the unity of consciousness that are explored, only one seems to be fundamental.
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