Numerosas investigaciones han demostrado recientemente que la hipótesis que supone que el proceso de decisión humano está seriamente sesgado no se encuentra apoyada por datos convincentes. Se ha señalado que las demostraciones de Tversky y Kahneman del carácter falible de los juicios humanos no debería tomarse como si tuviera consecuencias negativas en relación con la racionalidad del proceso de razonamiento humano. Desde una perspectiva conductual, es posible describir una serie de juicios aparentemente no racionales que son, sin embargo, regulares y sistemáticos. En este artículo se analizan tres tipos de regularidades conductuales que se revelan sistemáticas. Estas regularidades afectan a: a) el procesamiento de información del contexto de estímulo; b) la base de conocimiento previo y los algoritmos que evalúan y combinan esta información con la que se procesa, y c) el tipo de respuesta que se demanda. Los hallazgos más relevantes se discuten brevemente.
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