The production of our built environment involves many transaction costs. We want to avoid unnecessary transaction costs. Nevertheless, we hardly take account of transaction costs when considering different ways of organising the development process. The most important reason is probably the difficulty in identifying them. This paper shows why transaction costs are important and offers a method for identifying them. With this method, it is possible to compare the efficiency of different institutional arrangements.
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