In US municipalities, petitions for exception to the zoning code are thought to elicit 'not in my backyard' or 'nimby' responses from neighbourhood organisations concerned about potential negative externalities. This paper brings qualitative and quantitative data to bear on a theory arguing that municipal zoning boards provide incentives over time for neighbourhood organisations to come to consensus with developers. The findings suggest that neighbourhood organisations have greater success influencing zoning boards to deny zoning exception petitions after establishing reputations for coming to agreement with developers in the past. Further, neighbourhood groups that choose more oppositional strategies tend to face more noxious zoning petitions in the neighbourhood in the future.
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