Advanced undergraduate science majors attempted for approximately 10h each to discover the laws governing a dynamic system. The system included 27 fixed objects, some of which influenced the direction of a moving particle. At a given time, any one screen of a nine-screen matrix could be observed on a plasma display screen. Confirmatory strategies were the rule, even though half the subjects had been carefully instructed in strong inference. Falsification was counterproductive for some subjects. It seems that a firm base of inductive generalizations, supported by confirmatory research, is a prerequisite to useful implementation of a falsification strategy.
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