This study is concerned with the effects of prior experience on a deceptive reasoning problem. In the first experiment the subjects (students) were presented with the problem after they had experienced its logical structure. This experience was, on the whole, ineffective in allowing subsequent insight to be gained into the problem. In the second experiment the problem was presented in “thematic” form to one group, and in abstract form to the other group. Ten out of 16 subjects solved it in the thematic group, as opposed to 2 out of 16 in the abstract group. Three hypotheses are proposed to account for this result.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Johnson-LairdP. N.TagartJ. (1969). How implication in understood. American Journal of Psychology82, 367–73.
2.
Johnson-LairdP. N.WasonP. C. (1970a). A theoretical analysis of insight into a reasoning task. Cognitive Psychology1, 134–48.
3.
Johnson-LairdP. N.WasonP. C. (1970b). Insight into a logical relation. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology22, 49–61.
4.
WasonP. C. (1968). Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology20, 273–81.
5.
WasonP. C. (1969a). Regression in reasoning?. British Journal of Psychology60, 471–80.
6.
WasonP. C. (1969b). Structural simplicity and psychological complexity. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society22, 281–84.
7.
WilkinsM. C. (1929). The effect of changed material on ability to do formal syllogistic reasoning. Archives of Psychology No. 102.
