Contraception,Sexual Behavior,and Natural Law

Haring B. The inseparability of the Unitive-procreative Functions of the Marital Act. In: Curran C. (ed.), Contraception: Authority and Dissent. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), p. 180. Cf. as well the editor's contribution in this volume: C. Curran, Natural Law and Contemporary Moral Theology, 159: “The encyclical on the regulation of birth employs a natural law methodology which tends to identify the moral action with the physical and biological structure of the act.”

For the general difference between acts of intercourse considered as intentional actions and considered physically see: Anscombe G.E.M. You Can have Sex without Children. Christianity and the New Offer, in: The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Vol. III: Ethics, Religion and Politics. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 82–96: especially 86f.

How deeply the encyclical's teaching is in harmony with the Church's doctrinal tradition has been brilliantly shown by Anscombe G.E.M. Contraception and Chastity (London: Catholic Truth Society. 1975).

By Anscombe G.E.M. Contraception and Chastity, op. cit., 17.

That is why I think it to be inconvenient to talk about periodic continence practiced with a “contraceptive intent”. To speak about periodic continence adopted with “contraceptive intent” involves considering contraception already to be, in and of itself, essentially, what periodic continence can be only on the grounds of a possible further (e.g., anti-life) intention with which it is (illicitly) practiced. My argument will show that the further intention which may render periodic continence morally illicit is not what characterizes contraception already in and of itself (intrinsically); it may therefore not be called a “contraceptive intent” without risking confusion and without answering the question of why contraception is wrong before having asked the question properly. As like as to analyze periodic continence, also to understand contraception we have, at least, to distinguish the two following questions (see again G.E.M. Anscombe, Contraception and Chastity, op. cit., p. 18): “First: is the sort of act we contemplate doing something that it's all right to do? Second: are our further or surrounding intentions all right? (…) Contraceptive intercourse fails on the first count.”

See for this: Finnis J. M. “Humanae Vitae: Its Background and Aftermath.” In: International Review of Natural Family Planning IV (1980), 141–153.

This has been nicely pointed out by Belmans T. G. Le sens objectif de l'agir humain. Pour relire la morale conjugate de Saint Thomas (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), pp. 327–411. For “physicalism” in actual moral theology, see also my Natur als Grundlage der Moral (Insbruck-Wien: Tyrolia, 1987). B. Häring, in his above cited article for example (183), simply equals the natural patterns involved in sexuality with “biological functions” which “may be interfered with and even destroyed if it is necessary for the well being of the person”, which according to him is a mere medical problem. The contraceptive pill is regarded by Häring as something that “preserves the ovule which, here and now, is not needed because procreation would be irresponsible” (185).

Except by quoting sentences (or fragments thereof) taken out of their context, of which Curran C. op. cit., p. 160, provides a typical example.

Grisez G. A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument against Contraception. In The Thomist. XXX (1966), p. 343.

See my Natur als Grundlage der Moral, op. cit., pp. 108 ff.

This latter example is given by Grisez G. The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. I. Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), p. 105: the former by G.E.M. Anscombe, op. cit., p. 87.

An author like G. Martelet (see his article “Morale conjugale et vie chretienne.” In Nouvelle Revue Théologique, 87 (1965), pp. 245–266) has, indeed, pointed out the moral relevance of sexuality. Therefore, his argument against contraception has not to be subsumed under the “perverted faculty argument”. The anthropological arguments which I will use later are not very different from Martelet's. But, as I have remarked above, Martelet's argument failed by omitting to show why and how his anthropology becomes relevant for judging single human actions. He neither worked with the concept of moral virtue, nor did he engage in action analysis. So, as it seems to me, he missed the point. Also man's eating, which aims at nutrition, is morally relevant (because self-preservation of the individual is). The problem is how this relevance will affect the judgment about single performances of nutritive acts.

Summa Contra Gentiles II. 122.

I refer to the last presentation of this argument, published by its authors in common: Grisez G. , Boyle J. , Finnis J. , May W. E. : “Every Marital Act ought to be Open to New Life”: Toward a Clearer Understanding, 1988; published in The Thomist, 52: 3 (1988) and (in an Italian version) in Anthropotes, IV: I (1988). I wish to thank Germain Grisez for having sent me the manuscript before its publication. I was pleased to see that this last version of the argument takes into consideration some objections I had occasion to raise in common discussions about the subject. Here is also the place to thank both Germain Grisez and John Finnis for raising some very useful objections to my own argument and having helped me thereby to introduce some important refinements.

See my Natur als Grundlage der Moral, cit., 367–374.

As it seems to have been the case in the theological working paper of the majority group of the famous Pontificial Commission on Population. Familyand Births. See for this Grisez G. : Dualism and the New Morality. In: Zalba M. : L'Agire Morale (Atti del Congresso Internazionale: Tommaso d'Aquino nei suo settimo centenario Vol. 5). Napoli 1974 323-330. See also my Natur als Grundlage der Moral, cit., for a more detailed examination of spiritualism and anthropological dualism underlying some influential schools of actual moral theology (mostly influenced by Karl Rahner).

Whereas the majority group of the mentioned Pontifical Commission wrote: “foecunditas hiologica in sfaeram humanam assumi debet”, a statement which Grisez, in his above cited article, rightly reproaches for implying anthropological dualism.

The misunderstanding and confusion between “function” and “meaning” is obvious in B. Häring: The Inseparability of the Unitive- Procreative Functions of the Marital Act., op. cit., p. 178 (already this title expresses the misunderstanding). “The expression ‘open to the transmission of life’ has much less meaning now. The marital act during pregnancy is acknowledged as being ‘open to new life’, and so is the conjugal act in the infecund periods despite the fact that scientific calculation might practically eliminate the probability of any transmission of life. It is unfortunate that Pope Paul uses the same phrase in referring to the ‘constant doctrine’ of the Church when historically the expression originated at a time when scientific theories on infecund periods were unknown.” Häring still thinks in biological patterns instead of adopting an intentional (moral) viewpoint.

Of course, without a basic, naturally given procreative “function” of sexuality, no sexual act could bear a procreative “meaning”. But, even if “meaning” has its roots in a “function”, as the intentional content of a human act it possesses a certain independence from the actual fertility of the act. This follows from integration of the “natural” into the higher order of the spirit.

Let me quote again Häring, op. cit., p. 188: “It is not easy to explain the relationship of the procreative to the unitive good in the marriage of proven sterile partners. Their marriage can fulfill the unitive meaning while it cannot truly and really fulfill a procreative role.” Again, the same misunderstanding seems to be at work. But afterwards, surprisingly, Häring affirms: “However. I think the combined functions are not totally excluded in such marriages, in which the partners truly consider each other as spouses, and love each other in a way that would keep them open for the parental vocation were such within the range of possiblity. One who sincerely loves his spouse as spouse would not refuse to have him or her as parent of his or her child if the choice were given“ (the emphasis is mine). This is surprising, because it is entirely correct: Häring here focuses the problem in a clearly intentional way. If he had treated the problem of contraception in the same way, he would have been able to understand the encyclical's teaching.

See I-II, q. 18, a. 10, where Aquinas properly says: “Species moralium actuum constituuntur ex formis, prout sunt a ratione conceptae.” But the species is formed by the object of an act (which includes also the goal of the intention, which as well is a specifying object). For a detailed interpretation of this doctrine see my Natur als Grundlage der Moral, cit., pp. 91-98; 318-374. Compare with this the rather naturalistic and biological intent of defining the object of the marital act made by the “earlier” Josef Fuchs, Biologie und Ehemoral, in Gregorianum 2 (1962), pp. 225-253.

Anscombe, G.E.M., Intention, Second Edition, 1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1979) p. 66 (§ 35).

Cf. Anscombe G.E.M. : Contraception and Chastity, op. cit., p. 17. There is an ambiguity in the term “intention”. “Intention” always signifies to relate to something by one's will; where there is an act of the will, there is an intention informed by practical reason. Human acts are chosen and, therefore, referred to with an act of deliberate (rationally guided) willingness. Thus, “objects” of human acts have to be described in terms of intentions. See also Anscombe: You can have Sex without Children, op. cit., p. 86: “We always need to distinguish the intention embodied in an action from the further intention with which the action is done: I am here concerned only with the former. Whatever ulterior intentions you may or may not have, the question first arises: what intention is inherent in the action you are actually performing? It is one thing to have or not have certain further intentions, another to modify the intentional action you in fact perform. What concerns us is the question: what are you here and now doing on purpose — whatever your ulterior aims?” What one is “here and now doing on purpose”, and this means what one is intentionally doing, this precisely is called the object of the act.

For this I refer again to Anscombe, You can have Sex without Children, op. cit., p. 85.

Precisely this was overlooked in a formerly famous article by the “earlier” Fuchs Josef (Biologie und Ehemoral. Gregorianum 43 [1962], pp. 225–253), who considered the marital act as having two objects or “fines operis”, a primary and a secondary one. It may seem paradoxical, but Fuchs was not able to conceive the objective unity of the marital act because of his considering “objects”, and especially the “procreative meaning”, as a kind of “natural functions”, and not as the content of intentional actions As an example of “biologism”, this article is still illuminating.

To a very similar result comes Belmans T. G. Le sens objectif de l'agir humain, op. cit., p. 425. Here the object of the conjugal act is defined as follows: “l'uition sexuelle entre conjoints, ouverte quant à son sens vécu à la transmission de la vie.” The German edition of Belmans” very accurate study puts it even better (see: Der objektive Sinn des menschlichen Handelns. … [Vallendar: Patris Verlag, 1984] 478 f.): “die geschlechtliche Hingabe an den Ehegatten” (= “sexual self-giving to the spouse”), “die inbezug auf ihren erlebnismässigen Sinngehalt für eine mögliche Weitergabe des Lebens offengehalten wird” (What, more simply, could be expressed as “intentionally open to procreation”).

I wish to emphasize that I do not overlook thereby the possibility of engaging in sexual intercourse outside marriage. The point is that sexual intercourse has essentially a marital (or bridal) meaning. Marital union is not only a “possibility” of performing sexual intercourse; but the very nature of sexuality, considered as a fully human and personal reality, consists just in its marital meaning: Full personal mutual self-giving of two human persons belonging to different sexes, without any restrictions and forever. Sexual intercourse outside marriage is not consummation of this kind of love; it, thus, contradicts to its objective meaning. According to the foregoing analysis, the following suggestion may be added: The traditional doctrine about the “two goals of marriage” (“fines matrimonii”) does not refer to exactly the same as the one about the “two meanings of the conjugal act”. The “finis secundarius” (“mutuum obsequium”, mutual assistance), as such, has nothing to do with the conjugal act., the “loving-union-meaning” of which obviously is not equal to the goal of “mutual assistance”. This “secondary goal of marriage” rather refers to marriage as a specific kind of human social reality that, according to traditional teaching, is an association of male and female primarily (basically) specified by its task of serving transmission of life. The “conjugal act”, however, plainly is not the same as “marital community”; it is rather the consummation of the very love from which marital community springs. Talking about the object of the conjugal act, therefore, is something conceptually different from talking about the goals of marriage. In the “object” of the conjugal act, the aspect of “loving union” (its unitive meaning) is just fundamental (and not at all “secondary”), and as such it involves the procreative meaning (which is not “primary”, but “inseparably connected” with the former). This precisely, the intrinsically procreative meaning of love between male and female, is the very reason why procreation is the primarily specifying goal of marital community; it owns this goal just insofar as “marital community” is a community of loving persons inclined to sexual union. So we may conclude that the question of the “two goals of marriage” and the question of the “two meanings of the conjugal act” are two quite different, though closely correlated, questions. About fifty years ago, a famous theologian, Herbert Doms, who opposed the, at the time generally held opinion according to which procreation was considered to be the “primary goal” or the “finis operis” of the conjugal act, tried to elaborate a “more personalistic” view. Unfortunately, by overlooking why this teaching was distorted, he was misled to falsely contending that “loving union” could equally be considered as the “finis primarius” of marriage (and of sexuality altogether), while in reality “loving union” has to be called the fundamental aspect of the object of the conjugal act. Actual moral theology is still suffering the consequences of this confusion.

About Ulpian and Aquinas, see the article by May William E. “The Meaning and Nature of the Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas,” in: American Journal of Jurisprudence, 22 (1977), pp. 168–189, and the references given there.

See II-II, q. 156, a.2.

See Aquinas Thomas “Virtus appetitivae partis nihil est aliud quam quaedam dispositio sive forma sigillata et impressa in vi appetitiva a ratione” (De Virtutibus in communi, a.9).

See e.g., I-II, q. 56, a. 4 where Aquinas explains that the sensual appetites are “natae rationi obedire”, so as to conclude: “Et sic irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis humanae: sic enim est principium humani actus, inquantum participat rationem.” The point of the virtues of temperance and force, hence, consists in rendering sensual appetites to be principles of human acts, which is equal to fully integrating them into the context of human action, according to their basic anthropological truth (based in substantial unity). This obviously does not apply to bodily functions which are not “natae rationi obedire” such as the heart, the liver, the digestive apparatus, etc. They are not principles of human acts but organic functions of the body. Of course, also in sexuality such mere organic functions are involved. But the sexual drive itself is much more than such a function.

This is the method adopted by Aquinas; see the Prologue to II-II: “… peccatum, cuius etiam cognitio dependet ex cognitione oppositae virtutis.” And: “est autem eadem materia circa quam virtus recte operatur et vitia opposita a rectitudine recedunt.” So, the method consists in “totam materiam moralem ad considerationem virtutum reducere”.

Cf. the well argued article by Bajda J. “Verantwortete Elternschaft und Antikonzeption”, in Wenisch E. (ed.): Elternschaft und Menschenwurde (Vallendar: Patris Verlag, 1984) 243–260.

Notice that this does not apply to the case of naturally given sterility, for this condition does not imply a choice of rendering needless the modification of sexual behavior. So the intentional relation to naturally given and voluntarily produced sterility is different. It is precisely this intentional relation which specifies and shapes further actions. Of course infertility by nature or disease also may be abused.

Anscombe, Contraception and Chastity, op. cit., p. 18–19.

If I talk about “operative integration” I do not talk about “ontological integration”. I do not wish to say that sexuality requires being “humanized”. Sexuality is human by its very ontological status (because of the substantial unity of body and spirit). “Operative integration” means to take into account this ontological status while acting.

See for this Finnis J. “Personal Integrity, Sexual Morality and Responsible Parenthood,” in Anthropos (now: Anthropotes) I (1985), pp. 43–55. For a more thorough analysis see K. Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, Part III.

Cf. Spaemann R. “Wovon handelt die Moraltheologie? Bemerkungen eines Philosophen,” in Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift 6 (1977), 307f.

This is why, in order to explain the connection between contraception and abortion, there is no need to interpret contraception as being essentially contralife or even in analogy with “homicide”. I argue just the other way around: The connection between abortion and contraception is sufficiently explained by the fact that abortion, insofar as it is promoted by spreading contraception, is characterized by a contraceptive mentality, that is, by a mentality which excludes the responsibility for the procreative consequences of one's sexual behavior. The basic problem is not that people do not want to have children; the basic and first problem is that they want to have sex without children.

For further details I refer to my Natur als Grundlage der Moral, cit. A summary is to be found in M. Rhonheimer, “Die Konstitutierung des Naturgesetzes und sittlichnormativer Objektivitat durch die praktische Vernunft,” in Autori Vari: Persona, Verita e Morale. Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Teologia Morale Roma 7-12 Aprile 1986 (Rome: Città Nuova Editrice, 1988) 859-884. See also the above mentioned article by May William E. The Meaning and Nature of the Natural Law ….

We may consider natural law either “formaliter” or “materialiter”. “Formaliter” considered, natural law is ordinatio rationis, the (universal) prescriptive acts of natural reason by which the order of reason is established in man's inclinations. “Materialiter” considered, natural laws are the natural inclinations insofar as they are integrated in the order of reason. Both considerations refer to the same reality; the former, however, aims at indicating the very essence of natural law; the latter stresses on its contents. As I think to have shown in my work about this subject, natural law is essentially the work of man's practical reason. Aquinas calls it, like “law” generally, an “opus rationis” (I-II, q. 94, a. 1) and “aliquid a ratione constitutum” (ibid.). When talking about natural law, the “reason” which is referred to is natural reason (“ratio naturalis”).

This often quoted anthropological insight, enunciated, e.g., in Familiaris Consortio, No. 32, is, as it seems to me, not evident by itself. However true it may be, in a philosophical context one has to argue for it, at least if one deals with a case of true responsible parenthood. With the foregoing analysis. I indeed claim to have provided such an argument which gives plain evidence of what John Paul II affirms in Familiaris Consortio. Therefore, I do not agree with those who simply repeat this teaching as an argument, using it as if were self-evident.

That precisely this full integration of the philosophical moralis consideratio into the higher context of moral theology may be considered as a specific feature of Aquinas's Secunda pars of his Summa Theologica has been convincingly shown by Abba G. : Lex et virtus. Studi sull'evoluzione della dottrina morale di san Tommaso d' Aquino. (Rome: LAS 1983). See also my Naturals Grundlage der Moral, cit., 195.

See John, 3, 17.