Abstract
Supported by scientific modes of representation, wildlife-management agencies commonly adopt policies that subordinate nonhuman species and resubstantiate human–nonhuman hierarchies. In this paper I illustrate the inadequacy of current management policies by drawing upon Deleuzian notions of immanence and movement and applying them to the specific case of Yellowstone bison. Modes of representation that define nonhuman ontology in terms of genetics are shown to be inadequate for they separate essence from experience and facilitate the removal and exclusion of nonhumans. In contrast, a Deleuzian theory of wildlife accentuates the importance of movement, contact, and contingency in the constitution of nonhuman ontology, thus outlining an approach that can also lead to a revision of human–nonhuman relations. In particular, movement provides a physical mechanism to bridge the theoretical gap that separates human from nonhuman, and suggests a means to link together ethical and evolutionary concerns regarding nonhumans. With the distinctions between Deleuzian theory and common wildlife-management practices in mind, the paradigm of sustainability is criticized for prioritizing demographic and genetic stability over spatial transgression, thereby minimizing the developmental capacities of nonhumans and legitimizing existing spatial structures of exclusion and control.
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