Do Local Policy Networks Deter the Race to the Bottom in Environmental Regulation? The Case of South Korea

Abstract

Scholars of environmental regulation have speculated that decentralization of policy authority may induce subnational governments to lower their regulatory stringency in pursuit of an economic advantage over other jurisdictions. I examine whether there is an environmental race to the bottom among local governments and to what extent local policy networks can offset this tendency in the nascent decentralized system of South Korea. The results of an empirical analysis of local enforcement activities show that, although positive regulatory gaps lack any significant influence, industrial decline leads local agencies to decrease their enforcement actions. Yet, I also find that local policy networks not only directly affect the regulatory behavior of local governments but also counterbalance the influence of industry, thereby mitigating the race to the bottom. Together, these findings suggest that decentralization may not always engender the interjurisdictional competition that leads to the suboptimal production of social policies.