The effect of local fiscal policy perception on the electoral process in a representative democracy is investigated. The test is made by using an ordinary least squares regression on a sample of fifty Spanish municipalities. The dependent variable is the relative increase in the number of votes in support of the political party in power between the two previous local elections, and the independent variables are public investment and taxes collected by local government. The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that fiscal perception affects voters’ behaviour.
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