In this paper the implications of locational surplus, defined as the benefits a citizen perceives as accruing to him/her by remaining in his/her present jurisdiction rather than migrating to another jurisdiction, are examined with respect to the traditional view that redistributive policies cannot be carried out effectively by subnational governments. Whether responsibility for redistributive policies should be assigned to national or to subnational governments is shown to depend on the extent to which there are disparities in economic and social conditions among subnational jurisdictions on the one hand, and on the extent to which distributional preferences differ among jurisdictions on the other.
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