Charles Babbage used an example suggested by the computational power of his calculating engine to suggest that ‘miraculous events’ might be as lawful as the regularities presumed by ‘vast inductions’. In this paper I revisit the issue by employing a simple shape grammatical example. Induction and emergence are contrasted.
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