The sizes and locations of an arbitrary number of retail stores in oligopolistic competition are sought through a representation and solution of an N-centre profit-maximizing model. The Nash-Cournot equilibrium states, which correspond to this competitive configuration are determined under variation in the number of stores and the parameters which govern spatial behaviour of consumers. This allows a comparison to be made of configurations generated by competitive processes with those which maximize consumer benefits. The relationship between profits and store numbers is explored theoretically and numerically.
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