Because of the nonconvexity of location choice, economists generally use two steps to construct spatial equilibria in monocentric cities: first they rank agents from the center (using, for instance, bid price functions), then they allocate goods. This paper provides a simple example in which externalities lead to a nonoptimal ranking at equilibrium.
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