Various studies have examined the equilibrium relationship between the local public sector and residential location. However, little is known about the disequilibrium adjustment processes in the provision of local public services. The present paper analyzes the dynamic process of disequilibrium adjustments in the local public sector in a realistic context. After deriving conditions for optimal provision of local services, factors displacing the initial equilibrium are analyzed, and the processes of adjustment are discussed.
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