In this paper, the quasi-optimal Pareto solution resulting from the imposition of an emission standard on an undepletable (public good) externality is derived. The basic vehicle around which the analysis is performed is a competitive general equilibrium model in the Negishi framework. The solution proves to be Pareto quasi-optimal in the sense that consumers will have maximized their utility for the given emissions level.
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