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References
1.See Pub.L. No. 106–113, §§ 4401-4402, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-557 (1999 ).
2.See Pub.L. No. 103–465, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809, 4984 (1994 ); see also Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
3.
35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A).
4.See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A)(i)—(iv); see also Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
5.See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)(i)—(iii); see also Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 139-140.
6.See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(C)(i)—(iii); see also Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
7.See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1).
8.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 139-140.
9.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
10.Id. .
11.Id. .
12.Id. .
13.Id. .
14.Id. at 140-141.
15.Id. at 141.
16.Id. .
17.Id. .
18.Id. .
19.Id. .
20.Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 140 (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 34238 (2004 )) (emphasis in quoted text).
21.
The Wyeth Court pointed out that the USPTO's rules regarding ‘A delay’ and ‘B delay’ essentially parrot the statutory text (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.703(f)), and that the ‘real interpretive act is found in something the [USPTO] calls its Explanation of 37 CFR 1.703(f) and of the [USPTO] Interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A)’, which is found in the Federal Registry at 69 Fed. Reg. 34238.
22.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
23.Id. at 140.
24.Id. .
25.Id. .
26.Id. .
27.Id. .
28.Id. .
29.Chevron v. NRDC , 467 US 837 (1984 ), dictates that a court must first determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear in the statute, then that is the end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the Court will give ‘deference’ to the agency's interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
30.See generally Chevron v. NRDC , 467 US 837 (1984 ).
31.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 140 (citing Merck & Co. v. Kessler , 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
32.Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 140 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3)(A)) (emphasis in quoted text).
33.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 141.
34.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 141 (citing MCI v. AT&T , 512 US 218, 229 (1994 ) (‘[A]n agency's interpretation of a statute is not entitled to deference when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear’.)).
35.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 141.
36.Id. .
37.Id. .
38.Id. .
39.Id. at 142.
40.
35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B); see also Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (emphasis added).
41.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
42.
35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A).
43.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
44.Id. .
45.Id. .
46.Id.; see also supra no. 6.
47.See Wyeth , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
48.Id. .
49.Id. .
50.Id. .
51.Id. .
52.See Wyeth et al v. Dudas , Civil Action No. 1:07-cv-01492-JR, Docket Item No. 29 (Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit).
53.See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4).