Book Reconsidered

The ego and the mechanisms of defence

Anna Freud, 1938

New York: International Universities Press, 1938

Ron Spielman

Sydney, Australia

‘She is a lioness, who is the daughter of a lion’. (French proverb)

O.H.D. ‘Bill’ Blomfield concludes his 1991 paper on Anna Freud's life and work with a reference to the above French proverb. It is embedded in a story drawn from a clinical vignette of Anna Freud's where she tells of a 7-year-old boy patient, troubled with castration anxiety. She writes ‘When I was seeing[this boy], at a time when he was very engaged with his lion story, my father walked through the waiting room which he and I shared, and the little boy nodded to me and then said, in reference to my father, “also a sort of a lion”’[1].

It would be good to be able to contribute a ‘revisiting’ of Anna Freud's earliest major contribution to psychoanalysis without having Freudpère stalking through it – but it would be impossible. Anna Freud's work on the defence mechanisms is itself a direct descendant of Sigmund Freud's own major ground-breaking work on conceptualising the origins and function of the ego. What a challenge to live as the daughter of a lionised father – and even have a child patient say so. We can only wonder – as many have – what the effect of being Sigmund Freud's daughter would have had on Anna Freud in regard to her becoming and being a prominent psychoanalyst in her own right.

If we are to be concrete about the French proverb, we will be content to accept the genetic transmission of leonine qualities as a biological given. But proverbs being what they are – and psychoanalysis being what it is – requires us to consider whether having to live as the daughter of a lion in itself obliges one to develop lion qualities of one's own, if one is to survive in a jungle of fearsome intellects.

Any reader interested in aspects of Anna Freud's biography will get a warm and respectful account from Blomfield's paper in the International Review of Psychoanalysis [2]. A more detailed, extensive and critical (as in evaluative) account of her life can be obtained from Elizabeth Young-Bruehl's definitive biography[3].

The ego and the mechanisms of defence has been extensively cited in psychoanalytic literature – one kind of modern-day measure of a work's influence. It has been the subject of several panels[4–6] at meetings of the American Psychoanalytic Association and it has indeed even been previously ‘revisited’ some 30 years after its original publication by Anna Freud herself, together with Joseph Sandler[1].

The ego and the mechanisms of defence is divided into four parts. The first and by far the largest part addresses the issue of the ego as the watchdog over the instinctual urges. A description of the analytic method as a technique of studying ‘the psychic institutions’ (id, ego and superego) is offered, but the major focus here, as the book's title suggests, is the nature and operation of the ego itself.

The term ‘psychic institutions’ is used freely and – understandably for the times – appears to take for granted that these ‘institutions’ actually exist. There have been many arguments mounted more recently (e.g. Schafer, [7]) against the idea of such ‘institutions’ and cautions against reification of them.

The second, third and fourth parts of the book address specific forms of defence mechanisms: denial, restriction of the ego (inhibitions), identification with the aggressor, altruism and defences in puberty against the specific problems of that developmental stage. (See Appendix for a fuller list of defence mechanisms mentioned throughout the volume.)

It must be remembered, too, that this small volume was first published in the mid 1930s, first in German and then in English. It is very readable and indeed quite chatty, in that Anna Freud uses the technique of writing ‘we’ do this, ‘we’ think that, etc., etc. Psychoanalytic theory and practice were still in their relative infancy and the golden years of Sigmund Freud's own productive life were about to end. One of Sigmund Freud's many contributions had been to discover the importance of unconscious mental phenomena in influencing behaviour, famously declaring ‘the ego is not master in its own house’[8].

Ironically, Anna Freud commences her book in a somewhat defensive manner. She feels the need to defend her focus on the ego itself against a potential charge of superficiality: that only the study of the id is a true depth psychology.

In chapter 1 she argues for the ego as the seat of observation. We can only become aware of id activities when they are out of harmony with the requirements of the ego:

All the defensive measures of the ego against the id are carried out silently and invisibly. The most that we can ever do is to reconstruct them in retrospect: we can never really witness them in operation…. The ego knows nothing of it; we are aware of it only subsequently, when it becomes apparent that something is missing.

The point she is emphasizing is that the ego is unaware of the unconscious defensive mechanisms in action: repression and reaction-formation, for example, are completed processes by the time any evidence of their having taken place becomes apparent. This raises important questions about the nature of consciousness and whether unconscious awareness is or is not a contradiction in terms.

If the ego is indeed unaware of the threatened irruption into consciousness of, say, an id impulse, at what level of awareness is a decision made within the mind to prevent such an irruption by utilizing a defence mechanism of any kind? Doesn't such a decision require a mental agency making a choice of some form or another?

A modern-day reading of the nature of consciousness [9] holds that all mental processes take place in the realm of the unconscious mind and that the outcomes of all such processes only become conscious by a proprioceptivelike property of the mind observing itself.

Chapter 2 is an extended argument about the application of analytic technique to the study of the psychic institutions. Its real purpose is to claim legitimacy for analysis of the ego itself – alongside the need to analyse the id. Toward the end of this chapter she writes:

Analytic theory has ceased to hold that the concept of the ego is identical with that of the system of perceptual consciousness; that is to say, we have realized that large portions of the ego institutions are themselves unconscious and require the help of analysis to become conscious.

Here she is coming toward what is to become Solm's position, albeit – as it is – one based firmly in Sigmund Freud's speculations about the nature of consciousness.

In developing this argument, she commences chapter 3 with a disarming disclaimer, but goes on to make an assertion which has become a famous dictum:

The tedious and detailed theoretical discussions contained in the last chapter may for practical purposes be summed up in a few simple sentences. It is the task of the analyst to bring into consciousness that which is unconscious, no matter to which psychic institution it belongs. He directs his attention equally and objectively to the unconscious elements in all three institutions. To put it another way, when he sets about the work of enlightenment, [the analyst] takes his stand at a point equidistant from the id, the ego and the superego. (italics added).

This dictum has become the central tenet of the important psychoanalytic principle of technical neutrality: that the analyst does not take sides in any of the conflicts which are the subject of analysis, and as far as is humanly possible seeks to refrain from intruding his or her own values onto the analysand.

This third chapter also addresses the question of trying to classify precisely what the ego is defending against. Anna Freud distinguishes (i) defence against instincts; (ii) defence against affects; and (iii) what she calls ‘permanent defence phenomena’.

The defences against the instinctual drives in the id are seen as resistances to the analysis and the analyst; in that the objective of the analysis is to permit an adequate understanding of these threatening id instincts, and any ego activity preventing this (albeit in the relative safety of the consulting room) is interpreted as resistance.

Defences against affects are seen as defences against a whole range of painful or unacceptable feelings associated with the sexual and aggressive drives.

The section on the so-called ‘permanent defence phenomena’ has what nowadays feels to be a quaint quality about it. She likens these phenomena to what Wilhelm Reich called the ‘armor-plating of character’.

Bodily attitudes such as stiffness and rigidity, personal peculiarities such as a fixed smile, contemptuous, ironical and arrogant behaviour – all these are residues of very vigorous defensive processes in the past which have become dissociated from their original situations (conflicts with instincts or affects) and have developed into permanent character traits, the “armor-plating of character” (Charakterpanzerung, as Reich calls it). When in analysis we succeed in tracing these residues to their historical source, they recover their mobility and cease to block by their fixation our access to the defensive operations upon which the ego is at the moment actively engaged.

If only it were so easy. Years of psychoanalytic struggle with the complexities of personality disorder (as opposed to the myth of discrete neuroses) have found that object relations theories offer more in understanding the operation of ‘character defences’ and personality disorder than does instinct theory.

In chapter 4, she develops Sigmund Freud's early attempts to correlate specific defence mechanisms with particular neurotic disorders, such as repression with hysteria and reaction formation and undoing with obsessive– compulsive disorder. She also speculates on chronological questions as to the appearance of different defence mechanisms at different stages of development.

Interestingly, in this chapter, there is a direct reference to the ‘English school’ (the Kleinians of even that early a time), where there is a stark difference in the conceptualization of the role of introjection and projection. Anna Freud clearly states the difference as:

According to the theory of the English school of analysis, introjection and projection, which to our view should be assigned to the period after the ego has been differentiated from the outside world, are the very processes by which the structure of the ego is developed and but for which differentiation would never have taken place. These differences of opinion bring home to us the fact that the chronology of psychic processes is still one of the most obscure fields of analytic theory.

It would be good to be able to assert that this is no longer the case, that such differences are no longer a matter of metapsychological opinion, but have been happily resolved by empirical research. While the new field of enquiry represented by modern infant developmental research is endeavouring to answer such questions, what actually takes place in the minds of young preverbal infants will remain elusive for some time.

In chapter 5, Anna Freud seeks to identify different sources of anxiety and perceived danger as the motives of defence. She claims the ego's fear of the superego to be the major source of neurosis in adults – but says that objective fear of the parents' prohibitions are the cause of infantile neurosis. One would have thought that the superego of an adult had its origins in the real and fantasized experiences of the parents, yet she appears to go to some lengths to differentiate these as different motives (pp. 55–58) for the employment of defences, even while acknowledging that they have a source in common (p.60). This is somewhat confusing.

The remainder of the volume deals with a small group of specific defence mechanisms, both in theory and with many illustrative clinical vignettes.

A definitively Anna Freudian contribution to the psychoanalytic literature, however, is the notion of Identification with the Aggressor, introduced in chapter 9. This is most recognizable in gross form in what has latterly been called ‘The Patty Hearst Syndrome’, wherein the abducted heiress identified with the objectives and values of her captors.

Anna Freud's clinical vignettes deal more with children facing fear of aggression or criticism. She claims the criticism is internalized and the offence and the guilt are externalized. She goes on to make an interesting assertion about the development of morality:

Vehement indignation at someone else's wrongdoing is the precursor of and substitute for guilty feelings on its own account. Its indignation increases automatically when the perception of its own guilt is imminent. This stage in the development of the superego is a kind of preliminary phase of morality. True morality begins when the internalized criticism, now embodied in the standard exacted by the superego, coincides with the ego's perception of its own fault. From that moment, the severity of the superego is turned inward instead of outward and the subject becomes less intolerant of other people. But, when once it has reached this stage in its development, the ego has to endure the more acute unpleasure occasioned by self-criticism and the sense of guilt.[italics added].

This notion, Identification with the Aggressor, has assumed tragic poignancy in current times, with our growing recognition that children who have suffered actual physical abuse are only too likely to, in adulthood, become abusers in their own right. The empirical observation of this all-too-common reality can be understood as both the Anna Freudian defence of identification with the aggressor and as the enactment of an internalized object-relationship as conceptualized by object relations theory.

The only hope of breaking this tragic cycle lies in the above quoted paragraph from Anna Freud; in the development of a sense of morality by internalizing the projected vehemence directed toward another. In object relations theory, the task is conceptualized as taking back the projected abused-self. Not much difference really (at least in this instance).

Chapter 10 deals with another defence which Anna Freud appears to have some particular interest in: that which she calls ‘a form of altruism’ or ‘altruistic surrender’ (a term she attributes to Edward Bibring). Here there is an extended clinical case vignette and a lengthy account of Cyrano de Bergerac's exploits. If it were made clear that what is being described in both cases is ‘pseudo-altruism’ one would have no argument with the interpretations she offers. But one is left with the uncomfortable feeling that Anna Freud leaves it as a form of genuine altruistic behaviour. One would think that successful sublimation would be required to achieve the lofty goals of genuine altruism, but in neither of her examples does this appear to be the case.

As Anna Freud is identified as one of the earliest child analysts, mention needs to be made of chapters 11 and 12 as contributions to the specific problems faced by adolescents. She identifies adolescence (of course) as a critical developmental stage and addresses specifically the problems posed by the hormonal and psychological challenges of puberty. As we know, not all adolescents come through these critical challenges unscathed.

Ego psychology and its vicissitudes

Nowadays, the theoretical world of psychoanalysis – at least in the English-speaking world – is subdivided into three major realms: ego psychology; object relations theory; and self psychology. The first is associated primarily with the writings of Anna Freud, the second with those of Melanie Klein and the third with Heinz Kohut. Each of these psychoanalysts claim that their own work is firmly based on the foundations of Sigmund Freud's theories and to have been developed from them.

The (mainly) American adherence to the so-called ‘classical Freudian’ traditions in psychoanalytic treatment have their link to Sigmund Freud strongly through the work of Anna Freud. Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris and Rudolph Lowenstein were the authors responsible for the American development of this position in the immediate post-Freudian era, while Leo Rangell and Jacob Arlow followed closely behind. Many American analysts have since been major contributors.

Apparent American disillusionment with the limitations of ego psychology is manifest in two developments: that led by Heinz Kohut with his awareness that many pregenital issues remain relatively unaddressed by ego psychology; and that resulting from a growing number of American analysts being influenced by exposure to the writings of and lectures and supervisions of (as well as analysis by) a number of prominent British analysts who represent the British object relations school of thinking.

In Britain, the analytic world was strongly affected by the conflicts between the Anna Freudian followers and the Melanie Kleinian disciples. This conflict spawned the now respected and productive Independent Group in British psychoanalysis[10, 11].

Nevertheless, in this environment, the Anna Freudian school of thinking has continued to develop and is now represented by the contemporary Freudian group. Of its major contributors Joseph Sandler and Anne-Marie Sandler are probably the more prominent. Peter Fonagy and Mark Solms are each making major current contributions, the former in the interface between psychoanalysis and attachment theory and the latter in the interface between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. Perhaps this reflects Sigmund Freud's earlier grounding in the biological realms – in contrast to Klein's heavy emphasis on the realm of phantasy.

Subsequent directions of research into the mechanisms of defence

‘There is probably no concept more central to psychoanalytic theory, therapy, or research than that of defence.’[12].

Fortunately, then, unlike many other aspects of psychoanalytic theory, the notion of discrete defence mechanisms does lend itself to more or less objective research. In fact, it is likely – as Schlesinger asserts – that among the many concepts which comprise psychodynamic theory, the defence mechanisms themselves have been subjected to more efforts at disciplined empirical research than any other.

The definition, classification and identification of defence mechanisms comprises an important part of the development of one of the earliest efforts in conducting outcome research in psychoanalysis on other than a single case study basis. The Hampstead Index[13] was established as a repository of carefully codified case material relating to child psychoanalytic treatment in order to systematically study the psychoanalytic treatment process and its outcomes. The defence mechanisms employed by each patient were explicitly recorded and any changes in combinations of such mechanisms were noted.

In the USA, a single case study approach was adopted by Weiss[14], who kept detailed records of an extensive analysis and had the records rated by trained assessors for any discernible changes in the utilization of discrete defence mechanisms.

One of the many researchers in this field who will be very familiar to psychiatrists is George Vaillant who has conducted original research into the operation of defence mechanisms[15]. Vaillant has classified the defences into three major categories: immature, intermediate and mature. He correlated recognizable clusters of defence mechanisms with levels of more or less successful adaptation to life by longitudinally following cohorts of subjects.

Further developments utilizing similar techniques include the work of Holzman and Perry[16] who rated video-taped interviews for the presence or absence of 22 defences categorized as immature, borderline or neurotic; while Perry and Cooper[17] have focused specifically on the defences utilized by borderline personality disordered patients. This has involved the broadening of the range of defences under examination to include those more identified with object relations theory.

Of interest to many readers of this journal will be that two Australian researchers have also established a position for themselves in the literature on this topic. Gavin Andrews and Christopher Pollock have published work on the role of defence mechanisms in anxiety disorders (e.g[18, 19]).

A technique utilized by these researchers has been to tape record and transcribe interviews with both patients and non-clinical samples (especially twin cohorts) and to have these transcripts assessed for evidence of the subjects' use of discrete defence mechanisms by independent raters.

Conclusion

Psychoanalysis has provided a wide range of concepts relevant to clinical practice, that of defence mechanisms has been the most applicable.

While Anna Freud's book is somewhat outdated, it may legitimately lay claim to credit for being the impetus to a developmental stream in psychoanalysis and to a fruitful body of clinical and theoretical research.