Abstract
Researchers’ interest in the psychology of ethics has increased dramatically in the last 20 years. Because of the influence of “modern” moral philosophy on psychology, what has received most attention, and has even been taken by some to be an essential characteristic of morality, are oughts (i.e., duties and obligations). Consistent with some more recent advances in the psychological literature (and contemporary philosophy), we propose that this is not the only approach to moral value. Using regulatory focus theory as a lens, we suggest that more attention should also be paid to an important motivational alternative—ethical ideals (i.e. advances and aspirations). We review evidence that we believe supports the conclusion that ethics consists of (at least) 2 evaluative systems—not only a system of oughts that is concerned with maintaining obligations, but also a system of ideals that is concerned with attaining virtues.
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