Ruling Out Behavior Rules: When Theoretical Virtues and Empirical Evidence Collide

Abstract

In this article, I assess several methodological concerns surrounding mentalistic interpretations of infant social cognition. Those skeptical of such interpretations have offered behavior-reading interpretations of the same phenomena, thereby leading to an extended debate that has been, often implicitly, a debate over methodology in psychological explanations. In what follows, I set out the methodological concerns that arise in assessing the two interpretations and show the critical role these concerns play in this particular debate. Although it will become clear that I contend the overall debate favors the mentalistic interpretation over the behavior-rule interpretation, I will be focusing primarily on how to conceptualize the problems under discussion, rather than trying to solve them directly. Because additional empirical and conceptual work will be required to support either interpretation, I hope to situate both past and future work within a more thoroughly methodological terrain than has been attempted to date.