Owing to the intentional nature of consciousness, people possess a special kind of contact with the real world. They apprehend part of it in a qualitative and cognitive manner at the ontological level suitably described as corresponding to the psychological. At the core of the visual system's molar activities, a stream of visual awareness flows and is the very form wherein direct visual reference to the world is accomplished. Also a function of the visual system, when it is operating in the mode called “viewing” or “reflective seeing,” is one's immediate apprehension of visual perceptual experience per se. Using an approach that draws on both ecological and phenomenological thought, the author seeks to make progress toward a conceptual structure for consciousness.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
BrentanoG. (1973). Psychology from an empirical standpoint (RancurelloA. S., TerrellD. B., & McAlisterL. L.,). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1911)
2.
BurkeL. (1962). On the tunnel effect. In MichotteA., Causalité, permanence et realité phenomenales (pp. 374–406). Louvain, Belgium: Publications Universitaires. (Original work published 1952)
3.
ClarkR. (1982). Sensibility and understanding: The given of Wilfrid Sellars. The Monist, 65, 350–364.
4.
CoweyA. (1994). Cortical visual areas and the neurobiology of higher visual processes. In FarahM. J. & RatcliffG., The neuropsychology of high-level vision (pp. 3–31). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
5.
DeweyJ. (1906). The terms “conscious” and “consciousness.”Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, 3, 39–51.
6.
DulanyD. E. (1997). Consciousness in the explicit (deliberative) and implicit (evocative). In CohenJ. D. & SchoolerJ. W., Scientific approaches to consciousness (pp. 179–212). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
7.
EcclesJ. C. (1980). The human psyche. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
8.
EcclesJ. C. (1981). Mental dualism and commissurotomy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 105.
9.
GazzanigaM. S., FendrichR., & WessingerC. M. (1994). Blindsight reconsidered. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 3, 93–96.
10.
GibsonJ. J. (1950). The perception of the visual world. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
11.
GibsonJ. J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
12.
GibsonJ. J. (1970). On the relation between hallucination and perception. Leonardo, 3, 425–428.
13.
GibsonJ. J. (1978). The perceiving of hidden surfaces. In MachamerP. K. & TurnbullR. G., Studies in perception (pp. 435–466). Columbus: Ohio University Press.
14.
GibsonJ. J. (1982a). On the new idea of persistence and change and the old ideas that it drives out. In ReedE. S. & JonesR., Reasons for realism (pp. 393–396). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
15.
GibsonJ. J. (1982b). The useful dimensions of sensitivity. In ReedE. S. & JonesR., Reasons for realism (pp. 350–370). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
16.
GibsonJ. J. (1986). The ecological approach to visual perception. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
17.
GurwitschA. (1985). Marginal consciousness. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
18.
HenleM. (1974). On naive realism. In R. B. MacLeod & H. L. Pick, Jr., Perception (pp. 40–56). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
19.
HenleM. (1977). On the distinction between the phenomenal and the physical world. In NicholasJ. M., Images, perception and knowledge (pp. 187–194). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Reidel.
20.
HusserlE. (1977). Phenomenological psychology. The Hague: Nijhoff.
21.
HusserlE. (1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology (KerstenF.,). The Hague: Nijhoff. (Original work published 1913)
22.
JamesW. (1950). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Dover. (Original work published 1890)
23.
JamesW. (1984). Psychology, briefer courseCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1892)
24.
KoffkaK. (1935). Principles of Gestalt psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
25.
KöhlerW. (1947). Gestalt psychology (rev. ed.). New York: Liveright.
26.
LevinasE. (1973). The theory of intuition in Husserl's phenomenology (OrianneA.,). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1930)
27.
LombardoT. J. (1987). The reciprocity between perceiver and environment. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
28.
MichotteA. (1963). The perception of causality (MilesT. R.,). London: Methuen. (Original work published 1946)
29.
MichotteA., ThinèsG., & CrabbéG. (1991). Amodal completion of perceptual structures. In ThinèsG., CostallA., & ButterworthG., Michotte's experimental phenomenology of perception (pp. 140–167). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. (Original work published 1964)
30.
NatsoulasT. (1977). On perceptual aboutness. Behaviorism, 5, 75–97.
31.
NatsoulasT. (1982). Conscious perception and the paradox of “blind-sight.”. In UnderwoodG., Aspects of consciousness (Vol. 3, pp. 78–109). London: Academic Press.
32.
NatsoulasT. (1983). Concepts of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 4, 13–59.
33.
NatsoulasT. (1989). The distinction between visual perceiving and visual perceptual experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 10, 37–61.
34.
NatsoulasT. (1991). Consciousness and commissurotomy: III. Toward the improvement of alternative conceptions. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 12, 1–32.
35.
NatsoulasT. (1992a). The concept of consciousness3: The awareness meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 22, 199–225.
36.
NatsoulasT. (1992b). Is consciousness what psychologists actually examine?American Journal of Psychology, 105, 363–384.
37.
NatsoulasT. (1992c). The tunnel effect, Gibson's perception theory, and reflective seeing. Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung, 54, 160–174.
38.
NatsoulasT. (1992–1993a). The stream of consciousness: I. William James's pulses. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 12, 3–21.
39.
NatsoulasT. (1992–1993b). The stream of consciousness: II. William James's specious present. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 12, 367–385.
40.
NatsoulasT. (1993a). An introduction to reflective seeing: Part I. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 14, 235–256.
41.
NatsoulasT. (1993b). Perceiving, its component stream of perceptual experience, and Gibson's ecological approach. Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung, 55, 248–257.
42.
NatsoulasT. (1993c). What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 6, 137–154.
43.
NatsoulasT. (1994a). Gibson's environment, Husserl's Lebenswelt, the world of physics, and the rejection of phenomenal objectsAmerican Journal of Psychology, 107, 327–358.
44.
NatsoulasT. (1994b). An introduction to reflective seeing: Part II. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 15, 351–374.
45.
NatsoulasT. (1994c). On the distinction between the object and content of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 15, 239–264.
46.
NatsoulasT. (1995). Consciousness3 and Gibson's concept of awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 16, 305–328.
47.
NatsoulasT. (1996). The case for intrinsic theory: II. An examination of a conception of consciousness4 as intrinsic, necessary, and concomitant. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 17, 369–390.
48.
NatsoulasT. (1997). Blindsight and consciousness. American Journal of Psychology, 110, 1–34.
49.
NatsoulasT. (1998). On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness: James's ubiquitous feeling aspect. Review of General Psychology, 2, 123–152.
50.
Oxford English dictionary1989). 2nd ed.). (1989 Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
51.
PopperK. R., & EcclesJ. C. (1977). The self and its brain. Berlin: Springer.
52.
SearleJ. R. (1990). Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 585–642.
53.
SearleJ. R. (1992). The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.
54.
SellarsW. (1978). Some reflections on perceptual consciousness. In BruzinaR. & WilshireB., Crosscurrents in phenomenology (pp. 169–185). The Hague: Nijhoff.
55.
SingerJ. L. (1997–1998). Editorial statement. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 17, 177–178.
