Among problems psychologists of consciousness face is how to conceive of those mental states, events, or processes with which people have an intimate familiarity in their own case. Psychologists must not only determine the causal roles these occurrences play, but also their intrinsic properties. This article seeks to contribute to understanding what and how the conscious mental occurrences are in themselves, starting from W. James's conception of them, according to which every basic durational component of the stream, each successive state of consciousness, is an integral pulse of mentality possessing a feeling aspect and a cognitive aspect. Attention is also given to their reflexive aspect, wherein one has inner awareness of their occurrence and, often, of their type and content.
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