Abstract
The desert seems useless. But it exists and we should consider its possibilities. Il'f and Petrov The firemen decided that the most effective way to put down the fire was by total conflagration. Lenta.ru, December 23, 2006
The Soviet absorption of Central Asia in the 1920s followed the usual path of modern colonization, i.e. military intervention and subsequent Cultural Revolution which strived to rapidly transform a “backward people” into “civilized citizens” by changing their traditions and altering their nature (Khalid, 2006). The success of such a conquest required control over the conquered territories by establishing law and order. By the 1920s, the Red Army was winning battles over the Central Asia which included territories of Turkistan, Bukhoro and Semirechie. Soviet hopes the immediate “victory” of the socialist system in Central Asia was however shattered. The demise of the traditional hierarchical system did not automatically lead to the establishment of modern and secular republics. Instead what followed was a decade of insurgency, lawlessness, and corruption. The following article analyses some of these trends based on the research of the Red East Soviet archives.
The revolution and civil war succeeded in eliminated the existing power structure, but did not change traditional political culture, centuries-old economic ties, societal attitudes, systems of beliefs, or symbols of hierarchy and prestige. The “locals” of the “Eastern territories” did not take well to the new system. They resisted social and cultural transformation and congregated to familiar patrons and Muslim authorities. In the absence of viable alternatives, many continued to resolve their problems through clan networks based on the patronage system. 1
Khalid, 233.
This power vacuum as rapidly filled with power-hungry adventurers, remaining elites, and the previously-dispossessed, who used and abused the situation for their personal gain. Many newly-appointed Soviet and Party officials—including from both locals and outsiders—were tempted by stunning opportunities to enrich themselves. This region situated at the trade crossroads of the centuries-old Silk Road, so wonderfully affluent in its resources, lay open in front of them like the land of treasures from the Arabian tales. And chaos without accountability provided perfect opportunities for the abuse of power, corruption, and embezzlement. The system was “Soviet” in form; its content had little to do with socialist ideas.
It became painfully clear that communist ideology was often used by “accidental revolutionaries”, as an excuse for the acquisition of personal power and profit. One Party official writes: “Many joined us and followed communism only because they smelled profit for themselves. As soon as it became less lucrative, they turned away from our communist slogans and followed something else”. 2
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 1252, op. 1, d. 147 (1), 50.
Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 153(2), 7.
Ibid, d. 196 (3), 7.
In 1920, alarmed by the deteriorating situation, Soviet authorities sent in the “Red East,” a propaganda train. The officials onboard were to assess the state of Central Asian affairs, as well as to deliver lectures and literature, and to give theatrical performances for the “liberated.” “The Red East” visited Samarqand, Farghona, Andijon, and the Syr-Darya region, as well as many areas of Semirechie; altogether, some 20 cities, 12 settlements, 95 villages, and 49 subdivisions. According to the records, the train delivered 65 lectures with a total audience of 10,000 people, and organized 327 public meetings with a total audience of 197,000 people. The train journey took months and lasted until the end of 1921. 5
Ibid, d.192, p. 2.
The trip through deserts and steppes was expected to be peaceful, so there initially were few armed men aboard. Soon, however, the trip turned into a full-blown investigation on wheels. Overwhelmed by an avalanche of breaches of law and order, train authorities called for reinforcements. The first to arrive were investigators, who inspected 49 regions and 95 villages, and accepted 785 complaints. Just under half of those (365) were resolved on the spot, 6
Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 153, 327.
The complaints illuminated numerous wide-ranging problems. One pressing issue was the organized resistance of the local populations. The “insurgents” formed bands—varying in size from twenty to eight hundred members—which were engaged in arms sales, militant conspiracies, provocations against the Red Army, anti-Soviet attacks, and robberies of stores and trains. 7
Ibid, d. 147 (1), 50.
Ibid, d. 159, 46.
Ibid, 52.
Equally disappointing were increasing accounts of “terrorist” activities linked to Party and Soviet officials. On one occasion, a gang numbering twenty one people was arrested in Samarqand, along with the chairman of the regional ChK. 10
ChK-Chrezvychainaia Kommissiia po bor'be s ugolovnoi aktivnosty, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (Cheka) established 1917.
Ibid, d. 142 (2), 134.
Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 160 (1).
Such chaos made it virtually impossible to distinguish between friend and foe. People displayed their loyalty one day and switched sides the next. Most were following their own agenda. When confronted, they covered up for each other, and often deceived all sides. The infamous Farghona valley bandit Bayan and his gang once held a celebration in a village. When the authorities arrived, all except proud Bayan ran away. He was arrested with six bloody knives in his possession. Two days later, however, one of the militia members released Bayan, claiming that Bayan's behavior was “nothing more than normal partying with his brothers”. 13
Ibid, d. 143(2), 20.
Ibid, d. 143 (3), 10.
The situation demanded an urgent response from Soviet authorities. Yet the army contingent was small and local Bolshevik authorities had neither the revenue nor the trained personnel to stop criminal activities. Both the cities and the rural areas were under-governed: For instance, there were only 100 militia members in the one city populated by 8000 people. The salary of militia members was 800 rubles a month, plus a small food ration which included meat, barley, and butter. 15
The pound of bread cost 100–120 rubles, a pile of wood-5000 rubles, a pair of boots-10,000 rubles; an official's salary—6500 a month (GARF, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 196 (1), 146).
Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 146 (1), 9.
Ibid, d. 146 (1), 12.
It is no wonder that some local militia members turned to illegal activities to supplement their small salaries and limited authority. Border patrolmen were implicated in armed robberies and illegal confiscations of food, wine, rugs, pillows, and blankets. Others were engaged in racketeering, hooliganism, inappropriate disruptions of religious holidays, attempted murder, falsification of reports, and beatings of civilians. 18
Ibid, d. 140 (3), 91.
Ibid, 103.
Ibid, d. 143 (3), 147.
Even when guided by good intentions, the military and militias wrought havoc due to a lack of proper training and/or clear instructions. For example, an urgent request for assistance was sent from the border patrol in Bukhoro to the central authorities in Moscow: “We have no idea what is supposed to be confiscated and what is not. What counts as a contraband and what does not? The Bukhoro boarder patrol operates in the dark, it confiscates everything people bring to Customs, which causes complaints from local populations, and we have no way to resolve it since we have no one in charge and no one gives us orders”. 21
Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 140 (2), 42.
Ibid, d. 140 (2), 62.
The “Red East” train investigators came to the conclusion that corruption, fraud, embezzlement, bribery, forgery, and debauchery among the members of the local Soviet organizations, ChK, and the Special political divisions everywhere in the region were rampant. 23
Ibid, d. 140 (3), 85.
Ibid, 12.
Ibid, d. 147 (4), 190–192.
Children and the elderly and sick were particularly vulnerable to becoming victims of such bezpredel (total disorder). The director of one orphanage used its funds for his own personal needs. 26
Ibid, 192.
Ibid, d. 148, 25.
Ibid, d. 148, 27.
Ibid, d. 140 (3), 48.
Ibid, d. 145 (1).
Ibid, 11.
Confronted with this avalanche of abuses, the train investigators were forced to initiate further inspections of local institutions, offices, factories, schools, orphanages, and sanatoriums. The inspection of the Shymkent sanatorium for tuberculosis patients revealed a horrible picture. Mushtaev, the director of the sanatorium who was a former telegraph official, was incapable of meeting his responsibilities, though he had the best intentions. There were shortages of kumis (a drink made out of horse's milk), which was the main treatment for the patients, many of whom were seriously ill. The food was of poor quality and there were no medications. Patients were placed in yurts (nomadic huts) and slept on the ground. There was no garbage removal and all the lavatories were unsanitary. An investigator concluded: “The first Soviet tuberculosis sanatorium is a total failure”. 32
Ibid, d. 147(2), 192.
The inspection of the local orphanage was equally disturbing. There were no mattresses and children slept on the bunk beds without blankets. They had no shoes and no spare clothing, thus they were forced to go naked on laundry days. Everything had been stolen and the director was accused of embezzlement. 33
Ibid, d. 158 (2), 8.
Ibid, d. 144 (1).
The investigators concluded that the entire regional system was in chaos. Many officials had no shame while pocketing profits from the sale of national resources. An investigation revealed that the former chairman of the revolutionary committee, a chairman of the department of supplies Kuydin, the chairman of the military factory Kamesnkiy, the chairman of the export-import department Saltanyantz, and the merchant Abramov systematically stole Soviet goods and sold them to the neighboring countries. In another case in the city of Khoqand, the investigation uncovered illegal sales of stolen diamonds. 35
Ibid, d. 159, 44.
Ibid, d. 147 (1), 122.
Ibid, d. 140 (3), 48.
Soviet control committees worked day and night and learned that fish and egg supplies were left to rot at a loss of millions, that reserves of smoked fish were stolen, that there was no control over cattle diseases; that most meat suppliers did not fulfill their obligations yet were handsomely paid; that all the books from libraries miraculously disappeared; that local vineyards were abandoned; and that there was no protection of cotton and oil production. 38
Ibid, d. 140 (2), 157.
In the absence of vigilant and constant control, many members of the local party, and ChK and Soviet organizations, cleverly utilized their positions to benefit themselves. Poor accountability on the one hand and the riches of the region on the other created a perfect recipe for corruption. Numerous opportunities reinforced competition among various groups for political and economic power, which guaranteed free access to goods and resources. One report keenly assessed the situation: “The fortune-hunters are swarming around the Commissariats like bees; they append themselves to it like parasites and eat it alive. Every official thinks it is his duty to join the organization, steal, cover his tracks, and then disappear so that others have a chance to replace him at the feeder”. 39
Ibid, d. 152 (3), 148.
The struggle for spoils between the local ChK and the Special division of Internal Affairs turned into “mortal combat” that had little to do with ideological disagreements. 40
Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 153 (3), 87.
In addition, officials used their positions to pursue personal vendettas. In one case, Stepanov, who was in charge of the personnel files of the Katta-Kurghan Special division, falsely accused his colleague Lialin of treason because of a personal conflict. As a result, Lialin was arrested and kept in jail for one month. Dimitrik-Maliarik, the investigator of the same department, gave permission to arrest Lialin, yet later was himself incarcerated for fraud and alcohol abuse. 41
Ibid, d. 196 (3), 7.
Ibid, d. 140, 5.
In their pursuit of power, many officials recruited criminal elements and created a protected circle of loyal followers. Sipko, the former chairman of the Katta-Kurghan regional ChK, was accused of cruel treatment of working people, of being intoxicated in public, and of taking bribes. 43
Ibid, d. 140(3), 43.
Ibid, d. 145 (2), 24.
Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 145(2), 27.
Further investigation into the Sipko case revealed that Kuper had assisted another criminal defendant, Bayan, and helped him to escape from justice—because Bayan's sister was having an intimate relationship with a friend of Kuper's. It was established that Bayan paid a great deal of money for his release. 46
Ibid, d. 145(2), 11.
Ibid.
Enraged and discouraged, central authorities continued to push for the victory of the socialist system. But local traditional economic, social, and cultural ties remained very strong and presented a formidable impediment. Instead of choosing a bright path towards a modern secular republic, local populations continued to rely on uniquely regional patterns of trade, patron–client relationships, family ties, and class structures that ran contrary to modern notions of equality and fraternity. 48
Ibid, d. 145 (2), 13.
With the establishment of the Soviet representative system of the local elections the patron–client networks gained new meaning and purpose. The elections were seen by many as a method to reinstall local elites to positions of power. Votes were often bought with camels and horses. 49
Ibid, 27.
Ibid, d. 140 (3), 145–146.
Ibid,13.
Ibid, 18.
Ibid.
Many local residents hesitated to seek justice through the Soviet system and resorted to bribes, which was an overwhelming phenomenon that was especially difficult to combat. An investigator writes: “The native population is used to the system of bribes and accepts it as the natural order of things. The natives, divided into groups, at the time of the elections vote for their local representatives only (because of their ignorance of the system). Some hoped that their native official will be on their side and will mend laws solely in the interest of their group. After such an official is elected or appointed, the opposing group writes denunciations or complains about the results of the elections. Such denunciations are often exaggerated or falsify facts, which make it difficult to investigate. People also use false witnesses. There are many tea rooms (chaikhana) where so-called professional witnesses gather, drink tea, and patiently waited for their turn to be hired”. 54
Ibid, 149.
In some cases entire families, including their friends, clients, and patrons, i.e. “the circle,” became the target of thorough investigations. The case of Sultanbek Takhtanbekov, from the city of Andijon, was particularly informative. Sultanbek Takhtanbekov joined the Bolshevik party during World War I. After 1917, was appointed the chairman of the revolutionary committee of the city of Andijon. Soon enough Sultanbek was accused of bribes. 55
Ibid, d. 150, 12.
Ibid, d. 146 (2), 128.
The investigators found that another relative of the brothers, Muminbaev, was the chairman of the local butchers committee. With him, they concocted a successful scheme to undercut their competition. Muminbaev, known and respected as a “patron of all people” went to Soviet authorities and offered them a proposal. He would borrow three million rubles to purchase lambs and then sell the meat to the people twenty rubles cheaper than the rest of the butchers. The chairman of the revolutionary committee, Baryshev, issued a license to Muminbaev to sell the meat. He also gave him a mandate for the transaction and 50 million rubles. Muminbaev then purchased lambs for 40 million rubles and shared his profit with the parties involved. 57
Ibid, d. 146 (2), 177.
The case of Takhtambekov went farther. Numerous witnesses testified that Takhtambekov and Co. interfered with the electoral process and threatened any opposition to their loyalists. Khusanbekov, a Party member since 1918, testified that at the Party conference one of the candidates for reelection, Pardzhiev, was accused of fraud and removed from the list. Pardzhiev had had some information that would be detrimental to the reputation of Takhtambekov and his people. Thus, Takhtambekov used a pre-emptive strike to remove Pardzhiev before he could present his accusations at the Party conference. 58
Ibid, 173.
Ibid, 174.
Many witnesses testified to Takhtambekov's long criminal history. One witness, Sarkirov, testified that he once went to the neighboring house to borrow a meat grinder. There he saw many familiar Party officials who played cards for money. One of the players was Sultanbek Takhtambekov. While the gambling was a traditional male leisure activity for Muslim communities, gambling was considered a violation of Party discipline. The investigators suspected that the private gambling houses served as a breeding ground for conspiratorial activities against the Soviets. It was discovered that the patrons of the gambling houses gathered to discuss illegal business transactions. They sold and traded merchandise as well as gold and silver. Taking advantage of privileged information, they compiled lists of wealthy city people and periodically threatened them with arrest while extorting tributes. They once captured Chinese merchants along the border and confiscated goods totaling twenty-eight million rubles. Ironically, the confiscated merchandise was later uncovered hidden in the basement of the local court house. 60
Ibid, 188–190.
Takhtambekov and Co. disobeyed the authorities and openly demonstrated their total disregard for Soviet power. One ChK member recollected with disgust:” I was present at one of their parties. All of the officials were drinking grape vodka. They got drunk and started to tell jokes about the workers-communists. I asked them: “Aren't you the workers?” They said: “No. We are the proletariat”. I said: “You are not the proletariat; you are marauders who devour the body of the proletariat like a flock of black ravens”. 61
Ibid, 177.
The investigations were slowed down by the reluctance of locals, particularly the poor, to come forward with information about their abusers. Their fear of retaliation was not unfounded. It was indeed unsafe to complain and report injustices. Prior to the arrival of the “Red Train”, local authorities were commonly released from jail even if their crimes were confirmed. In one case, the chairman of the censorship department, Goloborod'ko, was charged with theft and detained. He was later released and appointed to the Special political department. In another case, Molari-Dmirik, a military investigator who was previously director of the provisional department, was changed with theft and alcohol abuse. He then began his own investigation of Party members and jailed several witnesses in his own case. One reports noted: “No wonder the local population refuses to cooperate with Soviet power. They know what happens to those who complain. For example, a local female teacher was arrested as a saboteur when she openly spoke against sexual assault and injustices”. 62
Ibid, d. 140 (3), 10.
The chairman of the Katta-Kurghan regional ChK agreed: “The bandits under the mask of communism occupy positions of power and use their positions for personal purposes. The so-called Soviet administration is nothing more than the bandits themselves. They expropriate property and when caught move from one position of power to another. Where is justice? An official was arrested after some locals brought charges against him, but the next day they saw that him walking the streets freely. What kind of horror must they have felt? Poor Muslims have no trust in Soviet power. They would rather give up all of their possessions than seek justice from Soviet authority”. 63
Ibid, 7.
The deteriorating situation began to change the social, cultural, and spiritual ties within these traditional communities. Many religions restrictions previously imposed by Muslim authorities were ignored, along with the new Bolshevik orders. There were innumerable cases of alcohol abuse, which happened in predominantly Muslim areas. Both non-Muslim outsiders and local Muslims were engaged in the production, sale, and consumption of moonshine vodka, called kishmishovka (made out of kizhmish, a type of grape) which was considered to be a serious offense 64
Ibid, 143(1), 165.
Ibid, d. 147 (3).
While many disregarded religious restrictions in respect to alcohol, they still continued to obey the hierarchy of local communities based on status and prestige. The new elite replaced the old. The symbolic representation of status and prestige continued to depend on the possessions of horses, camels, and wives, as well as on elaborate and expensive ritualistic celebrations of wedding and holidays. The only available financial sources for such celebrations were the Party funds which many officials treated as their own possessions. 66
Ibid, d. 147 (3), 134.
The New Year celebration in the city of Perovsk was one example of such celebration: “The elites of the city celebrated the New Year. All the officers wore golden uniforms and all the rich people were wrapped in furs. They cooked lamb and drank alcohol while the local population starved. For entertainment they invited a singer who sung “God, Save the Tsar!” They had clearly forgotten that the times had changed dramatically. Offended local workers attempted to stop the celebration. In response the elites started to shoot at them with revolvers. The workers came prepared, and responded with gun fire as well. The celebration was over and many were killed”. 67
The pound of bread cost 100–120 rubles, a pile of wood-5000 rubles, a pair of boots-10000 rubles; an official's salary—6500 a month (GARF, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 196 (1), 146).
In another case, a wedding reception which cost three million rubles was organized by the political commissar, Shadyrov. Prior to this event, there were already allegations of embezzlement against Shadyrov. According to witnesses, the wedding reception was attended by three hundred people: local Party members, high officials of the region, heads of chancelleries, and chairmen of militia. After some hours they started to sing arias from the opera “Demon” and threatened “to punch everyone in the face” if interrupted. 68
Ibid, f. 1251, op. 1 d. 146 (1,2,3), 65.
Alarmed officials commented: “There are plenty of Party generals who use the people's money to drink and pay for personal tailors. The Party committees organize banquets with fountains of wines and liquors, invite capitalists, and use public trains for their personal trips. Such behavior causes enormous resentment and rage amidst working people who are at the point of starvation. A member of the local government, Bronde, and his pals traveled on the train with luxury for days, engaged in alcoholic debauchery. The entire Party organization protested against it. During one orgy, the representative Bartashevich passed out on a pile of five bottles of vodka and twelve bottles of wine. During his attempted arrest he woke up and yelled “Don't you dare!”. 69
Ibid.
Some Soviet officials continued the practices of the Russian imperial administration and supported discrimination against some ethnic groups. 70
Ibid, d. 142 (2), 165.
Ibid, d. 147 (1), 5.
Some Soviet officials used the “divide and conquer” rule, allowing one ethnic group to assert dominance over another. Such attitudes fueled hatred and resentment. In one case, a conflict erupted between local Muslims and recently-arrived Armenian Christians that led to ethnic violence. 72
Ibid, d. 147 (1), 69.
Ibid, d. 147 (3), 18.
Understandably, many local people sought protection for their faith and livelihood and congregated to familiar Muslim religious authorities. Many observers noticed that mullahs cleverly used their influence to attract young people. Under their roof, these young people were sheltered and received instructions in organized resistance. This rapidly led to the rise of insurgency. One official wrote: “It is our own fault that all Russians are seen as enemies of the Muslims”. 74
Ibid, d. 147(2), 135.
The demands to establish control over the state of “unrest” and “chaos” in Central Asia escalated. With every passing month the rhetoric of reports and newspapers’ editorials became increasingly militant. One such editorial entitled “One more front!” claimed that Soviet and Party organizations were full of accidental revolutionaries, adventurers, black marketers, and former gendarmes: “Like parasites they use their profitable positions, take bribes, spend millions of rubles of the people's money for their own pleasure, and rob local populations without remorse. Russians, Muslims, former tsarist officials, former policemen, interpreters, and sometimes workers spoiled by the local anarchy and lawlessness, are tied tightly up in a disgusting knot. Even local ChKs, the institutions that were supposed to fight corruption and crime, are not free of such elements. The activities of the insurgents under such circumstances are out of control. Soviet power is drowning under the tsunami of the criminals. Honest and loyal officials transferred from the center have no power. While the republic is still fighting at the Polish front there is also the Turkestan front. We fight Soviet criminals with no less force than we fight against the White army”. 75
Ibid, d. 147 (4), 192.
High hopes that Revolution would open peoples’ minds and hearts to peace, tolerance, collegiality, and communal work for the benefit of the future republic did not materialize. The Bolshevik state was losing its battle for Central Asia. Frustrated local and central authorities called for more investigations and severe punishments. One member of the Turkestan ChK, the Chairman of the Regional ChK committee, submitted his suggestions to the central government on June 16, 1920. This letter was one of the precursors of coming changes: “The system is not working. The strong hand of the proletariat is needed to smash corrupt Soviet barons and the Soviet pompadours. It is essential to have informants in every village and every settlement selected only from loyal comrades. There should be a conspiratorial flat in every provincial city and an informant in every office. There should be an inquiry into the activities of officials twice a week. There should be an infusion of Party members into local militias and there should be more ChK members in every locale. The militia should be equated in status and power to that of the Red Army. There should be a military regiment of 100 specially-trained people attached to the ChK. The secret operation of ChK should be overseen by a loyal and energetic person. There should be at least five investigators in ChK. There should be additional and permanent funds available for ChK. There should be a guarantee from upper-level authorities that the local ChK has immunity and special powers”. 76
Ibid, d. 147 (4), 192.
Soviet authorities were unrealistic in their expectations to swiftly deconstruct the old oppressive system without a viable alternative. The “Red Train” itself turned into a metaphor for failure. The train was a modern contraption which they hoped to use to connect modernity and tradition. Local populations however refused changes, lacked belief in the Soviet system, and continued to be oppressed and apathetic. Many saw chaos as an opportunity to get rich or improve their social mobility.
It is not surprising that the intensification of repression was seen as the only possible solution to a deteriorating situation. Ironically, the escalation of repression only created deeper rifts between Soviet power and the local populations. In the end, societal disintegration and violence corrupted nearly everyone: While the outsiders had betrayed their secular principles of justice and equality, many local Muslims had forsaken the laws of Islam.