Abstract
The number of European jihadists currently fighting in Syria surpasses that of any comparable past mobilisation. Authorities throughout the continent fear that some returnees from the conflict, having become further radicalised and having acquired technical skills, might carry out attacks in Europe. They sometimes hold up as an example the man alleged to have carried out the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels in May 2014. The profiles of European jihadists in Syria are extremely diverse. Some have long been involved in militant actions. Others converted to Islam or became radicalised only shortly before travelling to Syria. Some reach the country through recruitment networks, while others travel independently. European countries have reacted to the phenomenon with a mixture of hard and soft measures. They often find it difficult to file criminal charges against individuals seeking to travel to or having returned from Syria because of the problems involved in obtaining sufficient evidence. Various softer measures have been put in place to dissuade individuals from travelling and to rehabilitate returnees.
Keywords
Introduction
The phenomenon of European ‘foreign fighters’ being involved with various jihadist groups in conflicts outside Europe is hardly new. It dates back to the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s and various conflicts in the 1990s (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya) and 2000s (e.g. Iraq, Somalia). Nor is it limited to Syria: Europeans are currently also fighting in places such as Somalia, Mali, Pakistan and Yemen. Yet the involvement of European jihadists in Syria is unprecedented because of the scale of the phenomenon and has triggered alarms throughout the continent.
This article seeks to analyse the dynamics of Sunni foreign fighters from Europe in Syria. 1 It first seeks to gauge the size of the phenomenon in various European countries. It then analyses the diversity of the profiles of the individuals who leave Europe for Syria and the logistical dynamics involved in getting to the war-torn country. Finally, it provides an overview of how European governments have sought to challenge the phenomenon.
While this article only analyses the phenomenon of foreign fighters embracing Sunni militant ideology, the author is well aware that the phenomenon of European foreign fighters in Syria is not limited to militant Sunni Islamism. There are in fact indications that European residents and citizens have also joined secular, Kurdish, Shi'ite and Christian militias.
Unprecedented numbers and fears
While exact numbers are obviously impossible to provide, various sources estimate that some 2,500–3,000 individuals with European citizenship or residency have been fighting with various jihadist groups in Syria (Barrett 2014; interviews with European officials). Larger countries such as France, Great Britain and Germany have provided the lion's share (respectively, roughly 700, 500 and 300). However, some smaller countries have been touched by the phenomenon in a disproportionate way. Belgium, for example, reports some 300 fighters; the Netherlands, 120; and Denmark, 100. Even countries that traditionally have witnessed a limited jihadist scene have seen significant numbers depart to fight (Ireland, 30; and Norway and Finland, 50 each). 2
The numbers given are estimates which have been provided to the author by EU officials and the authorities in individual countries.
In most European countries this mobilisation, which is happening on a larger scale than any comparable phenomenon in the recent past, has been perceived as the main security threat for the continent in the near future. British authorities have described this phenomenon as ‘a game-changer’ (Sherlock and Whitehead 2014). Former French Minister of the Interior Manuel Valls has called the possibility of these individuals returning to France as hardened jihadists ‘the biggest threat that the country faces in the coming years’ (Sherlock and Whitehead 2014). Hans-Peter Friedrich, Germany's former Minister of the Interior, has stated that returnees from Syria trained in ‘deadly handiwork’ will be ‘ticking time bombs’ (Busse 2013, author's own translation).
Authorities fear the ‘blow-back effect’, which could take place upon the return of these individuals to their home countries or in any third country that they might enter after concluding their experience as foreign fighters. These fears have been expressed by policymakers throughout Europe and North America. In January 2014, EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström warned about ‘Europeans [who] travel abroad to train and to fight in combat zones, becoming more radicalised in the process.’ ‘Some of these young men,’ she added, ‘have joined groups with terrorist agendas, they have been trained and hardened in war, and could pose a threat to our security upon their return from a conflict zone. In the longer term they could act as catalysts for terrorism’ (McDonald-Gibson 2014).
The fear that their newly acquired combat experience, network of contacts and ideological outlook might drive some foreign fighters to carry out attacks after their combat experience is not universally shared. Despite common assumptions, the empirical evidence from previous conflicts has shown that only a small minority of foreign fighters become involved in terrorist activities upon returning home (Hegghammer 2013). The fear of a blow-back from foreign fighters, for example, did not materialise after the Iraq war, as only a few returnees from it have engaged in acts of terrorism in the West. Similarly, many argue, most individuals currently involved in Syria either harbour no ill intentions against their home countries or, for a variety of other reasons, will never act against them.
At the same time, there are indications that at least some foreign fighters will indeed be engaged in terrorist activities upon returning home. The groundbreaking studies conducted by Norwegian academic Thomas Hegghammer (2013) have shown that only one in nine foreign fighters engage in terrorist activities after the conflict but that those who do are involved in plots that are twice as likely to kill. It is clear that each foreign fighter's dangerousness should be assessed individually (something obviously very difficult to do) but that some do pose a threat.
With specific regard to the current conflict in Syria, there are already preliminary indications of a possible blow-back effect. Since mid-2013 European and US intelligence agencies have detected signs that both Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS, currently Islamic State, IS), the two largest jihadist groups operating in Syria, have been recruiting and training Western militants to carry out attacks in their home countries (Schmidt and Schmitt 2014). Various European militants in Syria have already publicly issued videos threatening their home countries (Wright 2014; La Libre 2013).
Furthermore, attacks whose roots can be traced to Syria seem to have already occurred in Europe. In the autumn of 2013, British authorities reportedly thwarted a plot conceived by Syrian returnees to conduct Mumbai-style attacks in London (Williams 2014). In a better-known case, a gunman killed four people inside the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels on 24 May 2014. The man, Mehdi Nemmouche, was known to be a member of France's jihadist underworld and had reportedly just returned to Europe after spending over a year in Syria fighting with ISIS (BBC News 2014).
Who are the European foreign fighters?
Mirroring dynamics seen in European jihadist networks over the last decade, the European ‘contingent’ in Syria is characterised by extreme diversity in terms of the origins, ages, backgrounds and socioeconomic conditions of the individuals fighting there. Some of them are seasoned jihadists, individuals with a long track record of militancy and fighting experience. That is the case, for example, for Slimane Abderrahmane, a Danish-born, former Guantanamo Bay detainee who was reportedly killed in Syria in February 2013 (Prasz et al. 2013).
Yet most of the individuals fighting in Syria seem to be young aspiring jihadists with no previous battlefield experience. Many of them were known to belong to militant networks or to be active in the Salafist scene in their countries of origin but had not been previously involved in any direct violent action, whether domestically or abroad. Others were individuals who had previously not shown any sign of sympathy with jihadist ideology or even any interest in politics or religion. Across the continent one frequently encounters reports of individuals who, in the span of a few weeks, go from having no interest in jihadism to fighting in Syria.
One characteristic that has been noticed in most European countries is that many of the foreign fighters are extremely young, in some cases as young as 13. Another development that has been witnessed Europe-wide is the growing number of women who are deciding to travel to Syria with their husbands or to get married to mujahidin they have met online. The proportion of converts is also on the increase and in some countries is reported to be around 20 %. 3
This figure was provided by officials from EU member states.
The reasons that attract European foreign fighters to Syria are as diverse as their backgrounds and vary from case to case. It is arguable that, in most cases, various factors are concurrently at play. In interviews and on their social media profiles many of them talk about their frustration at the apathy of other Muslims and the international community with regard to the plight of Syrians and their desire to defend fellow Muslims from an unjust fate. Indeed many of them unquestionably perceive their participation in the conflict as a noble and altruistic gesture aimed at saving innocent women and children.
At the same time religious motivations play a crucial role. Most foreign fighters who join jihadist groups are driven by a deep hatred for Alawites and Shias, and see fighting what they consider to be deviant Islamic sects as a religious duty. Similarly, many of them are enthusiastic about the idea of establishing an Islamic state governed by a strict interpretation of the shariah in Syria, a country at the heart of the Arab world. This prospect also evokes particular emotions among those espousing jihadist ideology due to Syria's particular importance in Islamic history and eschatology. Finally, the personal issues and circumstances of many European foreign fighters cannot be ignored as important drivers behind the radicalisation process and the decision to travel to Syria.
These factors are unquestionably crucial for some of the Europeans who travel to Syria. But, at the same time, it can be argued that for many European foreign fighters the conflict in this Middle Eastern country is just one of the many ‘jihads’ they seek to join–-they are particularly drawn to it because of the relative logistical ease with which they can reach it. It is not uncommon to find cases where individuals who have managed to reach Syria had previously attempted or at least researched the possibility of travelling to other regions where a conflict they interpret as a legitimate jihad is taking place (Makhoul-Yatim 2014). 4 But unlike Mali, Somalia or Pakistan, reaching Syria is easy, fast and cheap. It is therefore unsurprising that it is common for European jihadists to frequently travel back and forth between their countries of origin and Syria, where they spend only a few weeks at a time.
That was the case, for example, for a mini-cell of three militants dismantled by the French authorities in 2013 which, just days before it was scheduled to leave for Syria, was still debating whether to travel to Mali, Libya or Yemen instead.
Mobilisation dynamics
The methods through which aspiring jihadists leave Europe and make their way to the Syrian battlefield are difficult to establish as they tend to be shrouded in secrecy. It nonetheless appears that aspiring jihadists from Europe join groups operating in Syria either independently or as part of a recruitment mechanism. The former dynamic was highly unusual in the past, as the traditionally security-conscious and infiltration-wary jihadist groups operating in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia or the Sahara desert would generally not accept individuals who just showed up and whose credentials could not be easily checked. Yet it appears that European militants with no previous connections do not find it particularly difficult to join the various groups fighting in Syria, and the same holds for those who establish connections through the Internet only shortly before setting out.
On the other hand, many Europeans travel to Syria and join jihadist groups through the intervention of facilitators who have the right connections and vouch for the recruits. These facilitators are generally seasoned militants who come into contact with aspiring jihadists in the community, in mosques or online and, once they have come to trust them, help them to travel to Syria and, most importantly, be accepted by a jihadist group. Facilitators do not recruit in the traditional sense of the word; rather, they make things happen, connecting various European individuals and clusters with groups in Syria.
In many European countries this role of facilitators is played by Salafist organisations that had operated for years without being directly involved in any militant activity but changed their approach once the conflict in Syria began. Arguably, the most remarkable example of this dynamic is that of Sharia4Belgium. For years the group has engaged in very controversial and deliberately provocative actions that have attracted the attention of the media and the Belgian authorities. But the general consensus, including within the Belgian counter-terrorism community, was that Sharia4Belgium did not pose a security threat.
This assessment changed dramatically in the autumn of 2012, when dozens of Sharia4Belgium activists left the country and joined jihadist groups in Syria. The Sharia4Belgium core was soon joined by dozens of individuals who had either been on the group's periphery or had previously had no connection whatsoever with it. More than half of the 226 Belgians estimated to have fought in Syria as of February 2014 have been linked to Sharia4Belgium. 5 Some of them have been killed; some have posted videos threatening attacks against Belgium; and others are known to have committed particularly heinous acts against enemies and civilians during the conflict.
Author's interviews with Belgian officials.
The approaches of European governments
European authorities have reacted to what most of them perceive as a significant security challenge with a variety of measures aimed at mitigating the threat. Many initiatives aim to prevent European Muslims from travelling to Syria in the first place. While approaches vary from country to country, most employ a mixture of hard and soft measures.
When possible, authorities arrest and criminally prosecute individuals seeking to leave for Syria. While no country criminalises travel to Syria or any other conflict area per se, many have statutes under which individuals seeking to do so can be charged with training for terrorist purposes, providing support to a terrorist organisation or similar offences. Obviously, in order to do that, authorities need to be in possession of solid evidence that can be produced in court, something which is not easy to obtain when seeking to prosecute individuals for planning terrorism-related activities. Many European countries consider prosecutions as just one of the various tools in their ‘travel disruption strategies’. Other measures include, when possible, the confiscation of travel documents or, in the case of minors, judicial custody.
Authorities face similarly significant challenges when dealing with individuals who have returned from Syria. Those seeking to prosecute returnees are faced with the challenge of proving, through evidence admissible in court, that a given individual committed specific crimes–-a daunting task given the difficulty in obtaining reliable, if any, evidence from the Syrian battlefield.
Given the limits of ‘hard measures’ and the belief that not all aspiring or returning jihadists pose an immediate security threat, many European countries have also employed various counter-radicalisation approaches in their attempts to mitigate the phenomenon. In many countries such programmes have taken the form of psychological counselling and coaching from trusted mentors. Often targeting individuals who are nothing more than confused teenagers, these efforts aim to prevent individuals from travelling and to rehabilitate returnees (Jordans and Grieshaber 2014).
The EU Commission has established the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), which promotes and shares best practices aimed at countering radicalisation in relation to the issue of foreign fighters. A recent paper by the organisation (2014) presents the following argument:
Only repression however will not solve the problem. Prevention, signalling and providing programmes to help (potential) foreign fighter to leave the path of violent extremism are necessary as well. These actions are often organised on a local level. For instance, first line practitioners, such as teachers and youth workers, can be trained to recognise and refer those who are being influenced to go on jihad. Also, families can be partners in both detecting potential fighters and convincing them to deploy their engagement in a non-violent way. Finally, exit-programmes that have proven to be effective, can be tailored to the target group, for instance by employing formers or practitioners as acceptable intermediaries or coaches.
Conclusion
It is premature to assess what exactly the blow-back of the presence of European fighters in Syria will be. Irrespective of this, the phenomenon has triggered some ominous questions throughout Europe. Answers to the first–-whether it will have direct security repercussions for Europe–-will eventually become clear. But the second and, arguably deeper, question is why (so far) some three thousand European youths have decided to travel to a foreign land and potentially die while fighting alongside jihadist groups. Answering or at least attempting to answer this extremely difficult question is crucially important to understanding not just security issues but also social dynamics with important implications for Europe, and ones which are likely to be present well beyond the Syrian conflict.
In the meantime, authorities throughout Europe seem to have adopted the right posture. While for the most part avoiding counterproductive alarmist positions or pointing the finger at entire communities, they have understood the seriousness of the threat and acted accordingly. International cooperation has been enhanced, in some cases legislative improvements have been enacted and many ingenious mechanisms have been devised in order to stop individuals from travelling to Syria. Obviously the limits of what a democratic state can do in these cases have been laid bare and the number of cases in which authorities powerlessly watch as certain dynamics of radicalisation and mobilisation take over are frustratingly high. But all possible resources have been mobilised to tackle this threat, which is likely to be significant for years to come.
Footnotes