Values,National Interests and the Transatlantic Partnership's Future

Abstract

As the United States and Europe struggle today to meet their respective economic and strategic challenges, it is becoming all too easy to take for granted, or even to forget, the significance of shared core values–-including strong beliefs in individual liberty, representative democracy, freedom of expression, the impartial rule of law, minority and women's rights, and the necessity of free markets for economic growth. However, the US and Europe should not forget that their shared and enduring core values provide a source for their individual and collective renewal, and for advancing new values-based foreign policy initiatives to reaffirm and revitalise the Transatlantic Partnership in the short and long term.

Introduction

While Americans and Europeans have national, cultural and local differences, they nonetheless share a broad range of core values. Indeed, these core values–-which include strong beliefs in individual liberty, representative democracy, freedom of expression, the impartial rule of law, minority and women's rights, and the necessity of free markets for economic growth–-form the Transatlantic Partnership's moral and ideational foundation.

However, as the US and nation states of Europe struggle today to meet their respective economic and strategic challenges, it is becoming all too easy to take for granted, or even to forget, the significance of these core values. Many members of the Transatlantic Partnership are facing flagging economies, rising unemployment or underemployment, growing national debt and declining investment in national defence. Collectively, Americans and Europeans are confronted by international dangers like Iran's growing nuclear weapons-making capability, Syria's spiralling internal crisis and the continuing threat of international terrorism from violent extremists.

It is therefore important for the US and Europe not to forget that, whatever challenges they may face at the moment, their shared and enduring core values provide a source for their individual and collective renewal, and for advancing new ways to reaffirm and revitalise the Transatlantic Partnership.

How values relate to national interests and foreign policy

Why do Americans and Europeans sometimes have a more difficult time discussing foreign policy in the language of values as opposed to the language of national interests? It is uncontroversial to say that nation states have security and economic interests, which are sometimes shared with those of other states but which sometimes come into partial or even total conflict. In contrast, there seems to be far less agreement on how to think, let alone talk, about the role of values in international relations. In no small part, this may be because discussions about values in global affairs almost invariably raise difficult questions about morality, ethics and universal applicability, among other issues. ¹ Nevertheless, values–-whether they are embraced or rejected–-are an inescapable dimension of every nation's foreign policy decision-making.

1

For example, see Slaughter (2007) and Kagan (2012); see also Chollet and Lindberg (2007) and Cohen (2012).

The concept of national interests is, in some ways, far less abstract than the concept of values. Borrowing concepts from the rational choice theory of economics, both statesmen and scholars often discuss a state's interests and policies in a way that economists might discuss, in simple terms, a rational unitary actor's preferences and self-interested choices. ² Indeed, the idea of an ‘interests-based foreign policy'–-in contrast to a ‘values-based foreign policy'–-suggests a model of national decision-making that is driven purely by a cost–benefit analysis of alternatives.

2

The ‘rational actor’ model of national decision-making tends to permeate public discourse on international relations. However, for an interesting discussion of three different models of national decision-making–-the ‘rational actor’ model, the ‘organisational process’ model and the ‘government politics’ model, see Allison and Zelikow (1999).

But it is a mistake to exclude the topic of values in a discussion on international relations. While rational choice theory provides a simplified model of choice among scarcity, it does not capture all the factors that go into decision-making in practice. As Nobel Laureate economist Amartya Sen observes, humans aren't ‘rational fools'–-they are not ice-cold, calculating computers seeking only to egoistically maximise their individual utility: ‘The purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron. Economic theory has been much preoccupied with this rational fool decked in the glory of his one all-purpose preference ordering. To make room for the different concepts related to his behavior we need a more elaborate structure’ (1977, 335–336).

He reminds us that humans in the real world also consider, besides self-interested preferences, things like sympathy and commitment in their choices:

The former corresponds to the case in which the concern for others directly affects one's own welfare. If the knowledge of torture of others makes you sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment (1977, 326).

In particular, Sen notes that factors like ‘commitments’ drive ‘a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare, and much of traditional economic theory relies on the identity of the two’ (1977, 329). Similarly, the idea of a purely interests-based foreign policy represents a highly simplified model of choice in international relations, but it certainly does not capture all the factors–-such as commitments like values–-that go into a nation's decision-making.

It is not uncommon to hear proponents of interests-based foreign policy approvingly quote that famous line from Lord Palmerston's 1848 speech to the House of Commons: ‘We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow … With every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy’ (Viscount Palmerston 1914, 245). However, those who quote from the British foreign minister's speech have often failed to read the speech in its entirety. Lord Palmerston was, in fact, defending the idea of values in foreign policy–-in particular, of liberal interventionism through the moral support of revolutionary parties on continental Europe. Indeed, he says elsewhere in the speech:

I hold that the real policy of England–-apart from questions which involve her own particular interests, political or commercial–-is to be the champion of justice and right; pursuing that course with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world, but giving her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks justice is, and whenever she thinks that wrong has been done (1914, 244). ³

3

For an interesting discussion of this speech, see Heath (1969).

Values often shape national interests in the real world, sometimes in very fundamental ways. To advocate for a purely interests-based foreign policy is to advocate for a foreign policy without commitments–-without a moral compass.

Values: the Transatlantic Partnership's compass amid challenges

There is no doubt that the nations of the Transatlantic Partnership face serious challenges, both individually and collectively, especially in the near term.

First, as the US nears the November 2012 presidential election, Democrats and Republicans are hotly debating how best to improve the US economy, create more jobs, control the growth of the national debt and prevent the looming threat of automatic cuts to the US military that will be both massive and indiscriminate.

Second, the nation states of the EU are confronted with severe economic and financial crises that have even led some to question the premise and future of European integration. Within NATO, only a handful of European allies are able to meet the target of spending at least 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence.

Third, the ability of transatlantic partners to effectively deal with international problems is being further tested by Iran's continuing march to nuclear weapons–making capability in violation of its international obligations; by the Assad regime's escalating campaign of indiscriminate violence against Syria's political and armed opposition groups; and potentially by the US's long-term efforts to rebalance and re-emphasise its foreign, trade and defence policies towards the Asia–Pacific.

As Americans and Europeans work to meet their individual and collective challenges, it is therefore necessary and critical for them to regroup and advance foreign policies that are based on both national interests and shared values. In particular, it is critical for the US and Europe to demonstrate the following in the near term.

Unity against Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran, an illiberal regime that is a state sponsor of terrorism, poses a growing threat to international peace and stability. In particular, Iran is continuing to develop–-in ongoing violation of its international obligations under the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons–-the capability to build a nuclear weapon on short notice.

Although the US and Europe have tried to diffuse the situation through a decade's worth of international diplomacy, Iran has rejected multiple proposals that could have ended the nuclear stand-off and has even begun the process of normalising relations. In parallel, the US and Europe have imposed powerful economic sanctions on Iran, but it remains unclear whether the economic pressure, coupled with international diplomacy, will persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. The US and Europe must stand shoulder-to-shoulder against the dangers that Iran poses to the Transatlantic Partnership's interests and values. It is long past due for the EU to join the US in putting the military option on the table.

Consistent resolve against the Syrian dictatorship

Over 30,000 Syrians have died since the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad began, in February 2011, its escalating campaign of indiscriminate violence against the country's internal political and armed opposition. What is also troubling is that the Assad regime is Iran's closest ally in the Arab world, a state sponsor of terrorism and a possessor of chemical and biological weapons that also tried to secretly build a nuclear programme with North Korean assistance. In short, the crisis in Syria implicates not only US and European strategic interests, but also the Transatlantic Partnership's moral values.

Under the auspices of NATO, the US and Europe intervened to prevent in Libya precisely the same sort of humanitarian disaster that is happening in slow motion in Syria. However, while Russia and Iran continue to provide direct military assistance to the Assad regime, the US and Europe so far have been unwilling to provide anything more than moral and non-military support to embattled anti-regime groups. As a result, America's and Europe's inconsistent policies towards Libya and Syria have left them open to charges of hypocrisy. As Anne-Marie Slaughter (2011) has warned, ‘When the gap between what we say and think about ourselves and what we actually do becomes too great, it can cause a crisis of both national identity and international legitimacy.’

The inability of the Assad regime to crush Syria's poorly armed and organised rebels speaks to the dictatorship's military weakness. The US and European nations, in cooperation with Turkey and other regional partners, should use air power or Patriot air defence batteries in Turkish territory along the border to impose a safe zone in Syria's Idlib and Aleppo provinces. This would protect embattled civilians, and provide space and time for the country's internal political and armed opposition groups to better coordinate and truly organise themselves. What is more, a safe zone would help the US and Europe to better vet and understand Syria's various internal opposition groups, and identify and empower those who share the West's values.

Over the long haul, shared Euro-American values also provide a compass for advancing new initiatives to reaffirm and revitalise the Transatlantic Partnership. Such initiatives include the following efforts.

Expanding the transatlantic economy

The US and the EU should advance formal negotiations for a free trade agreement as soon as practicable. A US–EU free trade agreement would not only benefit each other's economic interests but would also further economically align partners who already share many core political values and, in particular, advance the Transatlantic Community's commitment to free markets as an engine of economic growth.

The American and European economies already form the world's biggest and most prosperous market, accounting for 54 % of global GDP in terms of value and 40 % of GDP in terms of purchasing power. Individually, Americans and Europeans are still wealthier than Chinese, with a GDP per capita of roughly $50,000 in the US and $32,000 in the EU, compared to only $9,000 in China. According to a 2010 study for the European Centre for International Political Economy, a free trade agreement could lead to dynamic gains in GDP of as much as $69 billion for Europe and $181 billion for the US (Erixon and Bauer 2010).

US and European leaders agree, in principle, that expanding the transatlantic economy through a free trade agreement could be mutually beneficial. A June 2012 interim report advanced the principle of a US–EU free trade agreement, and identified sector-specific, technical and regulatory issues that will need to be overcome. In a joint statement, President Barack Obama, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy endorsed the interim report, adding: ‘Particularly at this time, a bold initiative to expand trade and investment could make a significant contribution to our strategy to strengthen growth and create jobs’ (Obama et al. 2012).

In the near term, US domestic politics–-in particular, the upcoming November 2012 presidential elections–-will likely delay serious efforts to advance US–EU negotiations for a free trade agreement. It is thus imperative that the US and the EU look to advance the principle of an expanded transatlantic economy in other, more modest ways, while not forgetting the long view on the US–EU free trade agreement.

Re-energising transatlantic security and defence

The US and European nations must recommit to strengthening the Transatlantic Partnership's security and defence architectures. Over the last half-century, collective security through the US–NATO alliance has ensured the absence of a great-power war on the continent, and thus created the space and time necessary for Europe to increase its political and economic integration. In turn, this has helped to advance many of the Transatlantic Partnership's core values. But it is high time for increased European security integration to now help protect and advance those values, too.

As the US rallies to reverse looming, automatic cuts that would massively and indiscriminately slash national defence spending over the next decade, NATO members should work in the short-to-medium term to uphold more of their share of the Euro-American security burden by advancing not just a ‘Smart Defence’ concept that would pool and share military capabilities in a time of diminished resources. They also should pursue what Erik Brattberg and Gergely Varga have called a ‘Smart Integration’ approach, to better coordinate ‘efforts in defense, industrial, economic [and] social policies, taking into account the unique features of Europe's history and diversity’ (2012, 4).

In the long term, Smart Defence Integration would see a critical mass of European countries, under the auspices of NATO and/or the EU, work to efficiently maximise their pooling of defence resources and sharing of defence capabilities, with the aim of minimising redundancy and increasing functional specialisation among themselves. As Brattberg and Varga note, achieving this would require ‘deeper cooperation involving defense industries, cooperative development of force structure and capabilities, and not least the foreign and security policies of the [respective] member states’ of NATO and/or the EU (2012,25). But in many ways, improved European security integration could also help support and further increase European political and economic integration. Indeed, it may become increasingly difficult to separate these aspects of European integration in the future.

A ‘transatlantic rebalance’ towards the Asia–Pacific

The US and Europe should find ways to rebalance collectively towards the Asia–Pacific, and better coordinate foreign, trade and defence policies in the region to the extent that this is practicable. A transatlantic rebalance would add new dynamism to Euro-American relations. But it would also provide an important opportunity for the US and Europe to advance their shared values in a region that will only grow in diplomatic, economic and military importance.

In late 2011, the Obama administration announced a long-term effort to re-emphasise US foreign, trade and defence policies towards the Asia–Pacific. The effort was initially called the ‘Asia Pivot’, a clumsy and ill-conceived name that caused heightened concern in Europe and the Middle East about decreased US attention. The initiative has subsequently come to be known as the ‘Asia Rebalance’. However, an even better and more accurate name yet might be the ‘Asia Re-emphasis’, a phrase that helps to push back against the mistaken notion that the US is seeking to move its attention away from Europe or the Middle East.

The US ‘Asia Re-emphasis’ effort makes good policy sense. During a highprofile speech in November 2011, President Obama described the basic rationale:

As the world's fastest-growing region–-and home to more than half the global economy–-the Asia Pacific is critical to … creating jobs and opportunity for the American people. With most of the world's nuclear power and some half of humanity, Asia will largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation, by needless suffering or human progress (Obama 2011).

Indeed, European nations, both individually and collectively, are also looking more towards the Asia–Pacific. For example, negotiations continue for an EU–India free trade agreement, and, during a trip to Japan and Southeast Asia, British Prime Minister David Cameron said that he wishes to strengthen trade ties in the region. The US should also encourage European nations to rebalance not only their trade and economic policies, but also their political and security interests towards the Asia–Pacific. As the American Enterprise Institute's Michael Auslin (2012) explains:

Though no one expects Europe to help the U.S. uphold its alliance commitments, there are many things that European militaries can do [in the Asia–Pacific]. European air forces and navies could offer their expertise to nations like Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, all of which are exploring larger regional roles. Similarly, Europe is well-placed to offer human rights education to militaries throughout the region. Such cooperation can build strong political relationships for the future.

Indeed, the collective weight of a fuller transatlantic rebalance towards the Asia–Pacific could help to accelerate the advance of Euro-American security interests, economic interests and shared values, such as human rights and democracy, in the region.

Conclusion

The time is long overdue for the US and Europe to take stock of their shared values–-and to fully embrace them as they craft foreign, trade and defence policies to meet the rising challenges of the new century. The Transatlantic Partnership's shared values are powerful, and capable of changing the course of history. They helped to bring a peaceful end to the Cold War, and there is no doubt that they can provide a compass as Americans and Europeans navigate through the serious challenges that confront them today. We just have to be willing to let our shared values guide us.