Abstract

As a consequence of the impact of the global financial and economic crisis, some political groups have raised the possibility of creating the post of a European Union finance minister, as if this figure would be the balm to heal the crisis.
We must be clear that this kind of appointment has never been a priority for any of the capitals of the EU and is even less so during a crisis. No government wants to give away powers such as the administration of economic policy, especially now that monetary policy administration has been transferred to the European Central Bank. The strongest evidence points to how EU countries have tried to halt the creation of European institutions or the supervision of financial institutions in the last two years or how they have resisted the European Commission's efforts to impose sanctions on those who breach their fiscal consolidation plans.
Creating a European finance minister will not solve anything unless the office is assigned real executive powers. The EU already relies on the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Olli Rehn, to ensure a minimum coordination of economic policies among the 27 Member States. There is also the Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jean Claude Juncker, who, as President of the ‘Eurogroup'—which brings together finance ministers from across the eurozone—is in a position to guarantee the external political representation of the common currency.
A new appointment without real substance could create suspicions, both among those who want a more federal Europe and among those who are against giving more powers to EU institutions. It could also cause the same frustration that has stemmed from the creation of the high representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, who acts as European foreign minister. Catherine Ashton, who holds this position, has been the subject of continuing criticism and the facts have shown a lack of effectiveness, largely because Member States are not in favour of someone from outside dictating their foreign policy.
The current circumstances require that the fight against the crisis be focused on practical measures that allow us to redirect the current EU financial situation, rather than an immersion into the rhetoric of appointments. The EU's best for moving towards stability will only come from the trust generated by concrete action by states and their coordination at EU level, and not from the creation of new forms and institutions that lack real power.
Banishing some of the approaches that have been repeated in recent months, such as those that question the permanence of Greece in the eurozone or the viability of the currency, is the first step towards regaining that trust. To continue the policy of fiscal consolidation for reducing government spending and structural reforms in order to restore competitiveness is the second step. The third is to adopt measures to promote economic growth through two tools available to the EU which are not intrusive: the deployment of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Single Market. The EIB should have a key role in a new ‘Marshall Plan’ to develop a large pan-European transport infrastructure and innovation projects that could not be carried out with national budgets. Meanwhile, the European Single Market should be extended to areas that remain closed, such as the digital or energy markets.
If EU countries apply this roadmap and Europe grows out of the crisis, then it will be time to discuss whether it is necessary to centralise the management of economic policy around a European finance minister. Any sooner and citizens would perceive a debate of this nature as just a sterile exercise in rhetoric.
