Abstract
The Balkans is often portrayed as an area full of ancient hatreds, bloody conflicts, political instability, flagrant corruption and incompetent leadership. In reality, the Balkans is not a homogeneous region. And, despite the mayhem of the early 1990s, recent developments are far from negative: law and order are spreading, democratisation is deepening and economic development is gradually but steadily transforming urban centres and rural hinterlands. This article attempts to discard seven widespread myths about the Balkans.
Myth one: the Balkans has always been the Balkans
Until the late nineteenth century most scholars used the term ‘European Turkey’ for the region. 1 However, as Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania and Montenegro gained their independence, the term ‘Balkans’ emerged. This was the name of a mountain range—the Haemus mountains—that was erroneously stretched by European geographers to cover the entire region. From the very beginning, ‘the Balkans’ was far more than a geographical term. In the words of historian Mark Mazower, the concept ‘was loaded with negative connotations of violence, savagery, primitivism—to an extent for which it is hard to find a historical parallel’ ([2], 5). After the First World War, the term ‘Balkanisation’, generally understood to be the break-up of larger political units into smaller, mutually hostile states manipulated by great powers, gained official linguistic recognition and acquired several negative connotations as a threat to international order, stability and peace. Another term that became à la mode was the description of the Balkans as ‘the powder keg of Europe’ (the 1914 assassination of the Archduke of Austria– Hungary that led to the outbreak of the First World War occurred in Sarajevo). Winston Churchill added to the negative perceptions by claiming that ‘the Balkans produce more history than they can consume’. In the early 1990s the well-established derogatory connotations of the Balkans became stronger than ever as many observers took the view that the violent collapse of Yugoslavia was the product of ancient hatreds. So tangible is the negative perception of the Balkans in Western minds that today natives adamantly reject the use of the term, hoping to escape the stigma of inferiority in the West. The term ‘South-Eastern Europe’ has now become a common substitute. However, the EU has invented and systematically uses the concept of the ‘western Balkans’ for the territory of the former Yugoslavia, excluding Slovenia but including Albania.
One of the best books on the history of the Balkans, originally published in 1958 and now available as a reprint, is Stavrianos and Stoianovich [4].
Myth two: the Balkans is a homogeneous region
To a large extent, the diversity of the region precludes useful generalisations. Balkan countries have few things in common. In a sense they have never had much to bind them. Yes, the largest part of the region was under Ottoman rule for centuries, but a part was also ruled by the Hapsburg Empire or was semi-independent. For almost half a century after the Second World War, Bulgaria and Romania belonged to the Warsaw Pact and had centrally organised economies, while Yugoslavia and Albania, despite being ruled by Communist parties, preferred go-it-alone foreign policies. On the other hand, Greece had a free-market economy and joined NATO. Today, the income of the average Croatian is double the income of the average Serb and four times higher than that of the average Albanian. The Balkans is also far from a culturally homogeneous region. Orthodox Christians, Muslims and devout Catholics populate Albania and Bosnia, while Serbs look to Russia for support and Romanians are proud of their Latin roots. In an important sense, the ‘Balkans’ is a Western invention. As a result, writing about the Balkans can be full of pitfalls—patronising generalisations, resounding clichés, imprecisions and untruths.
Myth three: the Balkans is a particularly violent region
In spite of the wars of the 1990s (in Bosnia 175,000 people died) there is absolutely no evidence that people in the Balkans tend to be more vicious or violent than people elsewhere. Yugoslavia did not collapse because of ancient hatreds and atavistic nationalism. It collapsed because its institutions were ineffective, the right of veto hindered reform and the Serbian leadership claimed a greater weight in the domestic balance of power. Moreover, the vicious circle of political instability, conflict and war that plagued the western part of the region in the 1990s has been broken. A 2008 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report shows that levels of crime against people and property (such as homicide, robbery, rape, burglary and assault) in the Balkans are lower than in Western Europe [5]. More importantly, murder statistics are falling. The region is becoming safer. Although the Balkans continues to be the main route into Western Europe for heroin, drugs and arms smuggling and human trafficking have all declined. The UN report concludes that this progress is likely to continue, since the region lacks the usual vulnerabilities that lead to crime elsewhere in the world, especially mass poverty, large income inequality and rapid urbanisation. The old stereotypes should be relegated to the history books.
Myth four: the Balkan states are too small to provide security and guarantee economic development
From one point of view the size of a nation can be a positive factor: a bigger state can deliver more public services (such as defence), benefit from economies of scale and has more weight in international negotiations. However, size also brings higher heterogeneity costs. A bigger state is much more likely to have a number of remote and peripheral regions that want to secede. As the Harvard economists Alesina and Spolaore [1] have demonstrated, the ‘optimum size’ of a state is driven by a trade-off between public services, economies of scale and rising heterogeneity costs. Has the western Balkans reached this equilibrium? As an example, take Montenegro, the Balkans’ smallest country, with a population of only 650,000 inhabitants living in an area of 14,000 km2. During the campaign for a referendum on divorcing Serbia in 2006, the pro-union camp warned that Montenegro was too small to survive alone without the jobs, education and health care that its neighbour had to offer. After five years of independence, this prediction has been totally discredited. The Montenegrin economy is booming. Net foreign direct investment per capita has reached $2,000 and ranks as one of the highest in Europe. Tourism and property investment, especially by Russian millionaires, have reached record levels. Life is better now.
Myth five: international boundary changes in the Balkans have come to an end
In February 2008 ethnic Albanians celebrated the birth of Kosovo, the newest country in Europe. There is no other secessionist movement in the Balkans today that can lead to the creation of another state. However, there are still considerable and forceful demands for boundary changes. Representatives of the Republika Srpska frequently mention the possibility of a referendum that would enable this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to join Serbia. But if the international community encourages or recognises further boundary reshaping, more could follow. The idea of joining their mother country is also popular among many Bosnian Croats. In its turn, this offers the Albanians of Macedonia (about 30% of the country's population) an incentive to question the federal arrangements of the Ohrid Agreement (2001). The Serbs of northern Kosovo (about 10% of the population) are already de facto ruled by Belgrade and may hold their own referendum on joining Serbia. However, most Balkan (including the Serb government) and international players (including the US and the EU) do not favour further boundary changes. It seems that the current balance of power protects the status quo.
Myth six: it is the lure of EU membership that keeps the Balkans stable and peaceful
For geographical and historical reasons, the stabilisation of the Balkans is primarily a European responsibility [3]. The EU is by far the biggest trade partner and donor in the region. There is no other area in the world where the Union's presence is so evident. EU peacekeeping forces have replaced US forces in Bosnia, and in December 2008 a large EU police and justice mission was deployed across Kosovo. Bulgaria and Romania became full EU members in 2007, while Slovenia joined the Union in 2004 and does not consider itself a Balkan state. All the other Balkan countries are negotiating accession or are preparing to ask for it, with Croatia the closest to being admitted. In the western Balkans everybody speaks of the region's European future. The prospect of EU membership is a significant factor in promoting political and economic reform throughout the region, with candidate countries hastily reforming their institutions and strengthening their public services in order to meet European standards. However, Brussels is in no hurry. Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are still a long way away from any clear prospect of EU accession. Since the EU lacks a common foreign policy, a country's negotiations for entry (the opening of different ‘chapters’) and final decision on membership require unanimous approval from its 27 Member States. Some of them hold their own views and are known to seek concessions from future members. Five EU Member States (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain)—in fear of setting a precedent for other break away regions—have not yet recognised Kosovo, where 15,000 NATO soldiers still protect the Serb minority. Moreover, there is clearly an ‘enlargement fatigue’ in Brussels. The difficulties of promoting the reform of EU institutions and the effects of the economic crisis clearly undermine the position of the supporters of a Balkan enlargement. In short, European engagement is not enough to maintain stability and promote growth in the western Balkans: a comprehensive approach requires the continuing commitment of the US. Russia—after a long period of marginalisation—should also be involved. After all, it is easy to predict that local political actors will be attracted to the idea of playing on a Western–Russia rivalry, as has happened many times in the past.
Myth seven: Balkanisation is a bad thing
Historically, separatism and secessionism have often been characteristic of periods of democratisation. Czechoslovakia broke up after becoming democratic, the Soviet Union disintegrated after the collapse of Communism and Spain's regional autonomy flourished after its successful democratic transition. The Balkans is more fragmented than ever but, at the same time, the Balkan countries are more democratic than ever before. Many of the region's democracies are imperfect or illiberal, but still leaders are being chosen by mostly free and fair elections that take place at regular intervals. When the politicians lose elections they usually accept defeat. For the first time, ethnic minorities have collective rights written down in constitutions or in official agreements, supported by the occasional presence of international peacekeepers. Balkanisation and democratisation seem to go together. But does fragmentation imply significant economic costs? The answer is no. In sharp contrast to the past, contemporary Balkanisation does not endanger the Balkan countries’ economic performance. As their economies are more integrated into the global economy, the size of the Balkan countries matters less for economic success. Balkan borders are more open than ever before: it is not uncommon to see provinces trading more frequently with each other than with their own countries. The prospect of EU accession is normalising differences in legislation, standards and currencies and as a result, the movement of ideas, goods and people across Balkan borders is happening at an unprecedented rate. In a sense, national fragmentation is a further motive for the intensification of political and economic integration. For what is probably the first time since the early years of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans is becoming truly unified.