Abstract
Right-wing populist parties have developed into a stable institution and a long-term feature of European politics. Again and again they prove themselves capable of gaining electoral success at national level, partly as a result of crises of the major parties, as is the case in France, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Scandinavia. After the change of the political system in Eastern Europe, populism also gained influence there. Yet right-wing populist parties rarely succeed in coming into government, and even if they actually manage it, they predominantly function only as junior partners or, as is currently the situation in the Netherlands, as supporters of a minority government.
Basically, they approve of the democratic system, and this is what distinguishes them from right-wing extremist parties. Populist party types manipulate anti-party emotions, present themselves as anti-elitist (in sharp contrast to conservative parties), have a tendency to break taboos in a highly staged manner effective in the media, have a central leader figure, create an in-group identity by targeting clear-cut enemy images, glorify the direct connection between the “people” and the government, and focus campaigning on a central theme.
Right-wing populist parties do not only enjoy popularity among those who reject modernisation or globalisation, but also among middle-class voters who are afraid of social decline and are therefore openly in favour of populist scapegoat campaigns against immigrants. The anti-Islam theme, in particular, has become the new “winning formula” among right-wing populist parties, as in the Netherlands, Austria and Scandinavia. Other themes include Euroscepticism and criticism of globalisation in the broader and narrower sense of the word, as well as a policy of social promises.
Not the least of what populism has to offer is orientation as it is a movement that “personalises” the solution to problems. Its structures are characterised by the fact that it consists of loosely organised movements with a broad base rather than traditional political parties. The successful Dutchman Geert Wilders is in fact the only member of his party, which constitutes a complete departure from the usual concept of member parties. Germany, on the other hand, assumes a special role: right-wing populism in Germany has hardly been able to achieve any successes despite countless topics which could serve as starting points for discussion—such as the 2010 integration debate. This is partly due to the “shadows of the past” and partly to the lacking supply element. In Central Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the “National Populism” that is widespread there is easily recognisable.
How can people's parties respond to populist competition? Whether the popular demand for a sharper profile will really catch on, remains questionable at least. As far as the organisational strengthening of the parties is concerned, there are several suggestions for making membership more attractive, as well as for making processes within the parties more transparent and open. At this level in particular, populist party types are heading in new directions, as clearly shown by Geert Wilders and his one-member party, the PVV.
There are also tasks in the field of political education: one major feature of populism is its defensive attitude towards the political system and its identification of scapegoats. “Us” against the “powers that be”—populist diction directly opposes representative bodies and thus classical institutions. This can only be counteracted if people are introduced early to the processes and fundamental values of democracy and if this process continues, wherever possible, in the sense of life-long learning.