Abstract
The current international situation presents significant security challenges to Europe and its allies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the linchpin of Europe–US security cooperation over the last 60 years and continues to play a significant role in their shared defence and in promoting their political aims in the wider world. The importance of NATO was reaffirmed last year by the agreement of the New Strategic Concept. However, this agreement also left many issues unresolved. These include, among other issues, NATO's future role as the United States concentrates on global challenges, mainly in Asia, rather than on Europe; Europe's weakened determination to play an adequate role in facing those challenges together with the US; the effects of military spending cuts amplified by the economic crisis; and the future of US military presence in Europe. It is therefore critical that Europeans, now more than ever, consider their capabilities and contributions to NATO in particular and to security and defence in general. As the European-led effort in Libya now clearly shows, Europe must bolster its capacity to confront threats and to project power when needed, while working within the framework of NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy, in coordination with the US.
The present international situation can be described by three words: insecurity and instability, leading to unpredictability ([9], 266). Recent and ongoing events in North Africa and the broader Middle East prove this point. But in operational terms, insecurity manifests itself in different ways on both sides of the Atlantic.
In Washington, it is the result of the acute awareness that as powerful as it is, the US does not have the adequate means to prevent the increasing number of multiple threats and is augmented by a growing sense of the de facto isolation that comes with addressing these threats. There is also the expectation that America's European allies will play a growing role in managing security in their immediate neighbourhood. Insecurity has also deepened as the result of the financial crisis and expected cuts in defence spending, which could diminish the capacity to neutralise threats around the world. This is directly related to the growing military influence of new powers, primarily China, as well as instability in Pakistan and the disruptive if not potentially deadly capabilities of state-sponsored or non-state actors through activities such as terrorism, organised crime or cyber attacks.
Uncertainty among the European allies, on the other hand, is linked to a growing awareness of Europe's differences with the US, which are the result of a lack of ambition and a reluctance to assume responsibility for global security, which in turn decreases Europe's operational usefulness for Washington. Continued cuts in military spending, deepened by the financial crisis, in the absence of direct and existential threats and compounded by the negative experiences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, provide justification for the reinforcement of these trends and lead to growing capability differences among NATO allies on both sides of the Atlantic. The crucial question remains, to what extent will NATO remain a linchpin of transatlantic relations, not just in protecting the security of the allies in all possible dimensions, but also as an effective tool of their agreed-upon policies?
The refusal of Germany and France to participate in the second war in Iraq and the lukewarm engagement in Afghanistan by many countries, subjected to a number of restrictions (national caveats), have become not just a matter of the current policies of individual governments but seem to stem from a profound change in these countries’ self-evaluation of their strategic interests in the new post-Cold War political culture.
The declarations of support for the Alliance as the basis for transatlantic security and as the most important forum for strategic debate that were delivered by all heads of state and government during and after the anniversary NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl in 2009 were certainly important (see [5]). Also important, including from a symbolic standpoint, was the return of France to NATO's military structures. Significantly, these declarations have been accompanied by strong statements from many leaders about the need to build EU security and defence capacity as well as to develop NATO's cooperation with the EU, knowing perfectly well that such objectives will take many years, if ever, to achieve [4,10].
The Alliance continues to be treated as a necessary tool but preferably one that is not used, given that its use has caused more problems than it has solved in recent years. The basis for this assertion stems from an evaluation of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. European elites are concerned that, based on America's own perceptions of its special responsibilities and the need to confront global threats, the US all too often is overly hasty in resorting to military means while involving its European allies in wars that cannot be won and that are difficult to justify to their publics. What's more, Europeans fear that such a strategy provokes Muslim hostility towards the West and increases the threat of terrorist attacks in Europe. This thinking was particularly prominent during the presidency of George W. Bush and his ‘global war on terror’, and even if it has been mitigated, such scepticism persists to this day [1].
The ascent of Barack Obama, with his proclamation of a more open and cooperative foreign policy, quickly improved the image of the US and its policies. Most commentators, however, warned about the possibility of unrealistic expectations, pointing out the more permanent elements of US policy and the fact that Obama (including in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech) strongly maintained the special, permanent and irreplaceable responsibility of the US to promote global security to safeguard its own security and that of its allies. Obama also said in Oslo that the number of threats, their dispersed nature and cultural and religious sources as well as the measures to prevent these threats require collective action by America and its allies. However, he did not rule out the need to sometimes take independent action in the name of security or the interests of the US [7].
Obama's words must worry many European leaders whose ambitions of autonomy, or who simply wish to be left alone, should not have to lead to either a withdrawal from the most important political and military alliance or to their participation in future high-risk expeditions to some ‘far away countries about which we know little’, as Neville Chamberlain described Czechoslovakia in 1938. Many Europeans would be quite satisfied to have some influence on Washington's actions, resulting from the process of consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.
The consequences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
The often unilateral approach of the Americans is related to the deeply felt conviction that even if the European allies are important politically (as a justification for the international nature of a mission) their role on the battlefield is secondary, and that they can hardly be counted on. For several years, the US government appealed to the Europeans to invest more in defence and strengthen their involvement in Afghanistan; the lack of positive responses intensified the feeling of disappointment on the part of the US, and among the military hardly mitigated the lack of appreciation for the allies’ contributions.
Meanwhile, the Europeans are watching the unstable situation in nuclear-armed Pakistan with growing concern, especially given the India–Pakistan conflict in the background. This situation augments the sense of helplessness and danger, while the incurred human losses increase calls for withdrawal even amongst the most loyal partners.
Many European governments provide support to the new American strategy in Afghanistan while appeasing public opinion in their own countries with announcements of withdrawal and changes in the nature of the mission. This follows from the belief that the abdication of responsibility for the results of the Afghan operation carried out, after all, by NATO under a UN mandate would deprive Europeans of the right to a partnership with the US, while at the same time such cooperation is still seen by most as an indispensable component of future security.
In Europe, NATO is the only force that is able to organise the collective defence effort, since no European army is able to take effective action using conventional weapons, even to defend its own territory, without the Americans. Awareness of this fact, however, does not cause concern in Western Europe, due to the lack of a sense of existential threat to the continent. Attitudes are different among the allies in Central and Eastern Europe because of their historical experiences and because of the conduct of Russia, which is considered to be revanchist in nature.
The importance of NATO's New Strategic Concept
Many voices have argued that discussions of a New Strategic Concept (NSC) will only deepen existing divisions within NATO. Despite tensions and differences, the process has shown that all participants have sought to reach the necessary level of cohesion in order to develop a basis for cooperation in the future. The NSC, which was accepted at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon [6] stipulates the following:
In the new multipolar world, NATO is to remain a foundation of the allies’ security, and—more broadly—an important element of international security in the world.
NATO is above all to ensure the collective defence of all members, thus highlighting the importance of Article 5 as an expression of ‘strategic reassurance’ and security guarantees. All members are to be covered by regularly updated contingency plans, strengthened by the allocation of military forces and resources as well as by regular manoeuvres on the ground.
Threats—old and new, including ‘asymmetrical’ ones—are numerous and dangerous, not always identifiable and require multi-level cooperation by the allies.
Emphasis will be placed on a ‘comprehensive approach’; that is, on a deeper integration of political, military and civilian forms of interaction together with a greater emphasis on non-military and preventive measures, including financial aid.
Out-of-area operations, also of a pre-emptive character, are deemed an essential element of forward defence.
The effectiveness of the Alliance depends on a number of regional partnerships based on shared interests and values, including cooperation with the UN, EU, OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and a number of regional actors, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia.
NATO will build, in cooperation with the US, an Antiballistic Missile Defence system.
The strategic partnership with Russia is considered important—hence the proposal to deepen cooperation within the NATO–Russia Council, also in the area of Missile Defence. The agreed-upon condition for security cooperation with Russia (
Agreeing on the content of the NSC is a major achievement, since it has reintegrated and thereby strengthened the Alliance, leaving behind a period of political uncertainty. Many problems, however, remain unsolved:
Collective defence and the importance of Article 5: there was no agreement on the introduction of an automatic response to aggression. A decision-making mechanism that leads to the involvement of an individual member state will continue to be political in nature and therefore too slow, as judged by several countries, including Poland. 1
The crucial issue of the future presence of US forces in Europe was left out.
The problem of financial solidarity (
The desired security partnership with the EU will be limited in the near future, not only because of the resistance of Turkey but also because of the role the EU intends or is able to play. 2
The strategic partnership with Russia will depend on Moscow. The mere presence and encouraging words of President Medvedev at the NATO–Russia Council Summit in Lisbon on the development of friendly cooperation was considered a success. It does not reflect a considerable degree of mistrust on either side. With the exception of assistance in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, of help in exerting pressure on Iran, we still have more to do with declarations of intentions rather than with the planning of a future-oriented, truly strategic and sustainable cooperation.
Nuclear disarmament as a stated objective does not reflect the realities of the positions of nuclear powers such as the US, France or the UK. Therefore, it was agreed that as long as others posses such weapons, NATO will also remain a nuclear alliance.
Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland, said during one of the discussions: ‘We do not want NATO to come to our aid in a time of need when we all will be dead …’.
During a closed-door meeting in Brussels on 1 December 2010, Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, told 136 ambassadors that relations with the US and China, climate change, poverty eradication, crisis management and counter-terrorism are to be the top priorities of the European External Action Service. See Reitman [8] and Le Gloannec [3].
Whatever the Europeans might decide to do, the US will play a role as the ultimate stabiliser of global security, negotiating but also using force when unavoidable. From Washington's point of view, NATO should remain strong not just as a political alliance but also as a means for Europe to take care of its own neighbourhood while allowing Washington to deal with global threats.
A potential source of destabilisation could be nuclear-armed Pakistan, or China resorting to military force, either in its neighbourhood or elsewhere. Such a crisis would hardly lead to NATO's involvement, but it would deepen US alliances with those countries to which China could pose a real threat—in particular Japan, India, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand, and not excluding Russia. In effect, NATO would become one of several alliances; how relevant it would be would depend on the resolve of the European partners.
The experience of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could help, as American strategists have been re-examining US strategic interests and have realised the limitations of their ability to influence world events through military power alone. Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence, recently made a particularly important point in this respect:
Looking ahead, though, in the competition for tight defense dollars within and between the services, the Army also must confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the US military are primarily naval and air engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere. The strategic rationale for swift-moving expeditionary forces, be they Army or Marines, airborne infantry or special operations, is self-evident given the likelihood of counterterrorism, rapid reaction, disaster response, or stability or security force assistance missions. But in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it. [2]
The crucial question is the extent to which NATO will remain a linchpin of transatlantic relations, not just in protecting the security of the allies against all possible threats—traditional, new and so-called asymmetric—but whether it will also continue to be an effective tool of their policies. For Europeans, the real challenge in cooperating with the Americans remains a growing gulf in military technology and capacities. However, the biggest problems by far are the strategic imagination and political will of the European allies. This depends on recognising identified threats as being both real and manageable, and handling them within the framework of NATO in coordination with the Americans.
Postscript: the Libyan test
In discussing the debate on the NSC above, I stressed that the Article 5 reaction mechanism is not automatic but political: individual member states, in the face of danger to one of the Alliance's members, will individually decide how to react. There have been even more cases in which there was no direct threat to any of the allies but a unanimous decision was made to involve NATO forces in an operation, such as in Afghanistan and now in Libya. Both decisions were made on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions and thus had a strong international mandate, and in both cases individual states made diverse decisions.
In the case of Afghanistan, following the experiences of the Iraq War and the role of the US under President Bush, the so-called national caveats have prevented the Alliance from acting effectively on the ground, leading to the US government's dissatisfaction and disillusionment. Libya's case is different for the following reasons:
France unilaterally recognised the rebels in Benghazi as an alternative Libyan government and argued for military intervention in order to support them.
The ‘responsibility to protect the civilians’ principle was successfully tested in the Security Council under the most controversial of circumstances, but was eventually accepted and enjoyed the support of at least some Arab and African countries; the right to intervene is limited to the protection of civilians, even though the objective is clearly to force Colonel Qaddafi to step down.
Germany abstained during the vote in the Security Council, breaking the allies’ solidarity and liaising with countries such China and Russia; a decision that led to critical comments in many European capitals.
France and the UK assumed a leading role by starting a military campaign practically on their own without referring the matter—as they should have—to NATO (France's objection) while also not involving the EU (the UK's objection).
In the past France has tended to disregard NATO as an organisation excessively influenced by the US.
In spite of the fact that France rejoined NATO's integrated military structures in 2009, President Sarkozy refused for weeks to accept a coordinating role for NATO, claiming that NATO is not popular in the Arab world and opting for ‘a coalition of the willing’.
President Sarkozy was practically forced by President Obama to accept NATO's coordinating role, threatening openly the total withdrawal of American forces.
Britain's role is almost equally astonishing, given that until now the UK's defence policy was based on a principle of the closest possible cooperation with and support for Washington.
The US has publicly stated that it would take a ‘back seat’ and act in a supporting role.
Following his overtures towards the Islamic world, President Obama openly declared that he does not wish to see the US enter a new war in yet another Muslim country.
Libya cannot be seen as playing a major role in US strategy, while on the other hand it is of strategic importance to the European members of NATO and to the EU.
Washington, somewhat hesitantly, did use its military capabilities to coordinate the allies’ military activities and stop the advances of Muammar Qaddafi's forces; in fact, some 60% of all military activities in Libya were performed by US forces.
Following the announcement that NATO had assumed the coordinating role, the US immediately scaled down its involvement but had to offer more specialised aerial support a few weeks later, as the Europeans did not have the proper capabilities.
Not just Germany but several other countries, including Poland, which had been interventionist until now, refused to participate in any military activities and instead promised humanitarian aid. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk openly challenged the initiators of the campaign, accusing them of double standards for having enjoyed extremely close relationships with oppressive regimes in North Africa for years, and now suddenly assuming a role as the promoters and standard-bearers of democracy and human rights.
Countries participating in the military campaign against the Libyan regime lack precise, uniform and publicly stated objectives for doing so: some, like Italy, Denmark and Sweden (a non-NATO member!) wish to protect civilians, while others openly aim to force Qaddafi into exile.
The Libya campaign has clearly shown how not to engage in a political and military operation. However noble the intentions, it has weakened NATO even further by
showing the lack of a common strategic approach and culture, which has led to further divisions within the Alliance; France's refusing to refer the matter to NATO before initiating the military campaign; forcing Washington into participating in a military campaign when the US government clearly treated the situation as a European matter—American diplomats and politicians did not hide their displeasure at the way the US was ‘persuaded’ to take part in the campaign; and showing the military weakness of the Europeans, whose actions without American support have led to a political and military stalemate in Libya.
Before this article appears in print, the Libyan crisis will probably be resolved: Qaddafi will either be killed or forced into exile, and a regime change under UN supervision will take place. However, this campaign should be seen as a roll-call for Europeans to think seriously about their capabilities and the necessity to devote more resources to NATO and to military capabilities in general. As President Obama has shown, his comments about reducing America's involvement and focusing on truly strategic matters were not mere words. Europeans had better listen and draw their own conclusions.
The situation should also force the Europeans to re-think what they actually mean by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). If one thing was lacking in the way the Libya campaign was initiated and executed, it was a European approach, as the forcing of military engagement, mainly by France with British support, makes such a policy more distant than ever.