Managing the Winds of Change in the Mediterranean: Europe's Challenge

Abstract

The southern Mediterranean is a geo-strategically sensitive part of the world that lacks a proper security arrangement. Territorial conflicts, economic stagnation and terrorism are the main obstacles hindering the region from achieving a desirable level of stability and engaging in a new Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Europe must develop a way of achieving long-term success in promoting economic and political reforms and the improvement of economic governance. Given its geographical proximity to the southern Mediterranean, Europe's tall order for the next few decades is to create a Mediterranean area of functioning market economies that fully respect the rule of law.

Introduction

The geopolitical landscape in the southern Mediterranean is changing, and there is an urgent need to address this political challenge. There is a great danger that the failed state syndrome, known from other parts of the world, could manifest if the transition to democracy is not successful. Furthermore, the Mediterranean lacks a legitimate security mechanism that could exercise authority in this region. There was no one to impose a moratorium on BP's activities off the coast of Libya, just as there was no one but the coalition of the willing really able to do anything against the actions taken by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in Libya during his military campaign against the revolutionaries in March 2011.

The Mediterranean is a geo-strategically sensitive part of the world. The rise of China, India and Brazil does not automatically mean the diminishment of this region's significance—it remains an essential strategic theatre of operations linking Europe, North Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Black Sea ([1], pp. 9–60). The region is being destabilised by the sub-regional conflicts, weapons proliferation, abuse of human rights, illegal migration, climate change, ethnic tensions and various terrorist activities, thus the absence of a security arrangement is even more pronounced. This instability is amplified by the negative image it is given by the media in the West, portraying it as a source of instability. This is counterproductive to efforts trying to solve illegal migration, xenophobia, the rise of right-wing political movements across Europe and the often very disadvantageous position of migrant communities in the West. Neglected political reforms and economic stagnation have served as a major push factor for a ‘migration invasion’. The international economic downturn has lead to even higher numbers of migrants, so more stringent criteria for asylum seekers are to be expected.

Related to the increasingly negative attitude towards the Middle East is a chorus of discontent that has emerged across Europe and North America against continuing to fund such countries through the transfer of billions of dollars for oil. Alternative sources of energy are essential to reduce the West's dependency on Middle East oil and gas.

The revival of Islamic extremism easily provokes fears across Europe of a resurgence of the Islamic faith, seeking to make up for past battles lost. Political sensitivity to migrant communities is readily amplified as a result of long-term high levels of unemployment in Europe. If these fears are not addressed in a concerted manner, the Huntingtonian clash of civilisations could become more of a reality in Euro-Mediterranean security discourse in the decades ahead. This outcome would have catastrophic consequences for all peoples of the Mediterranean and is therefore a scenario that must be fiercely rejected.

A new Euro-Mediterranean strategic partnership

Numerous geo-strategic factors are contributing to increased insecurity across the Mediterranean. In particular, ten major issues have had a negative impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations since the end of the Cold War and have prevented the emergence of a more cooperative security culture in this part of the world. Closely examining and systematically addressing these phenomena is essential if the causes of insecurity in the Mediterranean area are to be better managed in the decade ahead.

First, the six-decade-old conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours must be resolved through a policy of compromise. The Israel-Palestine conflict is pivotal to the geopolitics of the Mediterranean. Since the collapse of the Oslo peace process the resolution of the Israel–Palestine conflict has been in a long coma. This conflict remains the main bone of contention in the Mediterranean area. It impacts negatively, directly and indirectly, on attempts to foster closer political, economic and social development across the Mediterranean. Before efforts to resuscitate peace negotiations can be successful, numerous changes must take place.

The United States must assume a more robust direct involvement in peace efforts. President Barack Obama signalled a more dynamic and balanced approach towards this conflict upon being elected to the Oval Office. Delivering on such a promise would have a major positive effect on bringing the protagonists back to the peace table.

Moreover, the willingness of the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu to consider a two-state solution to the conflict must be seen as a positive development. It is also much more likely that a more hard-line Israeli government will ultimately be the one to deliver the compromises necessary to achieve peace.

In addition, reconciliation between different Palestinian factions is a prerequisite to the Palestinians adopting a credible negotiating position. A national unity government or a consensus government must be formed if the Palestinians are to be taken seriously in any future marathon of peace talks with Israel. The al-Fatah and Hamas political movements must be prepared to put the Palestinian people's greater interest in an independent Palestinian state ahead of their own political interest in any given situation. Failure to do so will relegate the Palestinians to a continuation of the suffering they have experienced since the end of the Second World War.

Progress on the Israeli–Palestinian peace track should eventually be coupled with attempts to achieve progress at a regional level, with peace talks also commencing between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon. Israel remains pivotal to the geopolitics of the Mediterranean, serving as a unifying force that brings its opponents together. In this catchment area of the Mediterranean, Israel is the only state that has an economic profile similar to that of mainstream European states. Israel is also a leader in technological development and economic development. Securing a permanent peace with Palestine is in Israel's interest, as the open conflict will continue to serve as an ongoing security challenge within and outside Israel. The prospect of a nuclear Iran or nuclear Arab state will also remain an existential threat.

A second factor that has negatively influenced Euro-Mediterranean relations has been a considerable rise in terrorism in the region. This has had major economic consequences on income from tourism and on private foreign investment at a time when such revenues are essential if the developing states are going to be able to provide a better standard of living for their citizens. During the past decade, governments north and south of the Mediterranean have often shifted priorities because of terrorism by placing a higher premium on limiting the freedom of expression than on granting the utmost importance to human rights issues.

Third, there is a growing call for political freedom from Arab citizens throughout the region. As populations have become better educated they want a say in public affairs, or at the very minimum a number of basic freedoms, including those of association and expression. People do not believe anymore that the alternative is between the governments that are currently in place and Islamic chaos. They want peaceful change. The fascinating ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in Tunisia in January 2011 and the revolution in Egypt in February 2011 have provided tremendous momentum for this reality [2].

Fourth, in the last decade there has been a considerable rise in political Islam as a key interlocutor throughout the Arab Mediterranean region. Amongst the Arab EU partners in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, only in two (Syria and Tunisia) is political Islam not presently in power, either in parliament or in government or both.

Fifth, there has been a slowdown in the political dynamics of Europe, in particular with the decade-long review of the future of the EU that included the rejection of the Constitution by popular vote in two Member States. While the Barcelona Process was not directly influenced by this prolonged process (it is based on previous treaties), the Mediterranean area's proximity to European politics resulted in its being indirectly negatively influenced.

Sixth, the forces of economic globalisation, with the major expansion of China and India as global powerhouses, have taken their toll on the Mediterranean region, especially in the textile sector. The dismantlement of the textile agreements in 2005 in countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Egypt has had a major negative impact on the productivity of these sectors. The competitive rise of countries such as Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Russia and Indonesia has also undermined the ability of Mediterranean southern shore countries to attract the foreign direct investment necessary to improve their productivity.

Seventh, there has been a strong rise in the trafficking of human beings, which is now clearly in the hands of criminal gangs. These gangs are well organised, well equipped and connected to security forces throughout the region. This is a business worth €250 million per year, counting only the ‘fees’ collected by these gangs. This figure is to be compared to the monthly salaries of €150–200 in the police forces in the region. Addressing this issue is essential, since the number of migrants is certain to rise in the decade ahead as the sub-Saharan states struggle to cope with the rising expectations of their populations. A more forward-looking and inclusive EU migration policy must be forthcoming if this human security challenge is to be properly addressed. One should bear in mind that the EU will need 20 million new workers between 2010 and 2030 if it is to maintain its current demographic.

Eighth, the shape of the EU is changing with the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and with the forthcoming enlargements in process. This has created, whether one likes it or not, competition for foreign direct investment and public funding with the EU's southern neighbours. The imminent admission of Croatia into the EU will usher in a period when EU attention further focuses on assisting other Balkan states to become EU Member States in the decade ahead.

Ninth, the negative downturn of the European economy is having a major negative impact on the southern shore countries of the Mediterranean, which rely on the EU for 50–80% of their exports and for a large part of their investment and tourism. A revival of the European economy is essential to the future positive growth of Mediterranean state economies.

Tenth, Mediterranean partners have to date largely shied away from drastic economic reforms, either by not going the full length of the reforms or by not even starting them. This attitude of indifference must change if the Arab states of the Maghrib and the Mashraq are to improve their economic outlook. The striking lack of South–South integration must be succeeded by a thrust of regional integration, as has happened in most parts of the world since the end of the Cold War.

As we can see, many of these trends are of a much wider nature and scope than the Euro-Mediterranean context, but all of them have had an influence on the health and image of Mediterranean relations.

Policy recommendations for the EU in shaping a new Mediterranean relationship

Despite widespread critique, there is little choice other than pressing ahead with the agenda of the Barcelona Declaration. The quality of the economic and political dialogue within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership can make a real difference on the shape of events in the region. What can be done to improve the track record of Euro-Mediterranean relations [4]?

First, one must keep pushing economic reforms. Economic adjustment is not a one-time affair. Difficult adjustments and arbitrages still remain to be decided in many countries and in many sectors. This is not an easy proposition, as economic adjustment displaces vested interests and economic and political power. But the world keeps changing, and those countries that do not adapt to change will not be able to compete in the twenty-first century.

Second, one must find a way to improve the ‘economic governance’ in the Euro-Mediterranean region. It was only in 2005 that the economic and finance ministers of the region met collectively for the first time, in Morocco. It took nine years to have such an essential meeting. Now the creation of a ‘Euro-Med Bank’ is being debated. The issue, perhaps, is not so much the bank in itself as it is the collective economic governance body that it would offer. Many issues in the region need collective thinking, and many sectors, including infrastructure, social housing and private sector development, would benefit. Two countries in the region—namely Algeria and Libya—also have massive resources that can be reinvested on a much larger scale throughout the Maghrib than they have been to date.

Third, political reform must remain a priority on the agenda. Governments in the region have to tackle the immense challenge of a now vastly educated population with few political freedoms. This population does not believe anymore in the black-and-white choice of ‘us or chaos’ that their governments have long offered them. Islamic extremism is no longer an excuse. Terrorism needs to be fought at the same time that governance is improved, not at the expense of good governance. Political reform in the region is a strategic goal for the EU because its absence opens the door to many forms of instability. Political reform must not lose its ranking in the priority list of EU countries in the region.

Fourth, finding a role for civil society will remain important in the Mediterranean countries. The countries of the southern shores of the Mediterranean need to find a proper role for unions, people of culture and citizens at large. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and the Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures play a decisive role when it comes to raising awareness, but these institutions must be supplemented by people-to-people grass-roots involvement.

Fifth, illegal migration will remain a major security issue for quite some time to come. This migration originates mostly from sub-Saharan Africa and Egypt. Recently, the assessment of the issue has evolved. It is now considered a common issue, not Europe against its Mediterranean partners, and an issue where we collectively have to fight criminal networks of major importance. Therefore, there is a need for dialogue at the political level between the EU and the south of the Mediterranean, and between them and sub-Saharan Africa. Although the economies of more than 30 African states registered growth at a rate of 4% or more in the 2006–7 period, many of the sub-Saharan African states are not succeeding in creating sustainable economic growth strategies ([6], p. 61).

What is necessary but largely lacking in the Mediterranean when it comes to addressing security challenges is a more creative approach to diplomacy. Institutional mandates seeking to resolve ongoing conflicts such as those in Cyprus or the Israeli–Palestinian conflict must be more proactive and flexible in their approach if they are to stand a chance of improving the situation on the ground. The 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ provides the EU with an excellent opportunity to reassess its policy towards its southern neighbours. The EU must unveil a new strategic framework that seeks to consolidate transition towards democracy, respect for basic freedoms, the rule of law and a market economy.

The EU has been engaged with its southern neighbours for more than 30 years, focusing attention on trade and cooperation without daring to tackle the core issues of political governance. It has opened its market for manufactured products, which has helped boost exports, but has failed to create a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, largely because of the regimes’ unwillingness to engage with each other and the EU. The most impressive success story has been Turkey, and not Egypt or Morocco.

In order to support the winds of change in the Mediterranean, the EU should focus on those countries that are fully determined to undertake essential political and economic reforms, but without intervening in their affairs. When it comes to specific practical policy recommendations, several measures can be introduced in the short term.

First, the EU should enter into a quasi-permanent dialogue with and make available the necessary funding to those countries that are motivated to implement reforms. Effectiveness should be the name of the game. That is only possible in a bilateral framework that allows tailor-made solutions.

Second, the region must also address the dire need for a qualified labour force, especially in the fields of basic and vocational education and teacher training. Education should be a priority for future cooperation. To be effective, the EU should engage in a multi-year programme for primary, vocational and teacher training that includes teaching methods and curricula. The task is gigantic. The EU should not hesitate to invest one-third of the total funding available until 2013, say some €2 billion, and call upon the World Bank to participate. The region will also need substantially more technically and scientifically trained young people. Under its Erasmus Mundi Programme, the EU should offer up to 4,000 scholarships to students from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia in the forthcoming years.

Third, to give a boost to agricultural employment, the EU should conclude the ongoing negotiations for agricultural free trade and temporarily exempt restrictions (duties and quotas) for agricultural products imported from Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.

Fourth, from the perspective of 2050, we can expect North Africa to become Europe's major supplier of solar energy. The EU should immediately offer support to those countries interested in engaging in future solar-energy cooperation. The three Maghrib countries of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are the most likely candidates for such links.

Fifth, for socio-economic reasons the EU will not be able to open its floodgates to millions of Arabs from the southern shores of the Mediterranean. It must make this point clear. But the EU should show itself more flexible when it comes to granting visas for business people, researchers and scientists.

Political and economic reform on such a large scale will require an extremely significant amount of resources and coordination. In the short term, a multi-billion Euro-Mediterranean Development Fund that is open to all donors should be set up. Such a fund would provide assistance to those championing serious democratic reform in areas that have regularly been highlighted in the United Nations Arab Human Development Reports, including the building of law-based institutions, the improvement of education and the empowerment of women [5].

Just as this historic episode may be a harbinger of much-needed social reform and peaceful change, it could also usher in a period of continuous instability that would thwart the actual political support and economic investment that the region desperately requires to improve its outlook. At this critical juncture in Mediterranean relations, the EU together with others should launch a Mediterranean policy initiative that supports and seeks to sustain over the long term the wave of political reform across the Mediterranean. Such a policy must be formulated after listening carefully and understanding clearly the aspirations of the people in different countries that have risked everything to have a better future [3].

Geographic proximity and geopolitical interests dictate that the EU must revise its approach towards the Mediterranean and put forward a more practical diplomatic agenda that demonstrates its serious commitment to a more open and free Mediterranean area. The mission statement outlined in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995 that focuses on the political and security dimensions of relations as well as the economic, financial, socio-cultural and human aspects is a framework upon which future comprehensive relations can be mapped out.

Having championed the concept of partnership for the past 15 years, the EU should now demonstrate its credibility when it comes to championing political reform, democratic institutions, economic development and the respect for universal human rights. If a future EU Mediterranean policy review is to be successful it must balance realpolitik interests with the principles and values that we all cherish. Otherwise we will not be judged as being on the correct side of history.

Malta's active participation in Euro-Mediterranean initiatives since becoming independent positions it favourably to progressively further the overriding objectives of increasing stability and promoting prosperity in the Mediterranean. Enhancing pan-Mediterranean cooperation is a fundamental necessity if intra-regional intergovernmental and transnational opportunities are to be nurtured and strengthened. At this critical stage in Euro-Mediterranean relations, it is essential to identify a set of practical confidence-building measures that would create the necessary conducive environment within which a secure, stable and prosperous Mediterranean region can be established.

A sea change is taking place across the Mediterranean. It is essential that the geopolitical paradigm shift does not result in a new Cold War between the Arab world and the West. There are no political gimmicks or quick fixes for turning North African states into democracies that fully respect the rule of law and have functioning market economies. It will be a challenge for the next few decades. Europe has a vital interest in a smooth transition. It will need to invest all the political, economic and human capital possible to ensure this venture is a successful one.