Abstract
The dramatic popular uprisings sweeping across North Africa and the Middle East require that Europe reassess and reformulate its policies towards its neighbours to the south. European policy towards the region must, now more than ever, strive to promote the very values of democracy and freedom upon which the European project itself has been based, while also taking into account the unique social and cultural nuances at play in the region and in each country individually. Moreover, European policy must involve a strong merit-based component tied directly to concrete and measurable progress. Finally, EU leaders need to consider Europe's neighbourhood policy from a holistic standpoint. Addressing the important events in the southern neighbourhood should not come at the expense of the EU's commitment to its eastern neighbours who have made substantial progress towards free and democratic systems.
Tahrir Square, Cairo: February 2011. Following the extensive media coverage of the Egyptian popular movement, I could not help but recall my memories of the Hungarian uprising in October 1956. There are rare moments in one's life when the pulse of history can be experienced in an overwhelmingly palpable way, when individuals, united by their common condition humaine and driven by their utmost desire to live in dignity and decency, feel and act in complete consciousness that they are making history. These are real moments of grace and passion—moments of truth worth living for.
Some weeks later, in early March, after meeting members of the new Egyptian government and representatives of the opposition, I had the inspiring experience of taking a walk in Tahrir Square, always frantic, but this time bursting with the frenzy of vehicles of all types trying to make headway in the everyday scramble of Cairo. Tahrir Square was back to its routine traffic jams but, faithful to its name ‘liberation’, was now a symbol of standing up for political emancipation not only in Egypt itself, but also well beyond.
North Africa and the Middle East have come to a crossroads in their modern history, by far the most important one since the 1950s. The temptation to draw parallels between what we are currently witnessing in the Arab world and the ‘spring of nations’ sweeping over Europe in 1848 is hard to resist. The fall of the Berlin Wall is also often evoked in reference to the public desire for democracy in the region. However, it is imperative that we refrain from far-fetched and thus often misleading comparisons, notwithstanding that there is a grain of truth in them. This promising, though for some possibly inconvenient truth puts neighbouring Europe in a position where considerations of realpolitik need to be matched with the moral high ground the EU covets in international relations.
The southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy
The popular demonstrations breaking out in a row of countries in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as their possibly far-reaching effects, have changed the general context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). These extraordinary events have shaken, though not yet upset the status quo in the Arab world. The demonstration of deep social discontent has brought into question the viability of a widely accepted (though often without much thought) Western approach which assumes the geopolitical vulnerability of the region and puts the need to maintain stability above all other considerations, including progress towards the rule of basic democratic values.
In light of the latest developments, both the philosophy and the modus operandi of the policy pursued by the EU in its southern neighbourhood need thorough rethinking, which could affect the overall balance of the ENP and, therefore, the emphasis on furthering the eastern dimension of ENP, the Eastern Partnership.
Europe's perception of its role in the southern Mediterranean is shaped by five factors.
The method and pace of the much-hoped-for democratic transition in any country in the region should not be, and obviously could not be, immune to local cultural and social traditions, and it would be a mistake to seek (or to impose) solutions moulded mechanically on European or ‘Western’ patterns.
The lingering unease that nurtures discontent stems both from the lack of appropriate forms of legal political expression and from the dire existential plight of a majority of people in the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Consequently, strengthening the institutions of democratic political representation cannot be separated from truly inclusive economic development able to offer hope for broad social strata.
Social fermentation calling for political transformation will probably result in a variety of different outcomes which may exacerbate tensions both within individual countries and in the region as a whole for quite some time to come. We should neither underestimate the forces of resistance to change nor the possible side effects abrupt changes might cause. The complex situation now emerging may bring about growing political and security risks for the EU just across the Mediterranean. We have to expect, among other consequences, the pressure of increased migration.
The EU is by far not the only actor in the wider region. The transformation of North Africa and the Middle East, including meaningful progress towards a truly acceptable and lasting solution to the Palestinian problem, needs broadly based international cooperation, with the active participation of all constructive regional players, including reform-minded Arab countries leading the way towards democratic transition.
We have to build upon the effective and concerted efforts of the US, the EU, the Gulf states, which have a direct stake in consolidating the overall situation, Turkey, which is a much coveted possible model for modernisation in the Muslim world, emerging powers interested in regional stability and international financial institutions.
The nature, quality and efficacy of the European reaction to the developments in North Africa and the Middle East will have a strong and lasting impact on the international credibility of the EU both in political and moral terms. If the EU really intends to prove itself as a strategic actor to be reckoned with on the global scene, it has to demonstrate determination and leadership in coping with the unfolding trends in its immediate neighbourhood. Europe is expected to do much more than merely defend itself against the unsettling consequences of the ‘turmoil’ in the south. The EU should forthrightly further in its southern neighbourhood the very values upon which the European construction itself is based.
Both political necessity and moral obligation require the EU to live up to its responsibility vis-à-vis the southern neighbourhood. The EU is clearly aware of the complexity of the task it is facing, but this awareness has to be matched by persistent action and intelligent policies. The dramatic events in Libya have tested the will of the international community to make hard choices and to take courageous actions. In the face of the obvious necessity to rethink the nature of the relationship the EU maintains with its southern neighbourhood, the nuances in the positions of the Member States reflect their peculiar interests and thus the specificity of their approaches vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean. Without oversimplifying very complex issues, one can venture the assumption that those Member States in close geographical proximity to the southern shores of the Mediterranean are understandably more anxious about the possible political and security risks the unfolding situation might entail and are eager to promote a generous transfer of EU funds towards the south. Member States that are a ‘reassuring’ distance from the scene of the current developments place more emphasis on boosting economic ties between the two shores of the Mediterranean by assuring wider market access and promoting direct investment. Following this reasoning, the policy of the EU towards its southern neighbourhood should stress the principle of conditionality and merit-based differentiation tied to concrete progress in the political and economic reforms to be carried out in each country.
The Joint Communication issued by the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) on 3 March 2011 under the title ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’ sets well-balanced priorities by focusing on democratic transformation and support for civil society as well as on sustainable and inclusive economic development. Enhanced mobility and cultural diversity are key elements of people-to-people contact. The Communication, endorsed by the declaration of the Extraordinary European Council held on 11 March, specifies that the vocation of the Union for the Mediterranean is to promote both democracy and stability in the region, underlining the desirability of urgent progress on the Middle East peace process. Ideas, initiatives, programmes and instruments have been further specified by the Communication of the European Commission summarising the review of the ENP.
There is growing consensus in the EU that current developments in the south give enhanced emphasis and the utmost urgency to the ENP review, placing its conclusions and proposed fields of action in a considerably altered environment. However, this approximate consensus is somewhat shaky as to the possible impact the otherwise justified focus on the southern Mediterranean might have on the general context of the ENP, and more precisely on the delicate balance between the southern and the eastern dimensions of the ENP.
A view from Hungary
History is being made in the southern Mediterranean, and Hungary is aware of the influence these developments might have on the security and the stability of the EU itself. We do acknowledge the unavoidable responsibility of the EU to foster trends towards economic prosperity, social modernisation and political democratisation. At the same time, we have to meet the dual challenge of assisting in democratic transition and maintaining stability in the south without diminishing our commitment to the east.
Let me be clear: neither the historic developments in the south nor the understandable anxiety about what the unfolding events might entail for Europe should overshadow the ENP's eastern dimension. Allowing these new events to eclipse the Eastern Partnership would undermine the credibility and the prestige of the EU in the eyes of those Eastern European countries which have been encouraged to take the path of approximation towards the EU through consistent political and economic reforms. Some of these partners have managed to achieve considerable results by showing sustained engagement, and they definitely need further encouragement. The target territory of the Eastern Partnership has a relevance of its own, second to none in the direct vicinity of the EU. The geopolitical importance of the ‘common neighbourhood’ lying between the enlarged Union and a re-emerging Russia as well as the Southern Caucasus, which possesses alternative sources of energy supply for the European market, constitutes a strategic value which must be duly appreciated and fully reflected in the policies of the EU. A lessening of interest in and attention to the eastern neighbourhood might entail risks for the EU both over the longer term and possibly already in the short term.
Hungary has, because of its geographic location and recent history, a deeply felt empathy for the neighbourhood of the EU to the east. Nevertheless, we remain firmly committed to maintaining the equilibrium of the ENP. We propose analysing trends in the Mediterranean and working out a corresponding European strategy not only within the narrow context of the ENP's southern dimension, but also elevating our common thinking to the more complex level of the ENP in all its dimensions.
It is imperative to break with past practices and to overcome the temptation to fragment the ENP, since competing policy priorities, embodied and spearheaded by different Member States and pointing in opposite geographical directions, could neutralise each other. Neither the eastern nor the southern dimension of the ENP and, consequently, neither the Eastern Partnership nor the Union for the Mediterranean can be strengthened to the detriment of the other.
Conclusion
The very timely ENP review is definitely more than a mere ‘technical’ exercise; it has already gained true strategic depth. Paying tribute to the initiative taken by the Commission and the EEAS, we believe that the meaningful contributions of the Member States are bound to give indispensable political weight and strategic orientation to this process. Thus, the long-awaited Communication of the Commission on the ENP review should not be considered as the final word. Its recommendations need to be thoroughly debated on the level of the foreign ministers of the Member States. The final political conclusions have to be made by the European Council, duly anchored in the course of the preparation of the financial framework for the years 2014–2020.
In Hungary we believe that the ENP is a policy of the EU as a whole and that its overall framework must be preserved. Commitment to the coherence of the ENP and to the principle tenets of our relations with Europe's complex neighbourhood does not exclude differentiation inside the ENP. On the contrary: instead of ready-made programmes and solutions the EU should come up with approaches tailored to the needs and conditions of each region and, in fact, of each country, provided the guiding principles upon which this policy is based remain firm. Differentiation does not mean diverging policies. Lessons drawn from the current events in the south prove that the principles and methods used in the two geographic areas of the ENP should converge. The much-coveted principle of differentiation has to be based on each country's performance instead of predetermined quotas and inflexible ratios apportioning EU funds as a result of intense lobbying among European institutions and the Member States. A neighbourhood strategy based on values—building democratic institutions, strengthening civil society, benchmarks to measure progress in the implementation of political and economic reforms according to a ‘more for more’ approach to support partner countries, southern and eastern alike—should become the operative principle of ENP. In this respect, the valuable ‘EaP acquis’ accumulated during the past several years since launching the Eastern Partnership, could be of use in the southern neighbourhood as well. A coherent view of ENP should be underpinned by the recognition that paramount issues like energy security, environmental protection, combating climate change etc., cannot be tackled in geographic isolation; thus, we have to seek practical ways to tie together the different dimensions of the ENP.
We are obviously conscious of the fact that neighbourhood policy and enlargement constitute two different policies of the European Union. Yet we should make sure that events in the south do not divert attention and energy from the process of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. Trends in the southern neighbourhood might inevitably boost the regional weight and influence of Turkey, having possible consequences for the trajectory of EU–Turkish integration. A profound reassessment of the strategic context of the ENP confirms our conviction rooted in Treaty provisions that, depending on the drive for reform of our European neighbours and the subsequent progress in the intensity and the quality of their relations with the EU, historically the process of EU enlargement to the east is open-ended.