Abstract
Among concerned parties from Washington to Brussels, from political leaders to government officials, an intense debate is being waged on how to handle the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). A strategy of engaging the MB has recently been gaining momentum, and official meetings have taken place in both Europe and the US. The issue is not limited to foreign relations but has domestic implications as well, especially for Europe. Indeed, the MB has a strong presence in Europe, and its influence on Europe's Muslims must not be underestimated.
In order to arrive at an informed opinion on the MB, this paper looks at its history, its ideology and its vision of the West, and at three branches of the MB in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region: Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. Out of this research a more sophisticated picture arises, and the author is quick to note that perceptions in the West may be misleading. Historical, ideological and geographical factors interplay to influence the outlook of the MB. The author gives particular attention to aspects of the MB's ideology that have to do with terrorism and perceptions of the West.
Apart from Hamas’ success in the 2006 Palestinian elections, the MB has not garnered the electoral wins everybody, including the organisation itself, expected. In light of developments in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, it would appear that, by sending a contradictory message, the MB is losing some of its electorate. Being in the opposition provides many advantages, but people aspire to vote for a party with a realistic and feasible programme, not just slogans. This is a possible explanation for the MB's loss of popularity. All the same, the Islamists are little by little gaining ground, controlling cities and penetrating the core of some Arab societies. In most countries the MB is not really in a rush to seize power: it believes that time is on its side.
Decision-makers in the West have frequently followed a strategy of engaging non-violent Islamists such as the MB. Their rationale is that empowering Islamists of this kind will weaken the jihadists. But in the end both groups have the same goal, even if their tactics differ. The author's advice to EU actors is that, when engaging the MB, they should know who their interlocutors are, where they are coming from ideologically and what they really think of the West. One should not take everything at face value.
