Abstract
The increasing number of agreements between the EU and African states reveals a trend toward a ‘One Europe, One Africa’ policy. The EU has gained from the Lisbon Treaty new competencies for independent external action, and coordination on Africa policy has increased in the Council, mainly due to convergence between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. However, EU policy towards Africa still lacks coherence and direction and many EU Member States still privilege bilateral links with African countries. There is still an opportunity for the EU to increase its ‘actorness’ in Africa. First, the EU should take advantage of the economic crisis to create new institutional links between the EU and Africa. Second, the EU should focus on its visibility and act to strengthen private and civil society ties. Despite weaknesses, there are clear indications that the coherence of the EU's Africa policy is improving.
The relationship between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa has a long history that goes back to colonialism and far pre-dates the institutionalised framework for cooperation that the two regions have established over the past four decades. However the relationship has gone through significant changes since the turn of the century. First, the Cotonou Agreement, adopted in June 2000 and revised in 2005, brought about a major transformation in the longstanding relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries. Second, the 2005 EU-Africa Strategy and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy, which followed the first EU-Africa Summit in Cairo in 2000, marked the EU's intention to pursue a ‘common’ approach towards Africa under the slogan ‘one Europe, one Africa’.
The Cotonou Agreement, the EU-Africa summits and the Joint Strategy mark a significant widening of the scope of the EU-Africa agenda. During the Cold War, interregional relations were limited to trade and aid. Today the EU's Africa policy is implemented by three institutional bodies with different decision-making rules—development aid, trade and foreign policy (the Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy - CFSP/ESDP)—and covers a wide range of different agendas that range from development to climate change, from investment to migration and from fishing to peace and security. This widening of the agenda is important for both Europe and Africa. Although much has been written on the Chinese ‘invasion’ of Africa, Europe continues to be by far Africa's most important trading partner and donor, and Africa has become central to the EU's overall external affairs. The main question that should be answered is whether all these changes are part of a coherent strategy. Do Europeans have a clear sense of their interests and objectives in Africa?
In many respects, the EU's Africa policy is more coherent than ever before. Aiming at establishing a more effective foreign policy, the EU has improved coordination among its different policies (especially between the CFSP/ESDP and development aid) and has made them more consistent with each other. Compared to the past, the EU's African policy today is far less inconsistent than it used to be. This is, of course, partly a result of institutional reforms and reflects the European Commission's growing ability to set the agenda and influence policies. By framing the discussion and emphasising the links between development and security, the Commission has been able to exploit the gaps in the EU pillar structure and affirm its competence on security issues [13]. The lack of clear decision-making procedures for cross-pillar issues has helped the Commission to present policy problems as subject to first-pillar procedures. This has been done by framing the discussion, interpreting problems and defining their causes and implications [13]. By framing development and security issues as closely interlinked, the Commission ‘has the opportunity to extend its sphere of action, entering the competence area of the Council’ [13]. The Commission has claimed that the establishment of the CFSP and the ESDP made it absolutely necessary to implement the EU's different policy instruments in a coordinated, coherent and consistent way. The Commission's EU Strategy for Africa has tried to offer a basic framework for coordination by emphasising the close connection between conflict prevention and development. According to the document, ‘Without peace, there can be no lasting development’ (CEC [5], 10), and ‘peace and security are therefore the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development’ (26). The conclusion is extremely clear: the EU has to ‘set up a more comprehensive… approach complementing these Community instruments through CFSP/ESDP approaches. A common EU policy is therefore needed’ (71). Gradually the Commission has replaced the Council in managing funds for peacekeeping-related activities. The Treaty of Lisbon marks a significant step to even better coordination. It will help tackle the remaining problems related to policy incoherence by extending qualified majority voting to fields with external implications, such as external border control, asylum and migration [13, 231].
However, despite the increasing ability of the Commission to exploit the gaps in the EU pillar structure, the Council remains a powerful actor in determining the EU's Africa policy. Policy coherence has been strengthened not only because of the increasing role of the Commission but also—and probably more importantly—because of the conflation of views and interests of the three big powers: France, Germany and the United Kingdom [11, 434].
The agreement of these powers is probably the major precondition for a strong, coherent and consistent EU Africa policy. Very few of the other Member States rank developments in Africa as highly as these three do in their foreign policy agendas. This situation has led to totally different priority being given to Africa by the six-month rotating presidencies [9, 411]. The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of a European Council president, a beefed-up ‘high representative’ who will chair meetings of EU Foreign Ministers and a new foreign service (External Action Service) may prevent further competition and friction losses between the Council and the Commission. These developments may also increase the coherence of the EU's Africa policy, especially since the programming units of both the Commission Directorate General for Development (DG DEV) and the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO) will be transferred to that service.
However, much remains to be done. From a reading of all the strategy papers and the agreements it seems that a clear sense of European interests and objectives in Africa is still lacking and that a clear strategy for how relations between the two regions should look in the future is still missing. Despite all the grand words, to a large extent the EU's Africa policy continues in several respects to be incoherent and contradictory. EU agricultural subsidies continue to distort bilateral trade and seriously undermine efforts to combat poverty in Africa (a main objective of the EU's Africa strategy). The opening of African markets (through the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements) may lead to increasing unemployment in the continent, worsen social tensions and lead to violent conflict [2, 795]. And the high financial burden for supporting the EU naval force off the Somali coast could be used far more efficiently in rebuilding this shattered country. Indeed, the lack of coherence in the EU's African policies is an extremely complex problem. It is not a unique problem, however; to a large extent it replicates similar problems evident in all contemporary nation states. And it is not only an institutional problem.
A few ideas
The reform of the EU's institutional architecture is not the only way to increase policy coherence and give the EU's Africa policy a clear direction. The EU can undertake a number of initiatives that can strengthen the interregional relationship and help the EU develop a truly common approach towards Africa.
The global economic crisis is a new opportunity for EU-Africa relations. The crisis is forcing the great powers to re-examine the global institutional architecture. The impetus to reform international institutions partly reflects the realisation on the part of governments, rich and poor, that several important challenges—like climate change, the forces of globalisation, the scramble for resources, state failure, mass terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and so on—often need global solutions, not national or regional ones [8]. At the same time, new economic powers such as China and India are demanding more say. Both of these factors present an opportunity for some leading African countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa, to renew their demands for a reform of key international institutions like the UN Security Council and the International Monetary Fund, and for the inclusion of more voices from the South. But this is also an opportunity for the EU's Africa policy. The EU should help Africa—both some of the continent's powerful states and its more successful transnational institutions—to increase its presence in leading international bodies. If such a policy were introduced it would give real meaning to the EU-Africa ‘strategic partnership’ and would open a variety of new avenues for mutually beneficial cooperation. Above all, it would greatly help to bridge the trust gap between the two sides, especially from the point of view of the relationship's weaker partner—Africa.
After decades of ambitious declarations on ‘common policies’ and ‘joint actions’, there is still a need for the ‘Europeanisation’ of the EU's Africa policy, and especially of the EU's development policy. In many respects, the bilateral assistance policies of the EU's Member States towards Africa continue to be far more important than the policies of the Brussels institutions. In 2004, the European Commission (EC) and the EU's Member States provided $14,062 million, or about 55% of all aid to sub-Saharan Africa. This is an impressive percentage of all donor efforts. Both of these statistics are widely circulated. However, a closer look shows that the EC provided only a fifth of this amount, or only 11% of all donor assistance [6], 21). The World Bank (through International Development Association, its vehicle for soft loans) provided about 15%, the United States 14% and France (an EU Member State), through its bilateral programme, 12% [6], 21). By 2006, the EC was the fourth most generous donor to sub-Saharan Africa—behind the US, the United Kingdom and France [7]. The EU's Africa aid policy is far less ‘Europeanised’ than most people realise. There is an urgent need to get all Member States and the Commission to work with common objectives, country strategies and a unified delivery mechanism. Moreover, it would also be wise ‘to advise the new EU members against establishing more bilateral development bureaucracies and to recommend instead a more European and multilateral cooperation’ [10], 138–139). Probably the problem is not different interests or diverse views among Member States but lack of political will. If this political will existed, then the ‘Europeanisation’ of the EU's development policy could be a great success story, a model for the EU's foreign relations.
The EU's peacekeeping missions in Africa form an important success story that should be continued. In particular there should be a more consistent effort to develop a ‘security triangle’ of close cooperation among the European Union, the United Nations and the African Union [12]. Such a security triangle could become a global model of transmultilateral cooperation between international and regional organisations. It could simultaneously solve three challenges: the African Union's lack of resources, the UN's peacekeeping overstretch and the EU's search for more influence and visibility in world affairs. Indeed this triangle is already apparent in all EU military missions on the continent. What is needed is a more cohesive and integrated approach that includes permanent consultation mechanisms; common strategies, principles and norms; and the assignment of roles according to specific challenges and existing capabilities [12, 41].
The European Union should not try to limit the growing Chinese influence in Africa. The Member States should lower their high expectations that they can, through a ‘triangular dialogue’, alter Beijing's stance towards authoritarian regimes [14]. China's policy of non-interference in African affairs will most probably change by itself as the Chinese presence on the continent increases and the cost of its support for repressive regimes becomes more apparent [9], 418–419). The real question is not whether China will move from a position of a rising power to one of an established and responsible power, but how long it will take to move from one stance to the other. If Chinese policy towards Sudan is an indication, then the answer to the question is, very soon [9, 419]. The EU should not see China as a competitor but as a partner. It would probably even be fruitful for Europeans (both at the bilateral and the multilateral level) to copy Chinese methods, offering African partners packages of infrastructure financed by aid and resource extraction. This strategy is extremely simple and effective, since ‘revenues are very speedily converted into domestic public investment without the need of a great deal of honesty or competence in public administrations’ [4, 207].
The EU should focus on its visibility and on strengthening private and civil society ties with the continent. The EU dedicates significant resources to promoting economic growth and development, representative government, health and human rights in Africa, but this commitment goes largely unappreciated, in part because of its low profile. A 2003 public opinion survey found that only 42% of Africans interviewed had ever heard of the European Union, far fewer than had heard of the United Nations (52%) or the World Bank (50%). More importantly, informed Africans thought that the EU performed rather well, but not as well as the United Nations and the World Bank (6.2 out of 10 for the EU, compared to 6.79 and 6.78 for the UN and the World Bank, respectively) [1,2]. This situation hurts the relationship, impedes the negotiations of the new Economic Partnership Agreements and undermines African support for the EU. Lengthy trips by the new President of the Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as by the Commissioners of External Relations, Trade and Development and Humanitarian Aid to discuss shared interests would also help.
Moreover, the EU should make more systematic efforts to mobilise European capital to invest in Africa. At the moment there is very little detailed information on investment opportunities on the continent. As Collier [4, 208] argues, this lack of data exists simply because the cost of collecting it is unusually high: ‘each country is a distinct opportunity and needs to be understood as such, yet most African economies are so tiny that the cost of acquiring the information is high relative to the opportunity’. As a result, ‘few African countries have internationally rated public debt, so portfolio investments automatically fall below “investment grade” quality’. Thus it is absolutely necessary that the European Commission finance a number of studies on investment information in Africa, cooperate closely with Euro-African chambers of commerce and organise Euro-African forums and support meetings that bring businesspeople from both continents together.
Towards a new EU-Africa partnership
For decades, Europeans have had difficulty in seeing African countries as ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary.’ They have tended to relegate the continent to ‘the classic categories of barbarism or to the newspeak of “development,” “the elimination of poverty” or “humanitarian aid”’[3, 458]. This view has made ‘politics impossible’ [3, 458]. From this point of view, the EU's new Africa policy has succeeded in initiating a process of ‘normalisation’ of the interregional relationship. The end of non-reciprocity in trade relations and the new Economic Partnership Agreements, the growing cooperation between the Commission and Africa's continental, regional and sub-regional institutions, the support for Africa's peacekeeping missions and the shared views on the promotion of democracy and human rights clearly show that for the first time the EU does not regard Africa as inferior or different, and now considers the relationship to be ‘normal’ and ‘ordinary’.
Indeed, a sense of direction is still lacking. But there are indications that policy coherence is improving, and the new institutional architecture is offering great opportunities for the development of a truly ‘common’ EU-Africa policy. The Europe 2020 strategy states that “we will need to invest further in the future in developing [the] close partnership [with Africa]. This will take place in the broader ongoing efforts to increase development aid, improve the efficiency of our aid programmes notably through the efficient division of labour with Member States and by better reflecting development aims in other policies of the European Union”. Moreover, there are clear indications that the European Union is moving from a policy for Africa to a policy with Africa. If this approach is sustained, then the current, vastly asymmetrical relationship will resemble more and more a real, and not just a rhetorical, partnership.